This page aims to document the security related aspects of the FIDO2
implementation on Solo.  This is to make it easier for public review and
comments.

# Key generation

Solo aims to achieve 256 bit (32 byte) security with its FIDO2 implementation,
even in light of physical side channels.

When Solo is first programmed, it will be "uninitialized," meaning it won't
have any secret material, until the first time it boots, then it will leverage
the TRNG to generate all necessary material.  This only happens once.

A master secret, `M`, is generated at initialization.  This is only used for
all key generation and derivation in FIDO2.  Solo uses a key wrapping method
for FIDO2 operation.

## Key wrapping

When you register a service with a FIDO2 or U2F authenticator, the
authenticator must generate a new keypair unique to that service.  This keypair
could be stored on the authenticator to be used in subsequent authentications,
but now a certain amount of memory needs to be allocated for this.  On embedded
devices, there isn't much memory to spare and users will allows frustratingly
hit the limit of this memory.

The answer to this problem is to do key wrapping.  The authenticator just
stores `M` and uses `M` and the TRNG to generate new keys and derive previous
keys on the fly.  A random number, `R`, is generated, and is placed in the
FIDO2/U2F `KEYID` parameter.  The service stores `KEYID` after registering a
key and will issue it back to the authenticator for subsequent authentications.

In essence, the following happens at registration.

1. Generate `R`, calculate private key, `K`, using `HMAC(M,R)`
2. Derive public key, `P`, from `K`
3. Return `P` and `R` to service.  (`R` is in `KEYID` parameter)
4. Service stores `P` and `R`.

Now on authenication.

1. Service issues authentication request with `R` in `KEYID` parameter.
2. \* Authenticator generates `K` by calculating `HMAC(M,R)`.
3. Proceed normally as if `K` was loaded from storage memory.


<!-- As part of FIDO2/U2F, there is a `KEYID` parameter that is bascially a
binary blob that the authenticator returns to the service after registering,
and the service must store it and provide it to the authenticator on subsquent
authentications.

64 bytes of secrets will be generated to make master secret parts `M1` and
`M2`, 32 bytes each.  The master secrets are only used for generating signing
keys which are then used for FIDO2/U2F.  -->

## Key derivation

Master secret `M` consists of 64 bytes, split into equal parts `M1` and `M2`.
In theory, we should only need 32 bytes to achieve 256 security, but we also
plan to have side channel security hence the added bytes.

Our HMAC currently is a two step process.  First, just generate a normal
`SHA256-HMAC`.

1. `tmp = SHA256_HMAC(M1, R)`

We could proceed using `tmp` as our secret key, `K`.  But our `SHA256-HMAC`
implementation isn't side channel resistant and we won't bother trying to add
side channel resistance.  So we add an additional stage that is side channel
resistant.

2. `K = aes256_masked(M2, tmp)`

We add a masked AES encryption to provide side channel resistance.  Masked AES
is well studied and relatively easy to implement.  An adversary may be able to
recover `M1` via SCA but not `M2`.



<sup>* There are other details I leave out.  There's also an authentication tag
in the `KEYID` parameter to ensure this is a key generated by the Solo
key.</sup>
