Compare commits

...

90 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
2aa02d44b2 dont return index >= ctap_rk_size()
Fixes issue found by @My1: https://github.com/solokeys/solo/issues/407
2020-03-28 13:23:40 -04:00
cbf40f4ec7 hmac-secret should be different when UV=1 2020-03-28 12:28:05 -04:00
8d93f88631 Update STABLE_VERSION 2020-03-27 11:29:11 -04:00
5f8a9a44fc refactor credmgmt 2020-03-27 10:56:51 -04:00
8aa1f4ad01 change parsing TAG_CM to TAG_PARSE 2020-03-27 10:56:51 -04:00
04cffb6509 allow depth-first-search and account for interleaved RK's 2020-03-27 10:56:51 -04:00
f002d08071 Add support for the security manager in Google Chrome
This patch fixes the following issues to make Google Chrome happy:
1. Adds CTAP_CBOR_CRED_MGMT(0x0A) which is an alias to CTAP_CBOR_CRED_MGMT_PRE(0x41)
2. Returns success instead of NO_CREDENTIALS when there are no RKs
3. Skip the "icon" property if it's empty

Tested with Google Chrome Version 80.0.3987.149
2020-03-27 00:22:28 -04:00
e53b83257d Do not return NO_CREDENTIALS if there are no RKs and meta is requested
Fixes-issue: #403
2020-03-27 00:22:28 -04:00
05e149fb17 Update STABLE_VERSION 2020-03-25 15:16:14 -04:00
530e175ad1 cleanup 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
6cd3873b37 add reboot command for better testing 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
241f58657b consider credProtect with exclude list, and also check user presence 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
3b42289cce add rpId to RK's, fix counting of unique RP's 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
b3712b57fc refactor to reuse more code 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
37769bb735 to support deleted credentials, need to scan all rk slots since it's no longer continuous 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
d677f8c346 add rk delete implementations 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
98bcf647c4 implement rk delete command for cred mgmt 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
682a443f4e refactor credMgmt to parse as subCommandParams, and get ready for delete command 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
a28a05673f definitely need to update rpIdHash 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
3a70ee0ec6 refactor authData and extension handling to work for getNextAssertion 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
872a320abc Fix credential order: need to start with most recent 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
3cbf7ec451 move credProtect checking to credential filtering step 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
748c552eea fix overflow error for 5th resident key 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
98f996fcfe save some ram 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
97eb6bba8a bug fix 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
fdc5a68fcd update info/feature detection details 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
1c1005a0e8 add credprotect parameter to output 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
4831410111 add credProtect extension 2020-03-25 14:57:39 -04:00
05bc8bee55 Check return values when parsing CTAP commands 2020-03-21 12:49:05 -04:00
7112633779 Fix user presence test when pinAuth is empty
The check_retr macro is evaluating its argument twice, so when we do:

    check_retr( ctap2_user_presence_test(...) )

the user presence function is called twice and the user has to press the
button twice. This is regression introduced with commit 3b53537.
2020-03-21 12:48:05 -04:00
79b43a90fd Implement commands for management of resident keys
Implement command 0x41 which is used by OpenSSH for reading RKs. It has
the following subcommands:
 * CMD_CRED_METADATA - get number of saved/remaining RKs
 * CMD_RP_BEGIN/CMD_RP_NEXT - iterate over the saved RPs
 * CMD_RK_BEGIN/CMD_RK_NEXT - iterate over the RKs for a given RP

Fixes issue #374 and issue #314
2020-03-21 11:59:22 -04:00
ec7a6fd740 Update STABLE_VERSION 2020-03-16 15:04:45 -04:00
f2d6698066 Update version.c 2020-03-16 14:59:01 -04:00
3c9315e34c Update README.md
Basic steps how to apply updates
2020-03-09 12:06:39 -04:00
8ed7157bfe bump 3.1.2 2020-02-27 15:50:46 -05:00
28a1b1cc06 limit possible recursions in tinycbor 2020-02-27 15:40:27 -05:00
5738bcc7a3 more strict checks in cbor parsing 2020-02-27 15:40:27 -05:00
4fb166631d remove SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL default 2020-02-18 11:18:08 -05:00
1b862d3b0c fix error return 2020-02-18 11:18:08 -05:00
094420b32b overwrite if >256 is more clear 2020-02-18 11:18:08 -05:00
349cbc39f2 fix offset 2020-02-18 11:18:08 -05:00
e294cb3458 replace counter instead of increment for large increment 2020-02-18 11:18:08 -05:00
da31f984dd add version check 2020-02-18 11:18:08 -05:00
9d3e8c06fc subsequent button presses do not need to wait long 2020-02-18 11:18:08 -05:00
b378bbf61d Update building.md 2020-02-18 10:53:47 -05:00
04b89a9739 Update customization.md 2020-02-18 10:38:53 -05:00
0d28a7bcf6 Update customization.md 2020-02-18 10:03:19 -05:00
aeafd09007 only use .flag section for hw builds 2020-02-17 13:41:05 -05:00
8b6148ac90 bump 3.1.1 2020-02-13 17:32:26 -05:00
15a4fdfa66 remove unused code in bootloader 2020-02-13 17:17:23 -05:00
e713daba26 add temporary command to force flash locking 2020-02-13 17:17:23 -05:00
b78f2cd2e7 keep initialize last_addr and reject if it doesnt change 2020-02-13 17:17:23 -05:00
601c98000a Correct path for gencert tools and use python3 2020-02-12 14:52:53 -05:00
ab1c9417b1 Fix certification information 2020-02-12 14:52:53 -05:00
f6d96013e1 bump 3.1.0 2020-02-06 13:41:07 -05:00
f74dba7ff0 enforce ascending writes in bootloader update 2020-02-06 13:05:57 -05:00
794accf3dc Added how to setup Manjaro 18.x.
Added Manjaro setup for passwordless and second factor login to
documentation of applcation ideas. Also did some text formating.
2020-02-06 12:47:36 -05:00
2ca0ced808 Update programming.md 2020-01-22 12:41:39 -05:00
17b430fd44 Remove stale python-fido2 dependency 2020-01-16 10:35:22 +01:00
0d4197fb2c Merge pull request #356 from jnaulty/jnaulty/no-root-artifacts
Use current user at build container runtime
2020-01-15 21:17:53 +01:00
f74a77d80b Use current user at build container runtime
Using the current user id and group removes the need to use `sudo` when
cleaning up build artifacts from the docker build stage.

Issue: #355
2020-01-06 01:55:47 -08:00
5f1d61a3ba bump 2019-12-01 18:25:45 -05:00
46f2920e63 bugfix hid cancel 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
53427c4279 update metadata statements 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
ac10933379 pin fido2 dependency 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
8a44d14fef adjust default impl 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
1d59bbfdd4 support different aaguid's in cert for different solo models 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
54c66d80b6 overwrite x509 fields for tap or somu 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
6217fc34b9 update solo_cert to include aaguid field 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
af23e84a8d Update device.c 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
9650d99b34 add more clarity 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
145b04750e Update Makefile 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
078acbc4b4 prepend solo to version 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
670a4e5d62 version string 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
de55e521cc fix bootloader build 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
bbfe51499f document 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
6cb15a6482 small fixes 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
85ddc40036 add weak definitions for nonvolatila functions 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
1d63154699 move sense of "backup" from ctap to device layer 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
ee55bf3ba0 document device.h 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
3b4b6dd4fe remove solo functions from device.h 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
28e607ddac fix stm32 build 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
dcd256faf4 add initial weak definitions 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
85365c635d refactor to use libsolo 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
a388607dab build fido2 locally as lib 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
d266e7927c reorganize crypto and device.c to be more based on fido2/ 2019-11-22 19:02:52 -05:00
0ac074e8a8 Merge pull request #341 from emosenkis/patch-1
Fix typo in CERN OHL version 2.1 -> 1.2
2019-11-11 10:47:02 +01:00
67eb721da2 Fix typo in CERN OHL version 2.1 -> 1.2 2019-11-10 23:04:48 +02:00
6b5d353501 docs: update .all-contributorsrc 2019-11-07 08:29:08 -05:00
bacce7d978 docs: update README.md 2019-11-07 08:29:08 -05:00
48 changed files with 2218 additions and 1179 deletions

View File

@ -207,6 +207,17 @@
"infra",
"test"
]
},
{
"login": "Nitrokey",
"name": "Nitrokey",
"avatar_url": "https://avatars1.githubusercontent.com/u/9438831?v=4",
"profile": "https://www.nitrokey.com",
"contributions": [
"code",
"test",
"ideas"
]
}
],
"contributorsPerLine": 7,

View File

@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
include fido2/version.mk
#define uECC_arch_other 0
#define uECC_x86 1
#define uECC_x86_64 2
@ -6,44 +8,34 @@
#define uECC_arm_thumb2 5
#define uECC_arm64 6
#define uECC_avr 7
ecc_platform=2
src = $(wildcard pc/*.c) $(wildcard fido2/*.c) $(wildcard fido2/extensions/*.c) \
$(wildcard crypto/sha256/*.c) crypto/tiny-AES-c/aes.c
src = pc/device.c pc/main.c
obj = $(src:.c=.o) crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.o
obj = $(src:.c=.o)
LIBCBOR = tinycbor/lib/libtinycbor.a
LIBSOLO = fido2/libsolo.a
ifeq ($(shell uname -s),Darwin)
export LDFLAGS = -Wl,-dead_strip
else
export LDFLAGS = -Wl,--gc-sections
endif
LDFLAGS += $(LIBCBOR)
LDFLAGS += $(LIBSOLO) $(LIBCBOR)
VERSION_FULL:=$(shell git describe)
VERSION:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION_FULL)".split("-")[0])')
VERSION_MAJ:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[0])')
VERSION_MIN:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[1])')
VERSION_PAT:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[2])')
VERSION_FLAGS= -DSOLO_VERSION_MAJ=$(VERSION_MAJ) -DSOLO_VERSION_MIN=$(VERSION_MIN) \
-DSOLO_VERSION_PATCH=$(VERSION_PAT) -DSOLO_VERSION=\"$(VERSION_FULL)\"
CFLAGS = -O2 -fdata-sections -ffunction-sections -g
ECC_CFLAGS = -O2 -fdata-sections -ffunction-sections -DuECC_PLATFORM=$(ecc_platform)
CFLAGS = -O2 -fdata-sections -ffunction-sections $(VERSION_FLAGS) -g
INCLUDES = -I./tinycbor/src -I./crypto/sha256 -I./crypto/micro-ecc/ -Icrypto/tiny-AES-c/ -I./fido2/ -I./pc -I./fido2/extensions
INCLUDES += -I./crypto/cifra/src
INCLUDES = -I../ -I./fido2/ -I./pc -I../pc -I./tinycbor/src
CFLAGS += $(INCLUDES)
# for crypto/tiny-AES-c
CFLAGS += -DAES256=1 -DAPP_CONFIG=\"app.h\" -DSOLO_EXPERIMENTAL=1
CFLAGS += -DAES256=1 -DSOLO_EXPERIMENTAL=1 -DDEBUG_LEVEL=1
name = main
.PHONY: all $(LIBCBOR) black blackcheck cppcheck wink fido2-test clean full-clean travis test clean version
.PHONY: all $(LIBCBOR) $(LIBSOLO) black blackcheck cppcheck wink fido2-test clean full-clean travis test clean version
all: main
tinycbor/Makefile crypto/tiny-AES-c/aes.c:
@ -53,7 +45,10 @@ tinycbor/Makefile crypto/tiny-AES-c/aes.c:
cbor: $(LIBCBOR)
$(LIBCBOR):
cd tinycbor/ && $(MAKE) clean && $(MAKE) LDFLAGS='' -j8
cd tinycbor/ && $(MAKE) LDFLAGS='' -j8
$(LIBSOLO):
cd fido2/ && $(MAKE) CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" ECC_CFLAGS="$(ECC_CFLAGS)" APP_CONFIG=app.h -j8
version:
@git describe
@ -62,16 +57,13 @@ test: venv
$(MAKE) clean
$(MAKE) -C . main
$(MAKE) clean
$(MAKE) -C ./targets/stm32l432 test PREFIX=$(PREFIX) "VENV=$(VENV)" VERSION_FULL=${VERSION_FULL}
$(MAKE) -C ./targets/stm32l432 test PREFIX=$(PREFIX) "VENV=$(VENV)" VERSION_FULL=${SOLO_VERSION_FULL}
$(MAKE) clean
$(MAKE) cppcheck
$(name): $(obj) $(LIBCBOR)
$(name): $(obj) $(LIBCBOR) $(LIBSOLO)
$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(obj) $(LDFLAGS)
crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.o: ./crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.c
$(CC) -c -o $@ $^ -O2 -fdata-sections -ffunction-sections -DuECC_PLATFORM=$(ecc_platform) -I./crypto/micro-ecc/
venv:
python3 -m venv venv
venv/bin/pip -q install --upgrade pip
@ -98,20 +90,21 @@ DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE := "solokeys/solo-firmware-toolchain"
docker-build-toolchain:
docker build -t $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) .
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}.${VERSION_MIN}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION_MAJ}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION_MAJ}.${SOLO_VERSION_MIN}
uncached-docker-build-toolchain:
docker build --no-cache -t $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) .
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}.${VERSION_MIN}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION_MAJ}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION_MAJ}.${SOLO_VERSION_MIN}
docker-build-all:
docker run --rm -v "$(CURDIR)/builds:/builds" \
-v "$(CURDIR):/solo" \
$(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) "solo/in-docker-build.sh" ${VERSION_FULL}
-u $(shell id -u ${USER}):$(shell id -g ${USER}) \
$(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) "solo/in-docker-build.sh" ${SOLO_VERSION_FULL}
CPPCHECK_FLAGS=--quiet --error-exitcode=2
@ -128,6 +121,7 @@ clean:
(cd `dirname $$f` ; git checkout -- .) ;\
fi ;\
done
cd fido2 && $(MAKE) clean
full-clean: clean
rm -rf venv

