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move files, not yet implemented masked aes

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Conor Patrick
2019-01-23 19:53:58 -05:00
parent 15c3383249
commit a75d272f4a
4 changed files with 7 additions and 29 deletions
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4
docs/solo/fido2-impl.md
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@@ -15,13 +15,15 @@ A master secret, `M`, is generated at initialization. This is only used for
all key generation and derivation in FIDO2. Solo uses a key wrapping method
for FIDO2 operation.
** NOTE: The masked implementation of AES is planned, but not yet implemented. Currently it is normal AES. **
## Key wrapping
When you register a service with a FIDO2 or U2F authenticator, the
authenticator must generate a new keypair unique to that service. This keypair
could be stored on the authenticator to be used in subsequent authentications,
but now a certain amount of memory needs to be allocated for this. On embedded
devices, there isn't much memory to spare and users will always frustratingly
devices, there isn't much memory to spare and users will allows frustratingly
hit the limit of this memory.
The answer to this problem is to do key wrapping. The authenticator just

4
docs/solo/signed-updates.md
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@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ In order to boot the application, a valid signature must be provided to the boot
signature using a public key stored in the bootloader section, and the data in the application section. If the signature
is valid, the boot flag in the data section will be changed to allow boot.
Signature checks and checks to the data section boot flag are made redundantly to make glitching attacks more difficult. Random delays
between redundant checks are also made.
We are working to make the signature checking process redundantly to make glitching attacks more difficult. Also random delays
between redundant checks.