View File

@ -61,9 +61,11 @@ git checkout ${VERSION_TO_BUILD}
git submodule update --init --recursive
```
## Installing the toolchain
## Installing the toolchain and applying updates
In order to compile ARM code, you need the ARM compiler and other things like bundling bootloader and firmware require the `solo-python` python package. Check our [documentation](https://docs.solokeys.io/solo/) for details
In order to compile ARM code, you need the ARM compiler and other things like bundling bootloader and firmware require the [solo-python](https://github.com/solokeys/solo-python) python package. Check our [documentation](https://docs.solokeys.io/solo/) for details.
You can update your solokey after running `pip3 install solo-python` with `solo key update` for the latest version. To apply a custom image use `solo program bootloader <file>(.json|.hex)`.
## Installing the toolkit and compiling in Docker
Alternatively, you can use Docker to create a container with the toolchain.
@ -168,6 +170,9 @@ Thanks goes to these wonderful people ([emoji key](https://allcontributors.org/d
<td align="center"><a href="https://github.com/jolo1581"><img src="https://avatars1.githubusercontent.com/u/53423977?v=4" width="100px;" alt="Jan A."/><br /><sub><b>Jan A.</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=jolo1581" title="Code">💻</a> <a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=jolo1581" title="Documentation">📖</a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://github.com/ccinelli"><img src="https://avatars0.githubusercontent.com/u/38021940?v=4" width="100px;" alt="ccinelli"/><br /><sub><b>ccinelli</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#infra-ccinelli" title="Infrastructure (Hosting, Build-Tools, etc)">🚇</a> <a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=ccinelli" title="Tests">⚠️</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://www.nitrokey.com"><img src="https://avatars1.githubusercontent.com/u/9438831?v=4" width="100px;" alt="Nitrokey"/><br /><sub><b>Nitrokey</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=Nitrokey" title="Code">💻</a> <a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=Nitrokey" title="Tests">⚠️</a> <a href="#ideas-Nitrokey" title="Ideas, Planning, & Feedback">🤔</a></td>
</tr>
</table>
<!-- ALL-CONTRIBUTORS-LIST:END -->
@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ You may use Solo software under the terms of either the Apache 2.0 license or MI
Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.
All hardware, unless otherwise noted, is dual licensed under CERN and CC-BY-SA.
You may use Solo hardware under the terms of either the CERN 2.1 license or CC-BY-SA 4.0 license.
You may use Solo hardware under the terms of either the CERN 1.2 license or CC-BY-SA 4.0 license.
All documentation, unless otherwise noted, is licensed under CC-BY-SA.
You may use Solo documentation under the terms of the CC-BY-SA 4.0 license
@ -200,7 +205,7 @@ You can buy Solo, Solo Tap, and Solo for Hackers at [solokeys.com](https://solok
<br/>
[![License](https://img.shields.io/github/license/solokeys/solo.svg)](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/blob/master/LICENSE)
[![All Contributors](https://img.shields.io/badge/all_contributors-21-orange.svg?style=flat-square)](#contributors)
[![All Contributors](https://img.shields.io/badge/all_contributors-22-orange.svg?style=flat-square)](#contributors)
[![Build Status](https://travis-ci.com/solokeys/solo.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.com/solokeys/solo)
[![Discourse Users](https://img.shields.io/discourse/https/discourse.solokeys.com/users.svg)](https://discourse.solokeys.com)
[![Keybase Chat](https://img.shields.io/badge/chat-on%20keybase-brightgreen.svg)](https://keybase.io/team/solokeys.public)

View File

@ -1 +1 @@
3.0.0
4.0.0

View File

@ -1,16 +1,23 @@
# Using Solo for passwordless or second factor login on Linux
## Setup on Ubuntu 18.04
## Setup on Ubuntu and Manjaro
Before you can use Solo for passwordless or second factor login in your Linux system you have to install some packages.
This was tested under **Linux Mint 19.2**.
This was tested on **Linux Mint 19.3** and on **Manjaro 18.x**
First you have to install PAM modules for u2f.
**Ubuntu (Linux Mint):**
```
sudo apt install libpam-u2f pamu2fcfg
```
**Manjaro**
```
pacman -Syu pam-u2f
```
## Setting up key
To use Solo as passwordless or second factor login, you have to setup your system with your Solo.
First create a new folder named **Yubico** in your **.config** folder in your **home** directory
@ -28,35 +35,57 @@ If you want to register an additional key use this command instead:
pamu2fcfg >> ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys
```
Now press the button on your Solo.
<br>
<br>
If you can't generate your key (error message), you may add Yubico Team from PPA and install latest libpam-u2f and pamu2fcfg and try again.
If you can't generate your key on **Ubuntu** (error message), you may add Yubico Team from PPA and install latest libpam-u2f and pamu2fcfg and try again.
```
sudo add-apt-repository ppa:yubico/stable
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get upgrade
```
**Manjaro** should work without problems.
## Login into Linux
### Passwordless
To login passwordless into your Linux system, you have to edit the file **lightdm** (or **gdm** or which display manager you prefered).
In case of lightdm:
In case of lightdm and VIM as editor:
```
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
```
Now search following entry:
**On Ubuntu:**<br>
Search following entry:
```
@include common-auth
@include common-auth
```
and add
```
auth sufficient pam_u2f.so
auth sufficient pam_u2f.so
```
**before** @include common-auth.
**before** *@include common-auth.*
<br>
<br>
Save the file and test it.<br>
**On Manjaro**<br>
Search following enrty
```
auth include system-login
```
and add
```
auth sufficient pam_u2f.so
```
** before** *auth include system-login*.
<br>
<br>
Now save the file and test it.<br>
Insert Solo in your USB port and logout.
Now you should be able to login into Linux without password, only with pressing your button on Solo and press enter.
@ -65,7 +94,7 @@ Why **sufficient**? The difference between the keyword sufficient and required i
The login mechanism can be also used for additional features like:
: - Login after screen timeout - edit /etc/pam.d/mate-screensaver (or kde-screensaver, ...)
- Login after screen timeout - edit /etc/pam.d/mate-screensaver (or kde-screensaver, ...)
- Passwordless sudo - edit /etc/pam.d/sudo
Check out your folder **/etc/pam.d/** and do some experiments.
@ -78,17 +107,36 @@ The login passwordless won't make your system more secure, but maybe more comfor
To use Solo as second factor, for login into your Linux system, is nearly the same.
```
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
```
Now search following entry:
**On Ubuntu**<br>
Search following entry:
```
@include common-auth
@include common-auth
```
and add
```
auth required pam_u2f.so
auth required pam_u2f.so
```
**after** @include common-auth.
**after** *@include common-auth*.
<br>
<br>
**On Manjaro**<br>
Search following entry:
```
auth include system-login
```
Add following entry
```
auth required pam_u2f.so
```
**after** *auth include system-login*.
<br>
<br>
Save the file and test it. <br>
In case your Solo is not present, your password will be incrorrect. If Solo is plugged into your USB port, it will signal pressing the button and you will be able to login into Linux.

View File

@ -104,9 +104,24 @@ solo mergehex bootloader.hex solo.hex bundle.hex
`bundle.hex` is our complete firmware build. Note it is in this step that you can
include a custom attestation certificate or lock the device from debugging/DFU.
By default the "hacker" attestation certifcate and key is used.
By default the "hacker" attestation certifcate and key is used. Use the `--lock` flag
to make this permanent.
```
solo mergehex \
--attestation-key "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF" \
--attestation-cert attestation.der \
solo.hex \
bootloader.hex \
bundle.hex
```
**Warning**: If you use `--lock`, this will permanently lock the device to this new bootloader. You
won't be able to program the bootloader again or be able to connect a hardware debugger.
The new bootloader may be able to accept (signed) updates still, depending on how you configured it.
```
# Permanent!
solo mergehex \
--attestation-key "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF" \
--attestation-cert attestation.der \
@ -118,9 +133,5 @@ solo mergehex \
See [here for more information on custom attestation](/solo/customization/).
If you use `--lock`, this will permanently lock the device to this new bootloader. You
won't be able to program the bootloader again or be able to connect a hardware debugger.
The new bootloader may be able to accept (signed) updates still, depending on how you configured it.
To learn more about normal updates or a "full" update, you should [read more on Solo's boot stages](/solo/bootloader-mode).

View File

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ email=example@example.com
openssl ecparam -genkey -name "$curve" -out root_key.pem -rand seed.bin
# generate a "signing request"
openssl req -new -key root_key.pem -out root_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=example.com/emailAddress=$email"
openssl req -new -key root_key.pem -out root_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=$CN/emailAddress=$email"
# self sign the request
openssl x509 -trustout -req -days 18250 -in root_key.pem.csr -signkey root_key.pem -out root_cert.pem -sha256
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Note you must use a prime256v1 curve for this step, and you must leave the unit/
country=US
state=Maine
organization=OpenSourceSecurity
unit="Authenticator Attestation"
unit="Authenticator Attestation" # MUST KEEP THIS AS "Authenticator Attestation" for FIDO2.
CN=example.com
email=example@example.com
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ email=example@example.com
openssl ecparam -genkey -name "$curve" -out device_key.pem -rand seed.bin
# generate a "signing request"
openssl req -new -key device_key.pem -out device_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=example.com/emailAddress=$email"
openssl req -new -key device_key.pem -out device_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=$CN/emailAddress=$email"
# sign the request
openssl x509 -req -days 18250 -in device_key.pem.csr -extfile v3.ext -CA root_cert.pem -CAkey root_key.pem -set_serial 01 -out device_cert.pem -sha256
@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ First, [Build your solo application and bootloader](/solo/building).
Print your attestation key in a hex string format. Using our utility script:
```
python tools/print_x_y.py device_key.pem
python3 tools/gencert/print_x_y.py device_key.pem
```
Merge the `bootloader.hex`, `solo.hex`, attestion key, and certificate into one firmware file.
@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ solo mergehex \
bundle.hex
```
**Warning**: Using the `--lock` flag prevents the DFU from being accessed on the device again. It's recommended to try first without the `--lock` flag to make sure it works.
Now you have a newly created `bundle.hex` file with a custom attestation key and cert. You can [program this `bundle.hex` file
with Solo in DFU mode](/solo/programming#procedure).

60
docs/solo/porting.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
# Usage and Porting
Solo is designed to be used as a library or ported to other platforms easily. Here is an example
`main()` function.
```c
int main()
{
uint8_t hidmsg[64];
uint32_t t1 = 0;
device_init();
memset(hidmsg,0,sizeof(hidmsg));
while(1)
{
if (usbhid_recv(hidmsg) > 0)
{
ctaphid_handle_packet(hidmsg); // pass into libsolo!
memset(hidmsg, 0, sizeof(hidmsg));
}
ctaphid_check_timeouts();
}
}
```
`ctaphid_handle_packet(hidmsg);` is the entrance into the HID layer of libsolo, and will buffer packets and pass them
into FIDO2 or U2F layers.
Everything in the library is cross-platform, but it needs some functions implemented that are usually
platform specific. For example, how should libsolo implement an atomic counter? Where should it save state?
For all of these platform specific functions, the library contains it's own `weak` definition, so the library will compile and run.
LibSolo by default will not try to use an atomic
counter or save data persistently -- that needs to be implemented externally.
If you are using libsolo on another platform,
you should take a look at these possibly platform specific functions. They are listed in `fido2/device.h`.
If you'd like to reimplement any of the functions, then simply implement the function and compile normally.
GCC will replace libsolo's `weak` defined functions (everything in `fido2/device.h`) with your functions. By doing this, you
are replacing the function that is used by libsolo.
To get the library to compile
and run, you only need to implement one function for libsolo: `usbhid_send(uint8_t * send)`, which
is called by the library to send a 64 byte packet over a USB HID endpoint. In essence, you are giving
libsolo a function to write to USB.
The rest of the definitions in `fido2/device.h` are not required to compile and run so you can
immediately hit the ground running and iterative add what else you need. You'll definitely want
to continue implementing other functions in `fido2/device.h`. For example, no data will be stored
persistently until you define how it can be done!
For examples, check out the build for STM32L4 and PC (check out `pc/device` and `targets/stm32l432/src/device.c`).
If there's something that doesn't work for you -- send a pull request! It's better if we can
work together off of the same repo and not fork.

View File

@ -36,9 +36,13 @@ So it's important to not mess this up or you may brick your device.
You can use a firmware build from the [latest release](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/releases) or use
a build that you made yourself.
You need to use a firmware file that has the combined bootloader and application (or at the very least just the bootloader).
This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `bundle.hex` from your build. If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader,
it will be bricked.
You need to use a firmware file that has the combined bootloader, application, and attestation key pair (bootloader + firmware + key).
This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `bundle.hex` from your build.
#### *Warning*
* **If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader, it will be bricked**.
* **If you program bootloader and firmware with no attestation, you will run into FIDO registration issues**
We provide two types of bundled builds. The `bundle-hacker-*.hex` build is the hacker build. If you update with this,
you will update the bootloader and application, but nothing will be secured. The `bundle-secure-non-solokeys.hex`

44
fido2/Makefile Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
include version.mk
ifndef APP_CONFIG
APP_CONFIG=example_app.h
endif
INC = -I./ -I./extensions
INC += -I../tinycbor/src
INC += -I../crypto/sha256 -I../crypto/micro-ecc -I../crypto/tiny-AES-c
INC += -I../crypto/cifra/src -I../crypto/cifra/src/ext
INT_CFLAGS = -DAPP_CONFIG=\"$(APP_CONFIG)\"
INT_CFLAGS += $(INC)
INT_CFLAGS += $(SOLO_VERSION_FLAGS)
SRC = apdu.c util.c u2f.c test_power.c
SRC += stubs.c log.c ctaphid.c ctap.c
SRC += ctap_parse.c crypto.c
SRC += device.c
SRC += version.c
SRC += data_migration.c
SRC += extensions/extensions.c extensions/solo.c
SRC += extensions/wallet.c
# Crypto libs
SRC += ../crypto/sha256/sha256.c ../crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.c ../crypto/tiny-AES-c/aes.c
SRC += ../crypto/cifra/src/sha512.c ../crypto/cifra/src/blockwise.c
OBJ = $(SRC:.c=.o)
all: libsolo.a
libsolo.a: $(OBJ)
$(AR) cqs $@ $^
%.o: %.c
$(CC) $^ $(INT_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@
../crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.o: ../crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.c
$(CC) $^ $(INT_CFLAGS) $(ECC_CFLAGS) -c -o $@
clean:
rm -f $(OBJ) libsolo.a

View File

@ -5,29 +5,33 @@
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
/*
* Wrapper for crypto implementation on device
* Wrapper for crypto implementation on device.
*
* Can be replaced with different crypto implementation by
* defining EXTERNAL_SOLO_CRYPTO
*
* */
#ifndef EXTERNAL_SOLO_CRYPTO
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#ifdef USE_SOFTWARE_IMPLEMENTATION
#include "sha256.h"
#include "uECC.h"
#include "aes.h"
#include "ctap.h"
#include "device.h"
#include "log.h"
// stuff for SHA512
#include "sha2.h"
#include "blockwise.h"
#include APP_CONFIG
#include "log.h"
#ifdef USING_PC
typedef enum
{
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0,
@ -44,53 +48,56 @@ typedef enum
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, /*!< 224-bits "Koblitz" curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, /*!< 256-bits "Koblitz" curve */
} mbedtls_ecp_group_id;
#endif
const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der;
const uint16_t attestation_cert_der_size;
const uint8_t attestation_key[];
const uint16_t attestation_key_size;
static SHA256_CTX sha256_ctx;
static cf_sha512_context sha512_ctx;
static const struct uECC_Curve_t * _es256_curve = NULL;
static const uint8_t * _signing_key = NULL;
static int _key_len = 0;
// Secrets for testing only
static uint8_t master_secret[64];
static uint8_t transport_secret[32];
void crypto_sha256_init()
void crypto_sha256_init(void)
{
sha256_init(&sha256_ctx);
}
void crypto_reset_master_secret()
void crypto_sha512_init(void)
{
ctap_generate_rng(master_secret, 64);
ctap_generate_rng(transport_secret, 32);
cf_sha512_init(&sha512_ctx);
}
void crypto_load_master_secret(uint8_t * key)
{
#if KEY_SPACE_BYTES < 96
#error "need more key bytes"
#endif
#if KEY_SPACE_BYTES < 96
#error "need more key bytes"
#endif
memmove(master_secret, key, 64);
memmove(transport_secret, key+64, 32);
}
void crypto_reset_master_secret(void)
{
memset(master_secret, 0, 64);
memset(transport_secret, 0, 32);
ctap_generate_rng(master_secret, 64);
ctap_generate_rng(transport_secret, 32);
}
void crypto_sha256_update(uint8_t * data, size_t len)
{
sha256_update(&sha256_ctx, data, len);
}
void crypto_sha512_update(const uint8_t * data, size_t len) {
cf_sha512_update(&sha512_ctx, data, len);
}
void crypto_sha256_update_secret()
{
sha256_update(&sha256_ctx, master_secret, 32);
@ -101,16 +108,22 @@ void crypto_sha256_final(uint8_t * hash)
sha256_final(&sha256_ctx, hash);
}
void crypto_sha512_final(uint8_t * hash)
{
// NB: there is also cf_sha512_digest
cf_sha512_digest_final(&sha512_ctx, hash);
}
void crypto_sha256_hmac_init(uint8_t * key, uint32_t klen, uint8_t * hmac)
{
uint8_t buf[64];
int i;
unsigned int i;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (key == CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY)
{
key = master_secret;
klen = sizeof(master_secret);
klen = sizeof(master_secret)/2;
}
else if (key == CRYPTO_TRANSPORT_KEY)
{
@ -120,7 +133,7 @@ void crypto_sha256_hmac_init(uint8_t * key, uint32_t klen, uint8_t * hmac)
if(klen > 64)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, key size must be <= 64\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, key size must be <= 64\n");
exit(1);
}
@ -138,19 +151,24 @@ void crypto_sha256_hmac_init(uint8_t * key, uint32_t klen, uint8_t * hmac)
void crypto_sha256_hmac_final(uint8_t * key, uint32_t klen, uint8_t * hmac)
{
uint8_t buf[64];
int i;
unsigned int i;
crypto_sha256_final(hmac);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (key == CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY)
{
key = master_secret;
klen = sizeof(master_secret);
klen = sizeof(master_secret)/2;
}
else if (key == CRYPTO_TRANSPORT_KEY2)
{
key = transport_secret;
klen = 32;
}
if(klen > 64)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, key size must be <= 64\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, key size must be <= 64\n");
exit(1);
}
memmove(buf, key, klen);
@ -167,16 +185,16 @@ void crypto_sha256_hmac_final(uint8_t * key, uint32_t klen, uint8_t * hmac)
}
void crypto_ecc256_init()
void crypto_ecc256_init(void)
{
uECC_set_rng((uECC_RNG_Function)ctap_generate_rng);
_es256_curve = uECC_secp256r1();
}
void crypto_ecc256_load_attestation_key()
void crypto_ecc256_load_attestation_key(void)
{
_signing_key = attestation_key;
_signing_key = device_get_attestation_key();
_key_len = 32;
}
@ -184,7 +202,7 @@ void crypto_ecc256_sign(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * sig)
{
if ( uECC_sign(_signing_key, data, len, sig, _es256_curve) == 0)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"error, uECC failed\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, uECC failed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
@ -221,19 +239,19 @@ void crypto_ecdsa_sign(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * sig, int MBEDTLS_ECP_I
if (_key_len != 32) goto fail;
break;
default:
printf2(TAG_ERR,"error, invalid ECDSA alg specifier\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, invalid ECDSA alg specifier\n");
exit(1);
}
if ( uECC_sign(_signing_key, data, len, sig, curve) == 0)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"error, uECC failed\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, uECC failed\n");
exit(1);
}
return;
fail:
printf2(TAG_ERR,"error, invalid key length\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, invalid key length\n");
exit(1);
}
@ -243,8 +261,11 @@ void generate_private_key(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * data2, int len2, ui
crypto_sha256_hmac_init(CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY, 0, privkey);
crypto_sha256_update(data, len);
crypto_sha256_update(data2, len2);
crypto_sha256_update(master_secret, 32);
crypto_sha256_update(master_secret, 32); // TODO AES
crypto_sha256_hmac_final(CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY, 0, privkey);
crypto_aes256_init(master_secret + 32, NULL);
crypto_aes256_encrypt(privkey, 32);
}
@ -261,12 +282,12 @@ void crypto_ecc256_derive_public_key(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * x, uint8
memmove(x,pubkey,32);
memmove(y,pubkey+32,32);
}
void crypto_ecc256_compute_public_key(uint8_t * privkey, uint8_t * pubkey)
{
uECC_compute_public_key(privkey, pubkey, _es256_curve);
}
void crypto_load_external_key(uint8_t * key, int len)
{
_signing_key = key;
@ -278,7 +299,7 @@ void crypto_ecc256_make_key_pair(uint8_t * pubkey, uint8_t * privkey)
{
if (uECC_make_key(pubkey, privkey, _es256_curve) != 1)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, uECC_make_key failed\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, uECC_make_key failed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
@ -287,7 +308,7 @@ void crypto_ecc256_shared_secret(const uint8_t * pubkey, const uint8_t * privkey
{
if (uECC_shared_secret(pubkey, privkey, shared_secret, _es256_curve) != 1)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, uECC_shared_secret failed\n");
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, uECC_shared_secret failed\n");
exit(1);
}
@ -338,44 +359,4 @@ void crypto_aes256_encrypt(uint8_t * buf, int length)
}
const uint8_t _attestation_cert_der[] =
"\x30\x82\x01\xfb\x30\x82\x01\xa1\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x00\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
"\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x30\x2c\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13"
"\x02\x55\x53\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x02\x4d\x44\x31\x10\x30\x0e"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x07\x54\x45\x53\x54\x20\x43\x41\x30\x20\x17\x0d\x31\x38"
"\x30\x35\x31\x30\x30\x33\x30\x36\x32\x30\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30\x36\x38\x30\x34\x32"
"\x37\x30\x33\x30\x36\x32\x30\x5a\x30\x7c\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13"
"\x02\x55\x53\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x02\x4d\x44\x31\x0f\x30\x0d"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x07\x0c\x06\x4c\x61\x75\x72\x65\x6c\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55"
"\x04\x0a\x0c\x0c\x54\x45\x53\x54\x20\x43\x4f\x4d\x50\x41\x4e\x59\x31\x22\x30\x20"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x19\x41\x75\x74\x68\x65\x6e\x74\x69\x63\x61\x74\x6f\x72"
"\x20\x41\x74\x74\x65\x73\x74\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x31\x14\x30\x12\x06\x03\x55\x04"
"\x03\x0c\x0b\x63\x6f\x6e\x6f\x72\x70\x70\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x30\x59\x30\x13\x06\x07"
"\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07\x03\x42\x00"
"\x04\x45\xa9\x02\xc1\x2e\x9c\x0a\x33\xfa\x3e\x84\x50\x4a\xb8\x02\xdc\x4d\xb9\xaf"
"\x15\xb1\xb6\x3a\xea\x8d\x3f\x03\x03\x55\x65\x7d\x70\x3f\xb4\x02\xa4\x97\xf4\x83"
"\xb8\xa6\xf9\x3c\xd0\x18\xad\x92\x0c\xb7\x8a\x5a\x3e\x14\x48\x92\xef\x08\xf8\xca"
"\xea\xfb\x32\xab\x20\xa3\x62\x30\x60\x30\x46\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x3f\x30\x3d"
"\xa1\x30\xa4\x2e\x30\x2c\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31"
"\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x02\x4d\x44\x31\x10\x30\x0e\x06\x03\x55\x04"
"\x0a\x0c\x07\x54\x45\x53\x54\x20\x43\x41\x82\x09\x00\xf7\xc9\xec\x89\xf2\x63\x94"
"\xd9\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x13\x04\x02\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04"
"\x04\x03\x02\x04\xf0\x30\x0a\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x03\x48\x00"
"\x30\x45\x02\x20\x18\x38\xb0\x45\x03\x69\xaa\xa7\xb7\x38\x62\x01\xaf\x24\x97\x5e"
"\x7e\x74\x64\x1b\xa3\x7b\xf7\xe6\xd3\xaf\x79\x28\xdb\xdc\xa5\x88\x02\x21\x00\xcd"
"\x06\xf1\xe3\xab\x16\x21\x8e\xd8\xc0\x14\xaf\x09\x4f\x5b\x73\xef\x5e\x9e\x4b\xe7"
"\x35\xeb\xdd\x9b\x6d\x8f\x7d\xf3\xc4\x3a\xd7";
const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der = (const uint8_t *)_attestation_cert_der;
uint16_t attestation_cert_der_get_size(){
return sizeof(_attestation_cert_der)-1;
}
const uint8_t attestation_key[] = "\xcd\x67\xaa\x31\x0d\x09\x1e\xd1\x6e\x7e\x98\x92\xaa\x07\x0e\x19\x94\xfc\xd7\x14\xae\x7c\x40\x8f\xb9\x46\xb7\x2e\x5f\xe7\x5d\x30";
const uint16_t attestation_key_size = sizeof(attestation_key)-1;
#else
#error "No crypto implementation defined"
#endif

View File

@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#define USE_SOFTWARE_IMPLEMENTATION
void crypto_sha256_init();
void crypto_sha256_update(uint8_t * data, size_t len);
void crypto_sha256_update_secret();
@ -23,7 +21,6 @@ void crypto_sha512_init();
void crypto_sha512_update(const uint8_t * data, size_t len);
void crypto_sha512_final(uint8_t * hash);
void crypto_ecc256_init();
void crypto_ecc256_derive_public_key(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * x, uint8_t * y);
void crypto_ecc256_compute_public_key(uint8_t * privkey, uint8_t * pubkey);
@ -54,7 +51,4 @@ void crypto_reset_master_secret();
void crypto_load_master_secret(uint8_t * key);
extern const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der;
uint16_t attestation_cert_der_get_size();
#endif

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -16,12 +16,11 @@
#define CTAP_CLIENT_PIN 0x06
#define CTAP_RESET 0x07
#define GET_NEXT_ASSERTION 0x08
#define CTAP_CBOR_CRED_MGMT 0x0A
#define CTAP_VENDOR_FIRST 0x40
#define CTAP_CBOR_CRED_MGMT_PRE 0x41
#define CTAP_VENDOR_LAST 0xBF
// AAGUID For Solo
#define CTAP_AAGUID ((uint8_t*)"\x88\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79")
#define MC_clientDataHash 0x01
#define MC_rp 0x02
#define MC_user 0x03
@ -40,6 +39,19 @@
#define GA_pinAuth 0x06
#define GA_pinProtocol 0x07
#define CM_cmd 0x01
#define CM_cmdMetadata 0x01
#define CM_cmdRPBegin 0x02
#define CM_cmdRPNext 0x03
#define CM_cmdRKBegin 0x04
#define CM_cmdRKNext 0x05
#define CM_cmdRKDelete 0x06
#define CM_subCommandParams 0x02
#define CM_subCommandRpId 0x01
#define CM_subCommandCred 0x02
#define CM_pinProtocol 0x03
#define CM_pinAuth 0x04
#define CP_pinProtocol 0x01
#define CP_subCommand 0x02
#define CP_cmdGetRetries 0x01
@ -61,6 +73,11 @@
#define EXT_HMAC_SECRET_REQUESTED 0x01
#define EXT_HMAC_SECRET_PARSED 0x02
#define EXT_CRED_PROTECT_INVALID 0x00
#define EXT_CRED_PROTECT_OPTIONAL 0x01
#define EXT_CRED_PROTECT_OPTIONAL_WITH_CREDID 0x02
#define EXT_CRED_PROTECT_REQUIRED 0x03
#define RESP_versions 0x1
#define RESP_extensions 0x2
#define RESP_aaguid 0x3
@ -144,16 +161,29 @@ typedef struct
typedef struct {
uint8_t tag[CREDENTIAL_TAG_SIZE];
uint8_t nonce[CREDENTIAL_NONCE_SIZE];
union {
uint8_t nonce[CREDENTIAL_NONCE_SIZE];
struct {
uint8_t _pad[CREDENTIAL_NONCE_SIZE - 4];
uint32_t value;
}__attribute__((packed)) metadata;
}__attribute__((packed)) entropy;
uint8_t rpIdHash[32];
uint32_t count;
}__attribute__((packed)) CredentialId;
struct Credential {
struct __attribute__((packed)) Credential {
CredentialId id;
CTAP_userEntity user;
};
typedef struct Credential CTAP_residentKey;
typedef struct {
CredentialId id;
CTAP_userEntity user;
// Maximum amount of "extra" space in resident key.
uint8_t rpId[48];
uint8_t rpIdSize;
} __attribute__((packed)) CTAP_residentKey;
typedef struct
{
@ -220,6 +250,7 @@ typedef struct
{
uint8_t hmac_secret_present;
CTAP_hmac_secret hmac_secret;
uint32_t cred_protect;
} CTAP_extensions;
typedef struct
@ -288,6 +319,26 @@ typedef struct
} CTAP_getAssertion;
typedef struct
{
int cmd;
struct {
uint8_t rpIdHash[32];
CTAP_credentialDescriptor credentialDescriptor;
} subCommandParams;
struct {
uint8_t cmd;
uint8_t subCommandParamsCborCopy[sizeof(CTAP_credentialDescriptor) + 16];
} hashed;
uint32_t subCommandParamsCborSize;
uint8_t pinAuth[16];
uint8_t pinAuthPresent;
int pinProtocol;
} CTAP_credMgmt;
typedef struct
{
int pinProtocol;
@ -306,7 +357,12 @@ typedef struct
struct _getAssertionState {
CTAP_authDataHeader authData;
// Room for both authData struct and extensions
struct {
CTAP_authDataHeader authData;
uint8_t extensions[80];
} __attribute__((packed)) buf;
CTAP_extensions extensions;
uint8_t clientDataHash[CLIENT_DATA_HASH_SIZE];
CTAP_credentialDescriptor creds[ALLOW_LIST_MAX_SIZE];
uint8_t lastcmd;

View File

@ -666,8 +666,8 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_extensions(CborValue * val, CTAP_extensions * ext)
if (ret == CborErrorOutOfMemory)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, rp map key is too large. Ignoring.\n");
cbor_value_advance(&map);
cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret( cbor_value_advance(&map) );
check_ret( cbor_value_advance(&map) );
continue;
}
check_ret(ret);
@ -698,6 +698,14 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_extensions(CborValue * val, CTAP_extensions * ext)
printf1(TAG_RED, "warning: hmac_secret request ignored for being wrong type\r\n");
}
}
else if (strncmp(key, "credProtect",11) == 0) {
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) == CborIntegerType) {
ret = cbor_value_get_int(&map, (int*)&ext->cred_protect);
check_ret(ret);
} else {
printf1(TAG_RED, "warning: credProtect request ignored for being wrong type\r\n");
}
}
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
@ -871,7 +879,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_make_credential(CTAP_makeCredential * MC, CborEncoder * encod
{
return ret;
}
cbor_value_advance(&map);
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
}
@ -999,6 +1007,163 @@ uint8_t parse_allow_list(CTAP_getAssertion * GA, CborValue * it)
return 0;
}
static uint8_t parse_cred_mgmt_subcommandparams(CborValue * val, CTAP_credMgmt * CM)
{
size_t map_length;
int key;
int ret;
unsigned int i;
CborValue map;
size_t sz = 32;
if (cbor_value_get_type(val) != CborMapType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"error, wrong type\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_enter_container(val,&map);
check_ret(ret);
const uint8_t * start_byte = cbor_value_get_next_byte(&map) - 1;
ret = cbor_value_get_map_length(val, &map_length);
check_ret(ret);
for (i = 0; i < map_length; i++)
{
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) != CborIntegerType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting integer type for map key, got %s\n", cbor_value_get_type_string(&map));
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_get_int(&map, &key);
check_ret(ret);
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
switch(key)
{
case CM_subCommandRpId:
ret = cbor_value_copy_byte_string(&map, CM->subCommandParams.rpIdHash, &sz, NULL);
if (ret == CborErrorOutOfMemory)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, map key is too large\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
}
check_ret(ret);
break;
case CM_subCommandCred:
ret = parse_credential_descriptor(&map, &CM->subCommandParams.credentialDescriptor);
check_ret(ret);;
break;
}
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
}
const uint8_t * end_byte = cbor_value_get_next_byte(&map);
uint32_t length = (uint32_t)end_byte - (uint32_t)start_byte;
if (length > sizeof(CM->hashed.subCommandParamsCborCopy))
{
return CTAP2_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
}
// Copy the details that were hashed so they can be verified later.
memmove(CM->hashed.subCommandParamsCborCopy, start_byte, length);
CM->subCommandParamsCborSize = length;
return 0;
}
uint8_t ctap_parse_cred_mgmt(CTAP_credMgmt * CM, uint8_t * request, int length)
{
int ret;
unsigned int i;
int key;
size_t map_length;
CborParser parser;
CborValue it,map;
memset(CM, 0, sizeof(CTAP_credMgmt));
ret = cbor_parser_init(request, length, CborValidateCanonicalFormat, &parser, &it);
check_ret(ret);
CborType type = cbor_value_get_type(&it);
if (type != CborMapType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting cbor map\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_enter_container(&it,&map);
check_ret(ret);
ret = cbor_value_get_map_length(&it, &map_length);
check_ret(ret);
printf1(TAG_PARSE, "CM map has %d elements\n", map_length);
for (i = 0; i < map_length; i++)
{
type = cbor_value_get_type(&map);
if (type != CborIntegerType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting int for map key\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_get_int_checked(&map, &key);
check_ret(ret);
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
switch(key)
{
case CM_cmd:
printf1(TAG_PARSE, "CM_cmd\n");
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) == CborIntegerType)
{
ret = cbor_value_get_int_checked(&map, &CM->cmd);
check_ret(ret);
CM->hashed.cmd = CM->cmd;
}
else
{
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
break;
case CM_subCommandParams:
printf1(TAG_PARSE, "CM_subCommandParams\n");
ret = parse_cred_mgmt_subcommandparams(&map, CM);
check_ret(ret);
break;
case CM_pinProtocol:
printf1(TAG_PARSE, "CM_pinProtocol\n");
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) == CborIntegerType)
{
ret = cbor_value_get_int_checked(&map, &CM->pinProtocol);
check_ret(ret);
}
else
{
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
break;
case CM_pinAuth:
printf1(TAG_PARSE, "CM_pinAuth\n");
ret = parse_fixed_byte_string(&map, CM->pinAuth, 16);
check_retr(ret);
CM->pinAuthPresent = 1;
break;
}
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
}
return 0;
}
uint8_t ctap_parse_get_assertion(CTAP_getAssertion * GA, uint8_t * request, int length)
{
@ -1132,7 +1297,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_get_assertion(CTAP_getAssertion * GA, uint8_t * request, int
return ret;
}
cbor_value_advance(&map);
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
}
@ -1353,11 +1518,21 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_client_pin(CTAP_clientPin * CP, uint8_t * request, int length
break;
case CP_getKeyAgreement:
printf1(TAG_CP,"CP_getKeyAgreement\n");
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) != CborBooleanType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting cbor boolean\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_get_boolean(&map, &CP->getKeyAgreement);
check_ret(ret);
break;
case CP_getRetries:
printf1(TAG_CP,"CP_getRetries\n");
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) != CborBooleanType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting cbor boolean\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_get_boolean(&map, &CP->getRetries);
check_ret(ret);
break;

View File

@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ uint8_t parse_cose_key(CborValue * it, COSE_key * cose);
uint8_t ctap_parse_make_credential(CTAP_makeCredential * MC, CborEncoder * encoder, uint8_t * request, int length);
uint8_t ctap_parse_get_assertion(CTAP_getAssertion * GA, uint8_t * request, int length);
uint8_t ctap_parse_cred_mgmt(CTAP_credMgmt * CM, uint8_t * request, int length);
uint8_t ctap_parse_client_pin(CTAP_clientPin * CP, uint8_t * request, int length);
uint8_t parse_credential_descriptor(CborValue * arr, CTAP_credentialDescriptor * cred);

View File

@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static void ctaphid_write(CTAPHID_WRITE_BUFFER * wb, void * _data, int len)
if (wb->offset > 0)
{
memset(wb->buf + wb->offset, 0, HID_MESSAGE_SIZE - wb->offset);
ctaphid_write_block(wb->buf);
usbhid_send(wb->buf);
}
return;
}
@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static void ctaphid_write(CTAPHID_WRITE_BUFFER * wb, void * _data, int len)
wb->bytes_written += 1;
if (wb->offset == HID_MESSAGE_SIZE)
{
ctaphid_write_block(wb->buf);
usbhid_send(wb->buf);
wb->offset = 0;
}
}
@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ extern void _check_ret(CborError ret, int line, const char * filename);
uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE_BUFFER * wb);
extern void solo_lock_if_not_already();
uint8_t ctaphid_handle_packet(uint8_t * pkt_raw)
{
uint8_t cmd = 0;
@ -635,6 +638,9 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_handle_packet(uint8_t * pkt_raw)
status = ctap_request(ctap_buffer, len, &ctap_resp);
wb.bcnt = (ctap_resp.length+1);
wb.cid = cid;
wb.cmd = cmd;
timestamp();
@ -665,6 +671,9 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_handle_packet(uint8_t * pkt_raw)
u2f_request((struct u2f_request_apdu*)ctap_buffer, &ctap_resp);
wb.bcnt = (ctap_resp.length);
wb.cid = cid;
wb.cmd = cmd;
ctaphid_write(&wb, ctap_resp.data, ctap_resp.length);
ctaphid_write(&wb, NULL, 0);
@ -725,6 +734,11 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE
ctaphid_write(wb, NULL, 0);
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(SOLO)
case CTAPHID_REBOOT:
device_reboot();
return 1;
#endif
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER)
case CTAPHID_GETRNG:
@ -756,34 +770,51 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE
return 1;
break;
// Remove on next release
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && defined(SOLO)
case 0x99:
solo_lock_if_not_already();
wb->bcnt = 0;
ctaphid_write(wb, NULL, 0);
return 1;
break;
#endif
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && (defined(SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL))
case CTAPHID_LOADKEY:
/**
* Load external key. Useful for enabling backups.
* bytes: 4 96
* payload: | counter_increase (BE) | master_key |
* bytes: 4 4 96
* payload: version [maj rev patch RFU]| counter_replacement (BE) | master_key |
*
* Counter should be increased by a large amount, e.g. (0x10000000)
* to outdo any previously lost/broken keys.
*/
printf1(TAG_HID,"CTAPHID_LOADKEY\n");
if (len != 100)
if (len != 104)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, invalid length.\n");
ctaphid_send_error(wb->cid, CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_LENGTH);
return 1;
}
param = ctap_buffer[0] << 16;
param |= ctap_buffer[1] << 8;
param |= ctap_buffer[2] << 0;
if (param != 0){
ctaphid_send_error(wb->cid, CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION);
return 1;
}
// Ask for THREE button presses
if (ctap_user_presence_test(8000) > 0)
if (ctap_user_presence_test(8000) > 0)
if (ctap_user_presence_test(8000) > 0)
if (ctap_user_presence_test(2000) > 0)
if (ctap_user_presence_test(2000) > 0)
{
ctap_load_external_keys(ctap_buffer + 4);
param = ctap_buffer[3];
param |= ctap_buffer[2] << 8;
param |= ctap_buffer[1] << 16;
param |= ctap_buffer[0] << 24;
ctap_load_external_keys(ctap_buffer + 8);
param = ctap_buffer[7];
param |= ctap_buffer[6] << 8;
param |= ctap_buffer[5] << 16;
param |= ctap_buffer[4] << 24;
ctap_atomic_count(param);
wb->bcnt = 0;

View File

@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#define CTAPHID_BOOT (TYPE_INIT | 0x50)
#define CTAPHID_ENTERBOOT (TYPE_INIT | 0x51)
#define CTAPHID_ENTERSTBOOT (TYPE_INIT | 0x52)
#define CTAPHID_REBOOT (TYPE_INIT | 0x53)
#define CTAPHID_GETRNG (TYPE_INIT | 0x60)
#define CTAPHID_GETVERSION (TYPE_INIT | 0x61)
#define CTAPHID_LOADKEY (TYPE_INIT | 0x62)
@ -59,6 +60,8 @@
#define CTAP_CAPABILITIES (CAPABILITY_WINK | CAPABILITY_CBOR)
#define HID_MESSAGE_SIZE 64
typedef struct
{
uint32_t cid;

View File

@ -56,8 +56,7 @@ bool migrate_from_FF_to_01(AuthenticatorState_0xFF* state_prev_0xff, Authenticat
void save_migrated_state(AuthenticatorState *state_tmp_ptr) {
memmove(&STATE, state_tmp_ptr, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
authenticator_write_state(state_tmp_ptr, 0);
authenticator_write_state(state_tmp_ptr, 1);
authenticator_write_state(state_tmp_ptr);
}
void do_migration_if_required(AuthenticatorState* state_current){

225
fido2/device.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
// Copyright 2019 SoloKeys Developers
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0, <LICENSE-APACHE or
// http://apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license <LICENSE-MIT or
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
/** device.c
*
* This contains (weak) implementations
* to get FIDO2 working initially on a device. They probably
* aren't what you want to keep, but are designed to be replaced
* with some other platform specific implementation.
*
* For real examples, see the STM32L4 implementation and the PC implementation of device.c.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ctaphid.h"
#include "log.h"
#include APP_CONFIG
#define RK_NUM 50
struct ResidentKeyStore {
CTAP_residentKey rks[RK_NUM];
} RK_STORE;
static bool _up_disabled = false;
static uint8_t _attestation_cert_der[] =
"\x30\x82\x01\xfb\x30\x82\x01\xa1\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x00\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
"\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x30\x2c\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13"
"\x02\x55\x53\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x02\x4d\x44\x31\x10\x30\x0e"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x07\x54\x45\x53\x54\x20\x43\x41\x30\x20\x17\x0d\x31\x38"
"\x30\x35\x31\x30\x30\x33\x30\x36\x32\x30\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30\x36\x38\x30\x34\x32"
"\x37\x30\x33\x30\x36\x32\x30\x5a\x30\x7c\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13"
"\x02\x55\x53\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x02\x4d\x44\x31\x0f\x30\x0d"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x07\x0c\x06\x4c\x61\x75\x72\x65\x6c\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55"
"\x04\x0a\x0c\x0c\x54\x45\x53\x54\x20\x43\x4f\x4d\x50\x41\x4e\x59\x31\x22\x30\x20"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x19\x41\x75\x74\x68\x65\x6e\x74\x69\x63\x61\x74\x6f\x72"
"\x20\x41\x74\x74\x65\x73\x74\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x31\x14\x30\x12\x06\x03\x55\x04"
"\x03\x0c\x0b\x63\x6f\x6e\x6f\x72\x70\x70\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x30\x59\x30\x13\x06\x07"
"\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07\x03\x42\x00"
"\x04\x45\xa9\x02\xc1\x2e\x9c\x0a\x33\xfa\x3e\x84\x50\x4a\xb8\x02\xdc\x4d\xb9\xaf"
"\x15\xb1\xb6\x3a\xea\x8d\x3f\x03\x03\x55\x65\x7d\x70\x3f\xb4\x02\xa4\x97\xf4\x83"
"\xb8\xa6\xf9\x3c\xd0\x18\xad\x92\x0c\xb7\x8a\x5a\x3e\x14\x48\x92\xef\x08\xf8\xca"
"\xea\xfb\x32\xab\x20\xa3\x62\x30\x60\x30\x46\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x3f\x30\x3d"
"\xa1\x30\xa4\x2e\x30\x2c\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31"
"\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x02\x4d\x44\x31\x10\x30\x0e\x06\x03\x55\x04"
"\x0a\x0c\x07\x54\x45\x53\x54\x20\x43\x41\x82\x09\x00\xf7\xc9\xec\x89\xf2\x63\x94"
"\xd9\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x13\x04\x02\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04"
"\x04\x03\x02\x04\xf0\x30\x0a\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x03\x48\x00"
"\x30\x45\x02\x20\x18\x38\xb0\x45\x03\x69\xaa\xa7\xb7\x38\x62\x01\xaf\x24\x97\x5e"
"\x7e\x74\x64\x1b\xa3\x7b\xf7\xe6\xd3\xaf\x79\x28\xdb\xdc\xa5\x88\x02\x21\x00\xcd"
"\x06\xf1\xe3\xab\x16\x21\x8e\xd8\xc0\x14\xaf\x09\x4f\x5b\x73\xef\x5e\x9e\x4b\xe7"
"\x35\xeb\xdd\x9b\x6d\x8f\x7d\xf3\xc4\x3a\xd7";
__attribute__((weak)) void device_attestation_read_cert_der(uint8_t * dst){
memmove(dst, _attestation_cert_der, device_attestation_cert_der_get_size());
}
__attribute__((weak)) uint8_t * device_get_attestation_key(){
static uint8_t attestation_key[] =
"\xcd\x67\xaa\x31\x0d\x09\x1e\xd1\x6e\x7e\x98\x92\xaa"
"\x07\x0e\x19\x94\xfc\xd7\x14\xae\x7c\x40\x8f\xb9\x46"
"\xb7\x2e\x5f\xe7\x5d\x30";
return attestation_key;
}
__attribute__((weak)) uint16_t device_attestation_cert_der_get_size(){
return sizeof(_attestation_cert_der)-1;
}
__attribute__((weak)) void device_reboot()
{
printf1(TAG_RED, "REBOOT command recieved!\r\n");
exit(100);
}
__attribute__((weak)) void device_set_status(uint32_t status)
{
static uint32_t __device_status = 0;
if (status != CTAPHID_STATUS_IDLE && __device_status != status)
{
ctaphid_update_status(status);
}
__device_status = status;
}
__attribute__((weak)) void usbhid_close(){/**/}
__attribute__((weak)) void device_init(int argc, char *argv[]){/**/}
__attribute__((weak)) void device_disable_up(bool disable)
{
_up_disabled = disable;
}
__attribute__((weak)) int ctap_user_presence_test(uint32_t d)
{
if (_up_disabled)
{
return 2;
}
return 1;
}
__attribute__((weak)) int ctap_user_verification(uint8_t arg)
{
return 1;
}
__attribute__((weak)) uint32_t ctap_atomic_count(uint32_t amount)
{
static uint32_t counter1 = 25;
counter1 += (amount + 1);
return counter1;
}
__attribute__((weak)) int ctap_generate_rng(uint8_t * dst, size_t num)
{
int i;
printf1(TAG_ERR, "Insecure RNG being used.\r\n");
for (i = 0; i < num; i++){
dst[i] = (uint8_t)rand();
}
}
__attribute__((weak)) int device_is_nfc()
{
return 0;
}
__attribute__((weak)) void device_wink()
{
printf1(TAG_GREEN,"*WINK*\n");
}
__attribute__((weak)) void device_set_clock_rate(DEVICE_CLOCK_RATE param){/**/}
static AuthenticatorState _tmp_state = {0};
__attribute__((weak)) int authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * s){
if (_tmp_state.is_initialized != INITIALIZED_MARKER){
return 0;
}
else {
memmove(s, &_tmp_state, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
return 1;
}
}
__attribute__((weak)) void authenticator_write_state(AuthenticatorState * s){
memmove(&_tmp_state, s, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
}
__attribute__((weak)) void ctap_reset_rk()
{
memset(&RK_STORE,0xff,sizeof(RK_STORE));
}
__attribute__((weak)) uint32_t ctap_rk_size()
{
return RK_NUM;
}
__attribute__((weak)) void ctap_store_rk(int index, CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
if (index < RK_NUM)
{
memmove(RK_STORE.rks + index, rk, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
}
else
{
printf1(TAG_ERR,"Out of bounds for store_rk\r\n");
}
}
__attribute__((weak)) void ctap_delete_rk(int index)
{
CTAP_residentKey rk;
memset(&rk, 0xff, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
if (index < RK_NUM)
{
memmove(RK_STORE.rks + index, &rk, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
}
else
{
printf1(TAG_ERR,"Out of bounds for delete_rk\r\n");
}
}
__attribute__((weak)) void ctap_load_rk(int index, CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
memmove(rk, RK_STORE.rks + index, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
}
__attribute__((weak)) void ctap_overwrite_rk(int index, CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
if (index < RK_NUM)
{
memmove(RK_STORE.rks + index, rk, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
}
else
{
printf1(TAG_ERR,"Out of bounds for store_rk\r\n");
}
}
__attribute__((weak)) void device_read_aaguid(uint8_t * dst){
uint8_t * aaguid = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79";
memmove(dst, aaguid, 16);
}

View File

@ -9,82 +9,166 @@
#include "storage.h"
void device_init(int argc, char *argv[]);
/** Return a millisecond timestamp. Does not need to be synchronized to anything.
* *Optional* to compile, but will not calculate delays correctly without a correct implementation.
*/
uint32_t millis();
void delay(uint32_t ms);
// HID message size in bytes
#define HID_MESSAGE_SIZE 64
void usbhid_init();
int usbhid_recv(uint8_t * msg);
/** Called by HIDUSB layer to write bytes to the USB HID interface endpoint.
* Will write 64 bytes at a time.
*
* @param msg Pointer to a 64 byte buffer containing a payload to be sent via USB HID.
*
* **Required** to compile and work for FIDO application.
*/
void usbhid_send(uint8_t * msg);
void usbhid_close();
void main_loop_delay();
void heartbeat();
/** Reboot / power reset the device.
* **Optional** this is not used for FIDO2, and simply won't do anything if not implemented.
*/
void device_reboot();
void authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * );
/** Read AuthenticatorState from nonvolatile memory.
* @param s pointer to AuthenticatorState buffer to be overwritten with contents from NV memory.
* @return 0 - state stored is NOT initialized.
* 1 - state stored is initialized.
*
* *Optional* this is required to make persistant updates to FIDO2 State (PIN and device master secret).
* Without it, changes simply won't be persistant.
*/
int authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * s);
void authenticator_read_backup_state(AuthenticatorState * );
// Return 1 yes backup is init'd, else 0
//void authenticator_initialize()
int authenticator_is_backup_initialized();
void authenticator_write_state(AuthenticatorState *, int backup);
// Called each main loop. Doesn't need to do anything.
void device_manage();
/** Store changes in the authenticator state to nonvolatile memory.
* @param s pointer to valid Authenticator state to write to NV memory.
*
* *Optional* this is required to make persistant updates to FIDO2 State (PIN and device master secret).
* Without it, changes simply won't be persistant.
*/
void authenticator_write_state(AuthenticatorState * s);
// sets status that's uses for sending status updates ~100ms.
// A timer should be set up to call `ctaphid_update_status`
/** Updates status of the status of the FIDO2 layer application, which
* can be used for polling updates in the USBHID layer.
*
* @param status is one of the following, which can be used appropriately by USB HID layer.
#define CTAPHID_STATUS_IDLE 0
#define CTAPHID_STATUS_PROCESSING 1
#define CTAPHID_STATUS_UPNEEDED 2
*
* *Optional* to compile and run, but will be required to be used for proper FIDO2 operation with some platforms.
*/
void device_set_status(uint32_t status);
// Returns if button is currently pressed
/** Returns true if button is currently pressed. Debouncing does not need to be handled. Should not block.
* @return 1 if button is currently pressed.
*
* *Optional* to compile and run, but just returns one by default.
*/
int device_is_button_pressed();
// Test for user presence
//
// Return 2 for disabled, 1 for user is present, 0 user not present, -1 if cancel is requested.
/** Test for user presence.
* Perform test that user is present. Returns status on user presence. This is used by FIDO and U2F layer
* to check if an operation should continue, or if the UP flag should be set.
*
* @param delay number of milliseconds to delay waiting for user before timeout.
*
* @return 2 - User presence is disabled. Operation should continue, but UP flag not set.
* 1 - User presence confirmed. Operation should continue, and UP flag is set.
* 0 - User presence is not confirmed. Operation should be denied.
* -1 - Operation was canceled. Do not continue, reset transaction state.
*
* *Optional*, the default implementation will return 1, unless a FIDO2 operation calls for no UP, where this will then return 2.
*/
int ctap_user_presence_test(uint32_t delay);
// Generate @num bytes of random numbers to @dest
// return 1 if success, error otherwise
/** Disable the next user presence test. This is called by FIDO2 layer when a transaction
* requests UP to be disabled. The next call to ctap_user_presence_test should return 2,
* and then UP should be enabled again.
*
* @param request_active indicate to activate (true) or disable (false) UP.
*
* *Optional*, the default implementation will provide expected behaviour with the default ctap_user_presence_test(...).
*/
void device_disable_up(bool request_active);
/** Generate random numbers. Random numbers should be good enough quality for
* cryptographic use.
*
* @param dst the buffer to write into.
* @param num the number of bytes to generate and write to dst.
*
* @return 1 if successful, or else the RNG failed.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, the random numbers will be from rand() and an error will be logged.
*/
int ctap_generate_rng(uint8_t * dst, size_t num);
// Increment atomic counter and return it.
// @param amount the amount to increase the counter by.
/** Increment an atomic (non-volatile) counter and return the value.
*
* @param amount a non-zero amount to increment the counter by.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, the counter will not be persistant.
*/
uint32_t ctap_atomic_count(uint32_t amount);
// Verify the user
// return 1 if user is verified, 0 if not
int ctap_user_verification(uint8_t arg);
// Must be implemented by application
// data is HID_MESSAGE_SIZE long in bytes
void ctaphid_write_block(uint8_t * data);
// Resident key
/** Delete all resident keys.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, operates on non-persistant RK's.
*/
void ctap_reset_rk();
/** Return the maximum amount of resident keys that can be stored.
* @return max number of resident keys that can be stored, including already stored RK's.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, returns 50.
*/
uint32_t ctap_rk_size();
/** Store a resident key into an index between [ 0, ctap_rk_size() ).
* Storage should be in non-volatile memory.
*
* @param index between RK index range.
* @param rk pointer to valid rk structure that should be written to NV memory.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, operates on non-persistant RK's.
*/
void ctap_store_rk(int index,CTAP_residentKey * rk);
/** Delete a resident key from an index.
* @param index to delete resident key from. Has no effect if no RK exists at index.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, operates on non-persistant RK's.
*/
void ctap_delete_rk(int index);
/** Read a resident key from an index into memory
* @param index to read resident key from.
* @param rk pointer to resident key structure to write into with RK.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, operates on non-persistant RK's.
*/
void ctap_load_rk(int index,CTAP_residentKey * rk);
/** Overwrite the RK located in index with a new RK.
* @param index to write resident key to.
* @param rk pointer to valid rk structure that should be written to NV memory, and replace existing RK there.
*
* *Optional*, if not implemented, operates on non-persistant RK's.
*/
void ctap_overwrite_rk(int index,CTAP_residentKey * rk);
// For Solo hacker
void boot_solo_bootloader();
void boot_st_bootloader();
// HID wink command
/** Called by HID layer to indicate that a wink behavior should be performed.
* Should not block, and the wink behavior should occur in parallel to FIDO operations.
*
* *Optional*.
*/
void device_wink();
typedef enum {
@ -93,21 +177,50 @@ typedef enum {
DEVICE_FAST = 2,
} DEVICE_CLOCK_RATE;
// Set the clock rate for the device.
// Three modes are targetted for Solo.
// 0: Lowest clock rate for NFC.
// 1: fastest clock rate supported at a low power setting for NFC FIDO.
// 2: fastest clock rate. Generally for USB interface.
/**
* Set the clock rate for the device. This gets called only when the device is running in NFC mode.
* Before Register and authenticate operations, the clock rate will be set to (1), and otherwise back to (0).
* @param param
0: Lowest clock rate for NFC.
1: fastest clock rate supported at a low power setting for NFC FIDO.
2: fastest clock rate. Generally for USB interface.
* *Optional*, by default nothing happens.
*/
void device_set_clock_rate(DEVICE_CLOCK_RATE param);
// Returns NFC_IS_NA, NFC_IS_ACTIVE, or NFC_IS_AVAILABLE
#define NFC_IS_NA 0
#define NFC_IS_ACTIVE 1
#define NFC_IS_AVAILABLE 2
/** Returns NFC status of the device.
* @return 0 - NFC is not available.
* 1 - NFC is active, and is powering the chip for a transaction.
* 2 - NFC is available, but not currently being used.
*/
int device_is_nfc();
void device_disable_up(bool request_active);
void device_init_button();
/** Return pointer to attestation key.
* @return pointer to attestation private key, raw encoded. For P256, this is 32 bytes.
*/
uint8_t * device_get_attestation_key();
/** Read the device's attestation certificate into buffer @dst.
* @param dst the destination to write the certificate.
*
* The size of the certificate can be retrieved using `device_attestation_cert_der_get_size()`.
*/
void device_attestation_read_cert_der(uint8_t * dst);
/** Returns the size in bytes of attestation_cert_der.
* @return number of bytes in attestation_cert_der, not including any C string null byte.
*/
uint16_t device_attestation_cert_der_get_size();
/** Read the device's 16 byte AAGUID into a buffer.
* @param dst buffer to write 16 byte AAGUID into.
* */
void device_read_aaguid(uint8_t * dst);
#endif

41
fido2/example_app.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
// Copyright 2019 SoloKeys Developers
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0, <LICENSE-APACHE or
// http://apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license <LICENSE-MIT or
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
#ifndef SRC_APP_H_
#define SRC_APP_H_
#include <stdbool.h>
#define USING_DEV_BOARD
#define USING_PC
#define ENABLE_U2F
#define ENABLE_U2F_EXTENSIONS
//#define BRIDGE_TO_WALLET
void printing_init();
extern bool use_udp;
// 0xRRGGBB
#define LED_INIT_VALUE 0x000800
#define LED_WINK_VALUE 0x000008
#define LED_MAX_SCALER 30
#define LED_MIN_SCALER 1
// # of ms between each change in LED
#define HEARTBEAT_PERIOD 100
// Each LED channel will be multiplied by a integer between LED_MAX_SCALER
// and LED_MIN_SCALER to cause the slow pulse. E.g.
// #define LED_INIT_VALUE 0x301000
// #define LED_MAX_SCALER 30
// #define LED_MIN_SCALER 1
// #define HEARTBEAT_PERIOD 8
// Will pulse from 0x301000 to 0x903000 to 0x301000 ...
// Which will take ~8 * (30)*2 ms
#endif /* SRC_APP_H_ */

View File

@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct logtag tagtable[] = {
{TAG_NFC,"NFC"},
{TAG_NFC_APDU, "NAPDU"},
{TAG_CCID, "CCID"},
{TAG_CM, "CRED_MGMT"},
};

View File

@ -7,7 +7,10 @@
#ifndef _LOG_H
#define _LOG_H
#ifdef APP_CONFIG
#include APP_CONFIG
#endif
#include <stdint.h>
#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
@ -45,12 +48,13 @@ typedef enum
TAG_NFC = (1 << 19),
TAG_NFC_APDU = (1 << 20),
TAG_CCID = (1 << 21),
TAG_CM = (1 << 22),
TAG_NO_TAG = (1UL << 30),
TAG_FILENO = (1UL << 31)
} LOG_TAG;
#if DEBUG_LEVEL > 0
#if defined(DEBUG_LEVEL) && DEBUG_LEVEL > 0
void set_logging_mask(uint32_t mask);
#define printf1(tag,fmt, ...) LOG(tag & ~(TAG_FILENO), NULL, 0, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)

View File

@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int8_t u2f_authenticate_credential(struct u2f_key_handle * kh, uint8_t key_handl
printf1(TAG_U2F, "APPID does not match rpIdHash.\n");
return 0;
}
make_auth_tag(appid, cred->nonce, cred->count, tag);
make_auth_tag(appid, (uint8_t*)&cred->entropy, cred->count, tag);
if (memcmp(cred->tag, tag, CREDENTIAL_TAG_SIZE) == 0){
return 1;
@ -299,14 +299,19 @@ static int16_t u2f_authenticate(struct u2f_authenticate_request * req, uint8_t c
static int16_t u2f_register(struct u2f_register_request * req)
{
uint8_t i[] = {0x0,U2F_EC_FMT_UNCOMPRESSED};
uint8_t cert[1024];
struct u2f_key_handle key_handle;
uint8_t pubkey[64];
uint8_t hash[32];
uint8_t * sig = (uint8_t*)req;
const uint16_t attest_size = attestation_cert_der_get_size();
const uint16_t attest_size = device_attestation_cert_der_get_size();
if (attest_size > sizeof(cert)){
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Certificate is too large for buffer\r\n");
return U2F_SW_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
}
if ( ! ctap_user_presence_test(750))
{
@ -341,7 +346,8 @@ static int16_t u2f_register(struct u2f_register_request * req)
u2f_response_writeback(i,1);
u2f_response_writeback((uint8_t*)&key_handle,U2F_KEY_HANDLE_SIZE);
u2f_response_writeback(attestation_cert_der,attest_size);
device_attestation_read_cert_der(cert);
u2f_response_writeback(cert,attest_size);
dump_signature_der(sig);

View File

@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
#include "version.h"
#include "app.h"
const version_t firmware_version
#ifdef SOLO
__attribute__ ((section (".flag"))) __attribute__ ((__used__))
#endif
= {
.major = SOLO_VERSION_MAJ,
.minor = SOLO_VERSION_MIN,
.patch = SOLO_VERSION_PATCH,
.reserved = 0
};
const version_t firmware_version __attribute__ ((section (".flag"))) __attribute__ ((__used__)) = {
.major = SOLO_VERSION_MAJ,
.minor = SOLO_VERSION_MIN,
.patch = SOLO_VERSION_PATCH,
.reserved = 0
};
// from tinycbor, for a quick static_assert
#include <compilersupport_p.h>

9
fido2/version.mk Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
SOLO_VERSION_FULL?=$(shell git describe)
SOLO_VERSION:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(SOLO_VERSION_FULL)".split("-")[0])')
SOLO_VERSION_MAJ:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(SOLO_VERSION)".split(".")[0])')
SOLO_VERSION_MIN:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(SOLO_VERSION)".split(".")[1])')
SOLO_VERSION_PAT:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(SOLO_VERSION)".split(".")[2])')
SOLO_VERSION_FLAGS := -DSOLO_VERSION_MAJ=$(SOLO_VERSION_MAJ) -DSOLO_VERSION_MIN=$(SOLO_VERSION_MIN) \
-DSOLO_VERSION_PATCH=$(SOLO_VERSION_PAT) -DSOLO_VERSION=\"$(SOLO_VERSION_FULL)\"

View File

@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
"authenticationAlgorithm": 1,
"publicKeyAlgAndEncoding": 260,
"attestationTypes": [
15879,
15880
15879
],
"userVerificationDetails": [
[

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

View File

@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ nav:
- Application Ideas: solo/application-ideas.md
- Running on Nucleo32 board: solo/nucleo32-board.md
- Signed update process: solo/signed-updates.md
- Usage and Porting guide: solo/porting.md
- Code documentation: solo/code-overview.md
- Contributing Code: solo/contributing.md
- Contributing Docs: solo/documenting.md

View File

@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
@ -25,8 +24,7 @@
#define RK_NUM 50
bool use_udp = true;
static bool _up_disabled = false;
static bool use_udp = true;
struct ResidentKeyStore {
CTAP_residentKey rks[RK_NUM];
@ -34,21 +32,6 @@ struct ResidentKeyStore {
void authenticator_initialize();
uint32_t __device_status = 0;
void device_set_status(uint32_t status)
{
if (status != CTAPHID_STATUS_IDLE && __device_status != status)
{
ctaphid_update_status(status);
}
__device_status = status;
}
void device_reboot()
{
printf1(TAG_RED, "REBOOT command recieved!\r\n");
exit(100);
}
int udp_server()
{
@ -192,7 +175,6 @@ int usbhid_recv(uint8_t * msg)
return l;
}
// Send 64 byte USB HID message
void usbhid_send(uint8_t * msg)
{
if (use_udp)
@ -209,6 +191,8 @@ void usbhid_send(uint8_t * msg)
}
}
void usbhid_close()
{
close(fd);
@ -272,14 +256,6 @@ void device_init(int argc, char *argv[])
}
void main_loop_delay()
{
struct timespec ts;
ts.tv_sec = 0;
ts.tv_nsec = 1000*1000*100;
nanosleep(&ts,NULL);
}
void delay(uint32_t ms)
{
struct timespec ts;
@ -289,40 +265,6 @@ void delay(uint32_t ms)
}
void heartbeat()
{
}
void ctaphid_write_block(uint8_t * data)
{
/*printf("<< "); dump_hex(data, 64);*/
usbhid_send(data);
}
int ctap_user_presence_test(uint32_t d)
{
if (_up_disabled)
{
return 2;
}
return 1;
}
int ctap_user_verification(uint8_t arg)
{
return 1;
}
uint32_t ctap_atomic_count(uint32_t amount)
{
static uint32_t counter1 = 25;
counter1 += (amount + 1);
return counter1;
}
int ctap_generate_rng(uint8_t * dst, size_t num)
{
int ret;
@ -344,10 +286,9 @@ int ctap_generate_rng(uint8_t * dst, size_t num)
const char * state_file = "authenticator_state.bin";
const char * backup_file = "authenticator_state2.bin";
const char * rk_file = "resident_keys.bin";
void authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * state)
int authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * state)
{
FILE * f;
int ret;
@ -366,104 +307,35 @@ void authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * state)
perror("fwrite");
exit(1);
}
if (state->is_initialized == INITIALIZED_MARKER)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
void authenticator_read_backup_state(AuthenticatorState * state )
void authenticator_write_state(AuthenticatorState * state)
{
FILE * f;
int ret;
f = fopen(backup_file, "rb");
f = fopen(state_file, "wb+");
if (f== NULL)
{
perror("fopen");
exit(1);
}
ret = fread(state, 1, sizeof(AuthenticatorState), f);
ret = fwrite(state, 1, sizeof(AuthenticatorState), f);
fclose(f);
if(ret != sizeof(AuthenticatorState))
{
perror("fwrite");
exit(1);
}
}
void authenticator_write_state(AuthenticatorState * state, int backup)
{
FILE * f;
int ret;
if (! backup)
{
f = fopen(state_file, "wb+");
if (f== NULL)
{
perror("fopen");
exit(1);
}
ret = fwrite(state, 1, sizeof(AuthenticatorState), f);
fclose(f);
if (ret != sizeof(AuthenticatorState))
{
perror("fwrite");
exit(1);
}
}
else
{
f = fopen(backup_file, "wb+");
if (f== NULL)
{
perror("fopen");
exit(1);
}
ret = fwrite(state, 1, sizeof(AuthenticatorState), f);
fclose(f);
if (ret != sizeof(AuthenticatorState))
{
perror("fwrite");
exit(1);
}
}
}
// Return 1 yes backup is init'd, else 0
int authenticator_is_backup_initialized()
{
uint8_t header[16];
AuthenticatorState * state = (AuthenticatorState*) header;
FILE * f;
int ret;
printf("state file exists\n");
f = fopen(backup_file, "rb");
if (f== NULL)
{
printf("Warning, backup file doesn't exist\n");
return 0;
}
ret = fread(header, 1, sizeof(header), f);
fclose(f);
if(ret != sizeof(header))
if (ret != sizeof(AuthenticatorState))
{
perror("fwrite");
exit(1);
}
return state->is_initialized == INITIALIZED_MARKER;
}
// Return 1 yes backup is init'd, else 0
/*int authenticator_is_initialized()*/
/*{*/
/*}*/
static void sync_rk()
{
@ -543,44 +415,18 @@ void authenticator_initialize()
exit(1);
}
f = fopen(backup_file, "wb+");
if (f== NULL)
{
perror("fopen");
exit(1);
}
mem = malloc(sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
memset(mem,0xff,sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
ret = fwrite(mem, 1, sizeof(AuthenticatorState), f);
free(mem);
fclose(f);
if (ret != sizeof(AuthenticatorState))
{
perror("fwrite");
exit(1);
}
// resident_keys
memset(&RK_STORE,0xff,sizeof(RK_STORE));
sync_rk();
}
}
void device_manage()
{
}
void ctap_reset_rk()
{
memset(&RK_STORE,0xff,sizeof(RK_STORE));
sync_rk();
}
uint32_t ctap_rk_size()
@ -603,6 +449,12 @@ void ctap_store_rk(int index, CTAP_residentKey * rk)
}
void ctap_delete_rk(int index)
{
CTAP_residentKey rk;
memset(&rk, 0xff, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
memmove(RK_STORE.rks + index, &rk, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
}
void ctap_load_rk(int index, CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
@ -622,22 +474,9 @@ void ctap_overwrite_rk(int index, CTAP_residentKey * rk)
}
}
void device_wink()
{
printf("*WINK*\n");
}
int device_is_nfc()
{
return 0;
}
void device_disable_up(bool disable)
{
_up_disabled = disable;
}
void device_set_clock_rate(DEVICE_CLOCK_RATE param)
{
}

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "cbor.h"
#include "device.h"
@ -17,9 +18,12 @@
#include "util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ctap.h"
#include APP_CONFIG
#include "app.h"
void device_init(int argc, char *argv[]);
int usbhid_recv(uint8_t * msg);
#if !defined(TEST)
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
@ -29,20 +33,21 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
set_logging_mask(
/*0*/
//TAG_GEN|
// TAG_GEN|
// TAG_MC |
// TAG_GA |
TAG_WALLET |
TAG_STOR |
//TAG_NFC_APDU |
TAG_NFC |
//TAG_CP |
// TAG_CP |
// TAG_CTAP|
//TAG_HID|
// TAG_HID|
TAG_U2F|
//TAG_PARSE |
// TAG_PARSE |
//TAG_TIME|
// TAG_DUMP|
// TAG_DUMP2|
TAG_GREEN|
TAG_RED|
TAG_EXT|
@ -57,13 +62,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
while(1)
{
if (millis() - t1 > HEARTBEAT_PERIOD)
{
heartbeat();
t1 = millis();
}
device_manage();
if (usbhid_recv(hidmsg) > 0)
{
@ -73,14 +71,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
else
{
}
ctaphid_check_timeouts();
struct timespec ts;
ts.tv_sec = 0;
ts.tv_nsec = 1000*1000*10;
nanosleep(&ts,NULL);
}
// Should never get here
usbhid_close();
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "done\n");
return 0;
}
#endif

View File

@ -50,12 +50,15 @@ typedef struct {
uint8_t payload[255 - 10];
} __attribute__((packed)) BootloaderReq;
uint8_t * last_written_app_address = 0;
/**
* Erase all application pages. **APPLICATION_END_PAGE excluded**.
*/
static void erase_application()
{
int page;
last_written_app_address = (uint8_t*) 0;
for(page = APPLICATION_START_PAGE; page < APPLICATION_END_PAGE; page++)
{
flash_erase_page(page);
@ -106,17 +109,20 @@ int is_bootloader_disabled()
uint32_t * auth = (uint32_t *)(AUTH_WORD_ADDR+4);
return *auth == 0;
}
uint8_t * last_written_app_address;
#include "version.h"
bool is_firmware_version_newer_or_equal()
{
if (last_written_app_address == 0) {
return false;
}
printf1(TAG_BOOT,"Current firmware version: %u.%u.%u.%u (%02x.%02x.%02x.%02x)\r\n",
current_firmware_version.major, current_firmware_version.minor, current_firmware_version.patch, current_firmware_version.reserved,
current_firmware_version.major, current_firmware_version.minor, current_firmware_version.patch, current_firmware_version.reserved
);
volatile version_t * new_version = ((volatile version_t *) last_written_app_address);
volatile version_t * new_version = ((volatile version_t *) (last_written_app_address-8+4));
printf1(TAG_BOOT,"Uploaded firmware version: %u.%u.%u.%u (%02x.%02x.%02x.%02x)\r\n",
new_version->major, new_version->minor, new_version->patch, new_version->reserved,
new_version->major, new_version->minor, new_version->patch, new_version->reserved
@ -170,6 +176,7 @@ int bootloader_bridge(int klen, uint8_t * keyh)
uint32_t addr = ((*((uint32_t*)req->addr)) & 0xffffff) | 0x8000000;
uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *)addr;
uint32_t current_address;
switch(req->op){
case BootWrite:
@ -196,9 +203,16 @@ int bootloader_bridge(int klen, uint8_t * keyh)
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, boot check bypassed\n");
exit(1);
}
current_address = addr + len;
if (current_address < (uint32_t) last_written_app_address) {
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, only ascending writes allowed.\n");
has_erased = 0;
return CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
last_written_app_address = (uint8_t*) current_address;
// Do the actual write
flash_write((uint32_t)ptr,req->payload, len);
last_written_app_address = (uint8_t *)ptr + len - 8 + 4;
break;
case BootDone:
// Writing to flash finished. Request code validation.

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#define _APP_H_
#include <stdint.h>
#include "version.h"
#include "solo.h"
#define DEBUG_UART USART1
#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL

View File

@ -2,14 +2,14 @@ include build/common.mk
# ST related
SRC = src/main.c src/init.c src/redirect.c src/flash.c src/rng.c src/led.c src/device.c
SRC += src/fifo.c src/crypto.c src/attestation.c src/nfc.c src/ams.c src/sense.c
SRC += src/fifo.c src/attestation.c src/nfc.c src/ams.c src/sense.c
SRC += src/startup_stm32l432xx.s src/system_stm32l4xx.c
SRC += $(DRIVER_LIBS) $(USB_LIB)
# FIDO2 lib
SRC += ../../fido2/apdu.c ../../fido2/util.c ../../fido2/u2f.c ../../fido2/test_power.c
SRC += ../../fido2/stubs.c ../../fido2/log.c ../../fido2/ctaphid.c ../../fido2/ctap.c
SRC += ../../fido2/ctap_parse.c ../../fido2/main.c
SRC += ../../fido2/ctap_parse.c ../../fido2/crypto.c
SRC += ../../fido2/version.c
SRC += ../../fido2/data_migration.c
SRC += ../../fido2/extensions/extensions.c ../../fido2/extensions/solo.c
@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ SRC += ../../crypto/cifra/src/sha512.c ../../crypto/cifra/src/blockwise.c
OBJ1=$(SRC:.c=.o)
OBJ=$(OBJ1:.s=.o)
INC = -Isrc/ -Isrc/cmsis/ -Ilib/ -Ilib/usbd/ -I../../fido2/ -I../../fido2/extensions
INC = -Isrc/ -Isrc/cmsis/ -Ilib/ -Ilib/usbd/
INC+= -I../../fido2/ -I../../fido2/extensions
INC += -I../../tinycbor/src -I../../crypto/sha256 -I../../crypto/micro-ecc
INC += -I../../crypto/tiny-AES-c
INC += -I../../crypto/cifra/src -I../../crypto/cifra/src/ext
@ -66,9 +68,6 @@ all: $(TARGET).elf
../../crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.o: ../../crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.c
$(CC) $^ $(HW) -O3 $(ECC_CFLAGS) -o $@
%.o: %.s
$(CC) $^ $(HW) -Os $(CFLAGS) -o $@
%.elf: $(OBJ)
$(CC) $^ $(HW) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
@echo "Built version: $(VERSION_FLAGS)"
@ -85,4 +84,5 @@ cbor:
cd ../../tinycbor/ && make clean
cd ../../tinycbor/ && make CC="$(CC)" AR=$(AR) \
LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS_LIB)" \
CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Os"
CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Os -DCBOR_PARSER_MAX_RECURSIONS=3"

View File

@ -4,13 +4,14 @@ include build/common.mk
SRC = bootloader/main.c bootloader/bootloader.c
SRC += bootloader/pubkey_bootloader.c bootloader/version_check.c
SRC += src/init.c src/redirect.c src/flash.c src/rng.c src/led.c src/device.c
SRC += src/fifo.c src/crypto.c src/attestation.c src/sense.c
SRC += src/fifo.c src/attestation.c src/sense.c
SRC += src/startup_stm32l432xx.s src/system_stm32l4xx.c
SRC += $(DRIVER_LIBS) $(USB_LIB)
# FIDO2 lib
SRC += ../../fido2/util.c ../../fido2/u2f.c ../../fido2/extensions/extensions.c
SRC += ../../fido2/stubs.c ../../fido2/log.c ../../fido2/ctaphid.c ../../fido2/ctap.c
SRC += ../../fido2/crypto.c
# Crypto libs
SRC += ../../crypto/sha256/sha256.c ../../crypto/micro-ecc/uECC.c

View File

@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
include ../../fido2/version.mk
CC=$(PREFIX)arm-none-eabi-gcc
CP=$(PREFIX)arm-none-eabi-objcopy
SZ=$(PREFIX)arm-none-eabi-size
AR=$(PREFIX)arm-none-eabi-ar
AS=$(PREFIX)arm-none-eabi-as
DRIVER_LIBS := lib/stm32l4xx_hal_pcd.c lib/stm32l4xx_hal_pcd_ex.c lib/stm32l4xx_ll_gpio.c \
lib/stm32l4xx_ll_rcc.c lib/stm32l4xx_ll_rng.c lib/stm32l4xx_ll_tim.c \
@ -13,17 +16,20 @@ USB_LIB := lib/usbd/usbd_cdc.c lib/usbd/usbd_cdc_if.c lib/usbd/usbd_composite.c
lib/usbd/usbd_ctlreq.c lib/usbd/usbd_desc.c lib/usbd/usbd_hid.c \
lib/usbd/usbd_ccid.c
VERSION_FULL?=$(shell git describe)
VERSION:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION_FULL)".split("-")[0])')
VERSION_MAJ:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[0])')
VERSION_MIN:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[1])')
VERSION_PAT:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[2])')
VERSION_FULL?=$(SOLO_VERSION_FULL)
VERSION:=$(SOLO_VERSION)
VERSION_MAJ:=$(SOLO_VERSION_MAJ)
VERSION_MIN:=$(SOLO_VERSION_MIN)
VERSION_PAT:=$(SOLO_VERSION_PAT)
VERSION_FLAGS= -DSOLO_VERSION_MAJ=$(VERSION_MAJ) -DSOLO_VERSION_MIN=$(VERSION_MIN) \
-DSOLO_VERSION_PATCH=$(VERSION_PAT) -DSOLO_VERSION=\"$(VERSION_FULL)\"
_all:
echo $(VERSION_FULL)
echo $(VERSION_MAJ)
echo $(VERSION_MIN)
echo $(VERSION_PAT)
echo $(SOLO_VERSION_FULL)
echo $(SOLO_VERSION_MAJ)
echo $(SOLO_VERSION_MIN)
echo $(SOLO_VERSION_PAT)
%.o: %.s
$(AS) -o $@ $^

View File

@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ SECTIONS
*(.data*)
. = ALIGN(8);
_edata = .;
} >ram AT> flash
} >sram2 AT> flash
.flag :
{

View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#define _APP_H_
#include <stdint.h>
#include "version.h"
#include "solo.h"
#define SOLO

View File

@ -5,12 +5,16 @@
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "crypto.h"
#include "memory_layout.h"
#include "device.h"
#include "sense.h"
#include "log.h"
const uint8_t attestation_solo_cert_der[] =
"\x30\x82\x02\xe1\x30\x82\x02\x88\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x01\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
"\x30\x82\x03\x03\x30\x82\x02\xaa\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x01\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
"\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x30\x81\x80\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06"
"\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c"
"\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53\x6f\x6c\x6f\x20\x4b"
@ -18,36 +22,37 @@ const uint8_t attestation_solo_cert_der[] =
"\x41\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73"
"\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x01\x16"
"\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x30"
"\x20\x17\x0d\x31\x38\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x32\x35\x32\x30\x30\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30"
"\x36\x38\x31\x30\x32\x39\x31\x32\x35\x32\x30\x30\x5a\x30\x81\x92\x31\x0b\x30\x09"
"\x20\x17\x0d\x31\x39\x31\x32\x30\x31\x31\x39\x32\x33\x34\x39\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30"
"\x36\x39\x31\x31\x31\x38\x31\x39\x32\x33\x34\x39\x5a\x30\x81\x91\x31\x0b\x30\x09"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08"
"\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53"
"\x6f\x6c\x6f\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x22\x30\x20\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x19\x41"
"\x75\x74\x68\x65\x6e\x74\x69\x63\x61\x74\x6f\x72\x20\x41\x74\x74\x65\x73\x74\x61"
"\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b"
"\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01"
"\x09\x01\x16\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63"
"\x6f\x6d\x30\x59\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07\x03\x42\x00\x04\x22\xfe\x0f\xb5\x2a\x78\xbe\xc6\x45\x37\x1a"
"\x28\xa7\x57\x43\x49\xa4\x6f\x85\x4d\xca\x4e\x25\x1c\x9f\x75\x30\x3d\xbf\x10\xd5"
"\xd2\xd2\x0b\xb9\x69\x2c\xdd\xb2\x5c\x14\xd8\x39\x85\x12\xf6\x23\xee\x91\xba\xc6"
"\xac\xff\x4a\x1a\x27\xef\xe0\xc1\x54\x3f\xd4\xd9\xc5\xa3\x81\xdc\x30\x81\xd9\x30"
"\x1d\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0e\x04\x16\x04\x14\x3b\xe6\xd2\xc0\x6f\xf2\xe7\xb0\x7c\x9d"
"\x9e\x28\xc0\x20\xb0\x0d\x07\xc8\x15\xc8\x30\x81\x9f\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x81"
"\x97\x30\x81\x94\xa1\x81\x86\xa4\x81\x83\x30\x81\x80\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55"
"\x04\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72"
"\x79\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53\x6f\x6c\x6f"
"\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x10\x30\x0e\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x07\x52\x6f\x6f\x74"
"\x20\x43\x41\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65"
"\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x08\x53"
"\x6f\x6c\x6f\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x22\x30\x20\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x19\x41\x75"
"\x74\x68\x65\x6e\x74\x69\x63\x61\x74\x6f\x72\x20\x41\x74\x74\x65\x73\x74\x61\x74"
"\x69\x6f\x6e\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65"
"\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09"
"\x01\x16\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f"
"\x6d\x82\x09\x00\xc4\x47\x63\x92\x8f\xf4\xbe\x8c\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x13\x04"
"\x02\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04\x04\x03\x02\x04\xf0\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
"\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x03\x47\x00\x30\x44\x02\x20\x71\x10\x46\x2c\xf5"
"\x16\x18\x97\x55\xca\x64\x50\x3b\x69\xb2\xdf\x17\x71\xab\xad\x8e\xc0\xd6\xa6\x07"
"\x3d\x66\x8a\x3b\xbb\xfe\x61\x02\x20\x1e\x82\xef\xeb\x5e\x4e\x3a\x00\x84\x64\xd2"
"\xf8\x84\xc3\x78\x35\x93\x63\x81\x2e\xbe\xa6\x12\x32\x6e\x29\x90\xc8\x91\x4b\x71"
"\x52"
"\x6d\x30\x59\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce"
"\x3d\x03\x01\x07\x03\x42\x00\x04\x22\xfe\x0f\xb5\x2a\x78\xbe\xc6\x45\x37\x1a\x28"
"\xa7\x57\x43\x49\xa4\x6f\x85\x4d\xca\x4e\x25\x1c\x9f\x75\x30\x3d\xbf\x10\xd5\xd2"
"\xd2\x0b\xb9\x69\x2c\xdd\xb2\x5c\x14\xd8\x39\x85\x12\xf6\x23\xee\x91\xba\xc6\xac"
"\xff\x4a\x1a\x27\xef\xe0\xc1\x54\x3f\xd4\xd9\xc5\xa3\x81\xff\x30\x81\xfc\x30\x1d"
"\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0e\x04\x16\x04\x14\x3b\xe6\xd2\xc0\x6f\xf2\xe7\xb0\x7c\x9d\x9e"
"\x28\xc0\x20\xb0\x0d\x07\xc8\x15\xc8\x30\x81\x9f\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x81\x97"
"\x30\x81\x94\xa1\x81\x86\xa4\x81\x83\x30\x81\x80\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04"
"\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72\x79"
"\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53\x6f\x6c\x6f\x20"
"\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x10\x30\x0e\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x07\x52\x6f\x6f\x74\x20"
"\x43\x41\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79"
"\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x01"
"\x16\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d"
"\x82\x09\x00\xc4\x47\x63\x92\x8f\xf4\xbe\x8c\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x13\x04\x02"
"\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04\x04\x03\x02\x04\xf0\x30\x21\x06\x0b\x2b"
"\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\xe5\x1c\x01\x01\x04\x04\x12\x04\x10\x88\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0"
"\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79\x30\x0a\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04"
"\x03\x02\x03\x47\x00\x30\x44\x02\x20\x4d\xea\x09\x15\x6c\x86\x48\x57\x2a\xa8\x8d"
"\x87\xc3\xfa\xb6\x6b\x29\x9b\xfb\x8b\x4d\x4d\x29\x77\x5b\xa1\x04\x4c\x7f\x12\x8d"
"\x71\x02\x20\x47\x4c\x3d\xb2\xa1\x74\xe3\x9c\xfe\xe1\x23\xbf\xec\x47\x96\xf4\xe5"
"\x9b\x65\x76\xac\xc8\x69\x1d\xe2\x74\xff\x4e\xa4\xcf\x02\x6d"
;
const uint8_t attestation_hacker_cert_der[] =
@ -95,12 +100,32 @@ const uint8_t attestation_hacker_cert_der[] =
const uint16_t attestation_solo_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_solo_cert_der)-1;
const uint16_t attestation_hacker_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_hacker_cert_der)-1;
// const uint16_t attestation_key_size = 32;
const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der = ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert;
#include "log.h"
uint16_t attestation_cert_der_get_size(){
uint8_t * device_get_attestation_key(){
flash_attestation_page * page =(flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR;
return page->attestation_key;
}
uint16_t device_attestation_cert_der_get_size(){
uint16_t sz = (uint16_t)((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert_size;
return sz;
}
void device_attestation_read_cert_der(uint8_t * dst){
const uint8_t * der = ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert;
uint16_t sz = device_attestation_cert_der_get_size();
memmove(dst, der, sz);
// Overwrite respective x509 fields if Tap or Somu.
if (memcmp(dst + 0x2c6, "\xea\x09\x15\x6c\x86\x48\x57\x2a\xa8\x8d", 10) == 0){
if (device_is_nfc()){
dst[0x2a2] = 0x89;//tap aaguid byte
memmove(dst + 0xac, "\x34\x33\x38\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30\x36\x39\x31\x31\x31\x38\x31\x39\x32\x34\x33\x38", 20);//tap-id
memmove(dst + 0x2c5, "\x6d\x7b\x41\x2b\xff\x57\xf0\x03\xbd\x5b\x39\x4a\xf7\xa9\x2d\x6d\xcb\x9e\x2d\x88\xbf\xb3\x93\xc5\x66\x3b\xd1\xbc\x34\xfa\x5c\x4c\x02\x20\x59\x01\x49\x39\x1b\xb7\xa9\x1c\xed\x49\x78\x4f\x92\xa9\x61\x14\xa5\x6e\x96\x3f\x29\x02\x93\xe0\x5d\xe2\x75\xd0\x60\xd9\x74\xc2", 66);//tap-sig
} else if (tsc_sensor_exists()) {
dst[0x2a2] = 0x98;//somu aaguid byte
memmove(dst + 0xac, "\x35\x30\x32\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30\x36\x39\x31\x31\x31\x38\x31\x39\x32\x35\x30\x32", 20);//somu-id
memmove(dst + 0x2c5, "\x4d\x08\xc8\x9d\xc4\x50\x49\x70\x48\x4d\xd0\x12\xd9\x7c\x62\x5e\x6b\xd3\x84\xd5\x36\x42\xfe\x86\x8e\x7a\x23\x59\xa0\x20\xf0\xc5\x02\x20\x5f\x70\x93\x61\x5a\xe4\x20\xcf\xb9\x8a\xf5\xdd\x87\xd0\x48\x6d\x7d\x59\xef\x9e\x0e\x11\xa3\x8e\xf7\xe3\xe2\xf5\x35\x37\x99\x1a", 66);//somu-sig
}
}
}

View File

@ -1,369 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2019 SoloKeys Developers
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0, <LICENSE-APACHE or
// http://apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license <LICENSE-MIT or
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
/*
* Wrapper for crypto implementation on device
*
* */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#ifdef USE_SOFTWARE_IMPLEMENTATION
#include "sha256.h"
#include "uECC.h"
#include "aes.h"
#include "ctap.h"
#include "device.h"
// stuff for SHA512
#include "sha2.h"
#include "blockwise.h"
#include APP_CONFIG
#include "log.h"
#include "memory_layout.h"
typedef enum
{
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0,
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, /*!< 192-bits NIST curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, /*!< 224-bits NIST curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, /*!< 256-bits NIST curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, /*!< 384-bits NIST curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, /*!< 521-bits NIST curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, /*!< 256-bits Brainpool curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, /*!< 384-bits Brainpool curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, /*!< 512-bits Brainpool curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, /*!< Curve25519 */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, /*!< 192-bits "Koblitz" curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, /*!< 224-bits "Koblitz" curve */
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, /*!< 256-bits "Koblitz" curve */
} mbedtls_ecp_group_id;
static SHA256_CTX sha256_ctx;
static cf_sha512_context sha512_ctx;
static const struct uECC_Curve_t * _es256_curve = NULL;
static const uint8_t * _signing_key = NULL;
static int _key_len = 0;
// Secrets for testing only
static uint8_t master_secret[64];
static uint8_t transport_secret[32];
void crypto_sha256_init(void)
{
sha256_init(&sha256_ctx);
}
void crypto_sha512_init(void)
{
cf_sha512_init(&sha512_ctx);
}
void crypto_load_master_secret(uint8_t * key)
{
#if KEY_SPACE_BYTES < 96
#error "need more key bytes"
#endif
memmove(master_secret, key, 64);
memmove(transport_secret, key+64, 32);
}
void crypto_reset_master_secret(void)
{
memset(master_secret, 0, 64);
memset(transport_secret, 0, 32);
ctap_generate_rng(master_secret, 64);
ctap_generate_rng(transport_secret, 32);
}
void crypto_sha256_update(uint8_t * data, size_t len)
{
sha256_update(&sha256_ctx, data, len);
}
void crypto_sha512_update(const uint8_t * data, size_t len) {
cf_sha512_update(&sha512_ctx, data, len);
}
void crypto_sha256_update_secret()
{
sha256_update(&sha256_ctx, master_secret, 32);
}
void crypto_sha256_final(uint8_t * hash)
{
sha256_final(&sha256_ctx, hash);
}
void crypto_sha512_final(uint8_t * hash)
{
// NB: there is also cf_sha512_digest
cf_sha512_digest_final(&sha512_ctx, hash);
}
void crypto_sha256_hmac_init(uint8_t * key, uint32_t klen, uint8_t * hmac)
{
uint8_t buf[64];
unsigned int i;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (key == CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY)
{
key = master_secret;
klen = sizeof(master_secret)/2;
}
else if (key == CRYPTO_TRANSPORT_KEY)
{
key = transport_secret;
klen = 32;
}
if(klen > 64)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, key size must be <= 64\n");
exit(1);
}
memmove(buf, key, klen);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++)
{
buf[i] = buf[i] ^ 0x36;
}
crypto_sha256_init();
crypto_sha256_update(buf, 64);
}
void crypto_sha256_hmac_final(uint8_t * key, uint32_t klen, uint8_t * hmac)
{
uint8_t buf[64];
unsigned int i;
crypto_sha256_final(hmac);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (key == CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY)
{
key = master_secret;
klen = sizeof(master_secret)/2;
}
else if (key == CRYPTO_TRANSPORT_KEY2)
{
key = transport_secret;
klen = 32;
}
if(klen > 64)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, key size must be <= 64\n");
exit(1);
}
memmove(buf, key, klen);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++)
{
buf[i] = buf[i] ^ 0x5c;
}
crypto_sha256_init();
crypto_sha256_update(buf, 64);
crypto_sha256_update(hmac, 32);
crypto_sha256_final(hmac);
}
void crypto_ecc256_init(void)
{
uECC_set_rng((uECC_RNG_Function)ctap_generate_rng);
_es256_curve = uECC_secp256r1();
}
void crypto_ecc256_load_attestation_key(void)
{
// static uint8_t _key [32];
flash_attestation_page * page =(flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR;
// memmove(_key, (uint8_t *)ATTESTATION_KEY_ADDR, 32);
_signing_key = page->attestation_key;
_key_len = 32;
}
void crypto_ecc256_sign(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * sig)
{
if ( uECC_sign(_signing_key, data, len, sig, _es256_curve) == 0)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, uECC failed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
void crypto_ecc256_load_key(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * data2, int len2)
{
static uint8_t privkey[32];
generate_private_key(data,len,data2,len2,privkey);
_signing_key = privkey;
_key_len = 32;
}
void crypto_ecdsa_sign(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * sig, int MBEDTLS_ECP_ID)
{
const struct uECC_Curve_t * curve = NULL;
switch(MBEDTLS_ECP_ID)
{
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
curve = uECC_secp192r1();
if (_key_len != 24) goto fail;
break;
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
curve = uECC_secp224r1();
if (_key_len != 28) goto fail;
break;
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
curve = uECC_secp256r1();
if (_key_len != 32) goto fail;
break;
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
curve = uECC_secp256k1();
if (_key_len != 32) goto fail;
break;
default:
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, invalid ECDSA alg specifier\n");
exit(1);
}
if ( uECC_sign(_signing_key, data, len, sig, curve) == 0)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, uECC failed\n");
exit(1);
}
return;
fail:
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, invalid key length\n");
exit(1);
}
void generate_private_key(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * data2, int len2, uint8_t * privkey)
{
crypto_sha256_hmac_init(CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY, 0, privkey);
crypto_sha256_update(data, len);
crypto_sha256_update(data2, len2);
crypto_sha256_update(master_secret, 32); // TODO AES
crypto_sha256_hmac_final(CRYPTO_MASTER_KEY, 0, privkey);
crypto_aes256_init(master_secret + 32, NULL);
crypto_aes256_encrypt(privkey, 32);
}
/*int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key, uECC_Curve curve);*/
void crypto_ecc256_derive_public_key(uint8_t * data, int len, uint8_t * x, uint8_t * y)
{
uint8_t privkey[32];
uint8_t pubkey[64];
generate_private_key(data,len,NULL,0,privkey);
memset(pubkey,0,sizeof(pubkey));
uECC_compute_public_key(privkey, pubkey, _es256_curve);
memmove(x,pubkey,32);
memmove(y,pubkey+32,32);
}
void crypto_ecc256_compute_public_key(uint8_t * privkey, uint8_t * pubkey)
{
uECC_compute_public_key(privkey, pubkey, _es256_curve);
}
void crypto_load_external_key(uint8_t * key, int len)
{
_signing_key = key;
_key_len = len;
}
void crypto_ecc256_make_key_pair(uint8_t * pubkey, uint8_t * privkey)
{
if (uECC_make_key(pubkey, privkey, _es256_curve) != 1)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, uECC_make_key failed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
void crypto_ecc256_shared_secret(const uint8_t * pubkey, const uint8_t * privkey, uint8_t * shared_secret)
{
if (uECC_shared_secret(pubkey, privkey, shared_secret, _es256_curve) != 1)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, uECC_shared_secret failed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
struct AES_ctx aes_ctx;
void crypto_aes256_init(uint8_t * key, uint8_t * nonce)
{
if (key == CRYPTO_TRANSPORT_KEY)
{
AES_init_ctx(&aes_ctx, transport_secret);
}
else
{
AES_init_ctx(&aes_ctx, key);
}
if (nonce == NULL)
{
memset(aes_ctx.Iv, 0, 16);
}
else
{
memmove(aes_ctx.Iv, nonce, 16);
}
}
// prevent round key recomputation
void crypto_aes256_reset_iv(uint8_t * nonce)
{
if (nonce == NULL)
{
memset(aes_ctx.Iv, 0, 16);
}
else
{
memmove(aes_ctx.Iv, nonce, 16);
}
}
void crypto_aes256_decrypt(uint8_t * buf, int length)
{
AES_CBC_decrypt_buffer(&aes_ctx, buf, length);
}
void crypto_aes256_encrypt(uint8_t * buf, int length)
{
AES_CBC_encrypt_buffer(&aes_ctx, buf, length);
}
#else
#error "No crypto implementation defined"
#endif

View File

@ -199,6 +199,20 @@ int solo_is_locked(){
return tag == ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG && (device_settings & SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED) != 0;
}
// Locks solo flash from debugging. Locks on next reboot.
// This should be removed in next Solo release.
void solo_lock_if_not_already() {
uint8_t buf[2048];
memmove(buf, (uint8_t*)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR, 2048);
((flash_attestation_page *)buf)->device_settings |= SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED;
flash_erase_page(ATTESTATION_PAGE);
flash_write(ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR, buf, 2048);
}
/** device_migrate
* Depending on version of device, migrates:
* * Moves attestation certificate to data segment.
@ -285,7 +299,7 @@ static void device_migrate(){
}
}
void device_init(int argc, char *argv[])
void device_init()
{
hw_init(LOW_FREQUENCY);
@ -468,20 +482,8 @@ void heartbeat(void)
}
void authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * a)
{
uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *)flash_addr(STATE1_PAGE);
memmove(a,ptr,sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
}
void authenticator_read_backup_state(AuthenticatorState * a)
{
uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *)flash_addr(STATE2_PAGE);
memmove(a,ptr,sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
}
// Return 1 yes backup is init'd, else 0
int authenticator_is_backup_initialized(void)
static int authenticator_is_backup_initialized(void)
{
uint8_t header[16];
uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *)flash_addr(STATE2_PAGE);
@ -490,20 +492,35 @@ int authenticator_is_backup_initialized(void)
return state->is_initialized == INITIALIZED_MARKER;
}
void authenticator_write_state(AuthenticatorState * a, int backup)
int authenticator_read_state(AuthenticatorState * a)
{
if (! backup)
{
flash_erase_page(STATE1_PAGE);
uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *) flash_addr(STATE1_PAGE);
memmove(a, ptr, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
flash_write(flash_addr(STATE1_PAGE), (uint8_t*)a, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
}
else
{
flash_erase_page(STATE2_PAGE);
if (a->is_initialized != INITIALIZED_MARKER){
flash_write(flash_addr(STATE2_PAGE), (uint8_t*)a, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
if (authenticator_is_backup_initialized()){
printf1(TAG_ERR,"Warning: memory corruption detected. restoring from backup..\n");
ptr = (uint32_t *) flash_addr(STATE2_PAGE);
memmove(a, ptr, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
authenticator_write_state(a);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
void authenticator_write_state(AuthenticatorState * a)
{
flash_erase_page(STATE1_PAGE);
flash_write(flash_addr(STATE1_PAGE), (uint8_t*)a, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
flash_erase_page(STATE2_PAGE);
flash_write(flash_addr(STATE2_PAGE), (uint8_t*)a, sizeof(AuthenticatorState));
}
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER)
@ -560,7 +577,11 @@ uint32_t ctap_atomic_count(uint32_t amount)
return lastc;
}
lastc += amount;
if (amount > 256){
lastc = amount;
} else {
lastc += amount;
}
if (lastc/256 > erases)
{
@ -752,11 +773,6 @@ int ctap_generate_rng(uint8_t * dst, size_t num)
}
int ctap_user_verification(uint8_t arg)
{
return 1;
}
void ctap_reset_rk(void)
{
int i;
@ -774,33 +790,28 @@ uint32_t ctap_rk_size(void)
void ctap_store_rk(int index,CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
int page_offset = (sizeof(CTAP_residentKey) * index) / PAGE_SIZE;
uint32_t addr = flash_addr(page_offset + RK_START_PAGE) + ((sizeof(CTAP_residentKey)*index) % PAGE_SIZE);
ctap_overwrite_rk(index, rk);
}
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "storing RK %d @ %04x\r\n", index,addr);
if (page_offset < RK_NUM_PAGES)
{
flash_write(addr, (uint8_t*)rk, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
//dump_hex1(TAG_GREEN,rk,sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
}
else
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Out of bounds reading index %d for rk\n", index);
}
void ctap_delete_rk(int index)
{
CTAP_residentKey rk;
memset(&rk, 0xff, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
ctap_overwrite_rk(index, &rk);
}
void ctap_load_rk(int index,CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
int page_offset = (sizeof(CTAP_residentKey) * index) / PAGE_SIZE;
uint32_t addr = flash_addr(page_offset + RK_START_PAGE) + ((sizeof(CTAP_residentKey)*index) % PAGE_SIZE);
int byte_offset_into_page = (sizeof(CTAP_residentKey) * (index % (PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(CTAP_residentKey))));
int page_offset = (index)/(PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
uint32_t addr = flash_addr(page_offset + RK_START_PAGE) + byte_offset_into_page;
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "reading RK %d @ %04x\r\n", index, addr);
if (page_offset < RK_NUM_PAGES)
{
uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *)addr;
memmove((uint8_t*)rk,ptr,sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
//dump_hex1(TAG_GREEN,rk,sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
}
else
{
@ -811,22 +822,28 @@ void ctap_load_rk(int index,CTAP_residentKey * rk)
void ctap_overwrite_rk(int index,CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
uint8_t tmppage[PAGE_SIZE];
int page_offset = (sizeof(CTAP_residentKey) * index) / PAGE_SIZE;
int page = page_offset + RK_START_PAGE;
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "overwriting RK %d\r\n", index);
int byte_offset_into_page = (sizeof(CTAP_residentKey) * (index % (PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(CTAP_residentKey))));
int page_offset = (index)/(PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "overwriting RK %d @ page %d @ addr 0x%08x-0x%08x\r\n",
index, RK_START_PAGE + page_offset,
flash_addr(RK_START_PAGE + page_offset) + byte_offset_into_page,
flash_addr(RK_START_PAGE + page_offset) + byte_offset_into_page + sizeof(CTAP_residentKey)
);
if (page_offset < RK_NUM_PAGES)
{
memmove(tmppage, (uint8_t*)flash_addr(page), PAGE_SIZE);
memmove(tmppage, (uint8_t*)flash_addr(RK_START_PAGE + page_offset), PAGE_SIZE);
memmove(tmppage + (sizeof(CTAP_residentKey) * index) % PAGE_SIZE, rk, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
flash_erase_page(page);
flash_write(flash_addr(page), tmppage, PAGE_SIZE);
memmove(tmppage + byte_offset_into_page, rk, sizeof(CTAP_residentKey));
flash_erase_page(RK_START_PAGE + page_offset);
flash_write(flash_addr(RK_START_PAGE + page_offset), tmppage, PAGE_SIZE);
}
else
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Out of bounds reading index %d for rk\n", index);
}
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "4\r\n");
}
void boot_st_bootloader(void)
@ -861,6 +878,17 @@ void boot_solo_bootloader(void)
}
void device_read_aaguid(uint8_t * dst){
uint8_t * aaguid = (uint8_t *)"\x88\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79";
memmove(dst, aaguid, 16);
if (device_is_nfc()){
dst[0] = 0x89;
}
else if (tsc_sensor_exists()){
dst[0] = 0x98;
}
dump_hex1(TAG_GREEN,dst, 16);
}
void _Error_Handler(char *file, int line)

View File

@ -146,12 +146,14 @@ void device_set_clock_rate(DEVICE_CLOCK_RATE param)
case DEVICE_LOW_POWER_IDLE:
SET_CLOCK_RATE0();
break;
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER)
case DEVICE_LOW_POWER_FAST:
SET_CLOCK_RATE1();
break;
case DEVICE_FAST:
SET_CLOCK_RATE2();
break;
#endif
}
}

View File

@ -4,105 +4,83 @@
// http://apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license <LICENSE-MIT or
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "stm32l4xx.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_gpio.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_rcc.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_system.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_pwr.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_utils.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_cortex.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_gpio.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_usart.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_bus.h"
#include "stm32l4xx_ll_usb.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "stm32l4xx_hal_pcd.h"
#include "usbd_core.h"
#include "usbd_desc.h"
#include "usbd_hid.h"
/*#include "usbd_hid.h"*/
#include APP_CONFIG
#include "flash.h"
#include "rng.h"
#include "led.h"
#include "cbor.h"
#include "device.h"
#include "ctaphid.h"
//#include "bsp.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "fifo.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ctap.h"
#include APP_CONFIG
#ifdef TEST_SOLO_STM32
#define Error_Handler() _Error_Handler(__FILE__,__LINE__)
#define PAGE_SIZE 2048
#define PAGES 128
// Pages 119-127 are data
#define COUNTER2_PAGE (PAGES - 4)
#define COUNTER1_PAGE (PAGES - 3)
#define STATE2_PAGE (PAGES - 2)
#define STATE1_PAGE (PAGES - 1)
#if !defined(TEST)
uint32_t __90_ms = 0;
#define IS_BUTTON_PRESSED() (0 == (LL_GPIO_ReadInputPort(SOLO_BUTTON_PORT) & SOLO_BUTTON_PIN))
// Timer6 overflow handler. happens every ~90ms.
void TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler()
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
// timer is only 16 bits, so roll it over here
TIM6->SR = 0;
__90_ms += 1;
}
uint8_t hidmsg[64];
uint32_t t1 = 0;
set_logging_mask(
/*0*/
//TAG_GEN|
// TAG_MC |
// TAG_GA |
TAG_WALLET |
TAG_STOR |
//TAG_NFC_APDU |
TAG_NFC |
//TAG_CP |
// TAG_CTAP|
//TAG_HID|
TAG_U2F|
//TAG_PARSE |
//TAG_TIME|
// TAG_DUMP|
TAG_GREEN|
TAG_RED|
TAG_EXT|
TAG_CCID|
TAG_ERR
);
device_init(argc, argv);
memset(hidmsg,0,sizeof(hidmsg));
uint32_t millis(void)
{
return (((uint32_t)TIM6->CNT) + (__90_ms * 90));
}
void _Error_Handler(char *file, int line)
{
while(1)
{
}
}
int main(void)
{
uint32_t i = 5;
hw_init();
LL_GPIO_SetPinMode(SOLO_BUTTON_PORT,SOLO_BUTTON_PIN,LL_GPIO_MODE_INPUT);
LL_GPIO_SetPinPull(SOLO_BUTTON_PORT,SOLO_BUTTON_PIN,LL_GPIO_PULL_UP);
flash_option_bytes_init(1);
while (1)
{
uint32_t t0 = millis() % 750;
if (! IS_BUTTON_PRESSED())
if (millis() - t1 > HEARTBEAT_PERIOD)
{
if (t0 < 750*1/3)
{
led_rgb(0 | (0 << 8) | (i << 17));
}
else if (t0 < 750*2/3)
{
led_rgb(0 | (i << 8) | (0 << 16));
}
else
{
led_rgb(i | (0 << 8) | (0 << 16));
}
heartbeat();
t1 = millis();
}
device_manage();
if (usbhid_recv(hidmsg) > 0)
{
ctaphid_handle_packet(hidmsg);
memset(hidmsg, 0, sizeof(hidmsg));
}
else
{
led_rgb(0x151515);
}
ctaphid_check_timeouts();
}
// Should never get here
usbhid_close();
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "done\n");
return 0;
}
#endif

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@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ typedef struct flash_memory_st flash_memory_st;
#include <assert.h>
static_assert(sizeof(flash_memory_st) == 256*1024, "Data structure doesn't match flash size");
#define ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG 0xaa551e78
#define ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG 0xaa551e79
struct flash_attestation_page{
uint8_t attestation_key[32];

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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
#ifndef _SOLO_H_
#define _SOLO_H_
void device_init();
void main_loop_delay();
void usbhid_init();
void usbhid_close();
int usbhid_recv(uint8_t * msg);
void heartbeat();
// Called each main loop. Doesn't need to do anything.
void device_manage();
void device_init_button();
// For Solo hacker
void boot_solo_bootloader();
void boot_st_bootloader();
void delay(uint32_t ms);
#endif

View File

@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
ecdsa
fido2
intelhex
pyserial
solo-python