limit possible recursions in tinycbor

Added Manjaro setup for passwordless and second factor login to
documentation of applcation ideas. Also did some text formating.

Makefile

@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ uncached-docker-build-toolchain:
 docker-build-all:
 	docker run --rm -v "$(CURDIR)/builds:/builds" \
 					-v "$(CURDIR):/solo" \
+					-u $(shell id -u ${USER}):$(shell id -g ${USER}) \
 				    $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) "solo/in-docker-build.sh" ${SOLO_VERSION_FULL}
 
 CPPCHECK_FLAGS=--quiet --error-exitcode=2

STABLE_VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-3.0.0
+3.1.1

docs/solo/application-ideas.md

@@ -1,16 +1,23 @@
 # Using Solo for passwordless or second factor login on Linux 
 
-## Setup on Ubuntu 18.04
+## Setup on Ubuntu and Manjaro
 Before you can use Solo for passwordless or second factor login in your Linux system you have to install some packages.
  
-This was tested under **Linux Mint 19.2**.
+This was tested on **Linux Mint 19.3** and on **Manjaro 18.x**
 
 First you have to install PAM modules for u2f.
 
+**Ubuntu (Linux Mint):**
 ```
   sudo apt install libpam-u2f pamu2fcfg
 ```
 
+**Manjaro**
+```
+  pacman -Syu pam-u2f
+```
+
+
 ## Setting up key
 To use Solo as passwordless or second factor login, you have to setup your system with your Solo.
 First create a new folder named **Yubico** in your **.config** folder in your **home** directory
@@ -28,35 +35,57 @@ If you want to register an additional key use this command instead:
   pamu2fcfg >> ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys
 ```
 Now press the button on your Solo.
+<br>
+<br>
 
-
-If you can't generate your key (error message), you may add Yubico Team from PPA and install latest libpam-u2f and pamu2fcfg and try again.
+If you can't generate your key on **Ubuntu** (error message), you may add Yubico Team from PPA and install latest libpam-u2f and pamu2fcfg and try again.
 ```
   sudo add-apt-repository ppa:yubico/stable
   sudo apt-get update
   sudo apt-get upgrade
 ```
 
+**Manjaro** should work without problems.
+
 
 ## Login into Linux
 ### Passwordless
 To login passwordless into your Linux system, you have to edit the file **lightdm** (or **gdm** or which display manager you prefered).
-In case of lightdm:
+In case of lightdm and VIM as editor:
 
 ```
-sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
+  sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
 ```
-Now search following entry:
+
+**On Ubuntu:**<br>
+Search following entry:
 ```
-@include common-auth
+  @include common-auth
 ```
 and add
 ```
-auth    sufficient      pam_u2f.so
+  auth    sufficient      pam_u2f.so
 ```
-**before** @include common-auth.
+**before** *@include common-auth.*
+<br>
+<br>
 
-Save the file and test it.<br>
+**On Manjaro**<br>
+Search following enrty
+```
+  auth    include   system-login
+```
+
+and add
+```
+  auth    sufficient    pam_u2f.so
+```
+
+** before** *auth include system-login*.
+<br>
+<br>
+
+Now save the file and test it.<br>
 Insert Solo in your USB port and logout.
 Now you should be able to login into Linux without password, only with pressing your button on Solo and press enter.
 
@@ -65,7 +94,7 @@ Why **sufficient**? The difference between the keyword sufficient and required i
 
 The login mechanism can be also used for additional features like:
 
-:  - Login after screen timeout - edit /etc/pam.d/mate-screensaver (or kde-screensaver, ...)
+  - Login after screen timeout - edit /etc/pam.d/mate-screensaver (or kde-screensaver, ...)
   - Passwordless sudo - edit /etc/pam.d/sudo
 
 Check out your folder **/etc/pam.d/** and do some experiments.
@@ -78,17 +107,36 @@ The login passwordless won't make your system more secure, but maybe more comfor
 To use Solo as second factor, for login into your Linux system, is nearly the same.
 
 ```
-sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
+  sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
 ```
-Now search following entry:
+
+**On Ubuntu**<br>
+Search following entry:
 ```
-@include common-auth
+  @include common-auth
 ```
 and add
 ```
-auth    required      pam_u2f.so
+  auth    required      pam_u2f.so
 ```
-**after** @include common-auth.
+**after** *@include common-auth*.
+<br>
+<br>
+
+**On Manjaro**<br>
+Search following entry:
+```
+  auth   include    system-login
+```
+
+Add following entry
+```
+  auth    required    pam_u2f.so
+```
+
+**after** *auth include system-login*.
+<br>
+<br>
 
 Save the file and test it. <br>
 In case your Solo is not present, your password will be incrorrect. If Solo is plugged into your USB port, it will signal pressing the button and you will be able to login into Linux.

docs/solo/customization.md

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ email=example@example.com
 openssl ecparam -genkey -name "$curve" -out root_key.pem -rand seed.bin
 
 # generate a "signing request"
-openssl req -new -key root_key.pem -out root_key.pem.csr  -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=example.com/emailAddress=$email"
+openssl req -new -key root_key.pem -out root_key.pem.csr  -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=$CN/emailAddress=$email"
 
 # self sign the request
 openssl x509 -trustout -req -days 18250  -in root_key.pem.csr -signkey root_key.pem -out root_cert.pem -sha256
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ email=example@example.com
 openssl ecparam -genkey -name "$curve" -out device_key.pem -rand seed.bin
 
 # generate a "signing request"
-openssl req -new -key device_key.pem -out device_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=example.com/emailAddress=$email"
+openssl req -new -key device_key.pem -out device_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=$CN/emailAddress=$email"
 
 # sign the request
 openssl x509 -req -days 18250  -in device_key.pem.csr -extfile v3.ext -CA root_cert.pem -CAkey root_key.pem -set_serial 01 -out device_cert.pem -sha256
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ First, [Build your solo application and bootloader](/solo/building).
 Print your attestation key in a hex string format.  Using our utility script:
 
 ```
-python tools/print_x_y.py device_key.pem
+python3 tools/gencert/print_x_y.py device_key.pem
 ```
 
 Merge the `bootloader.hex`, `solo.hex`, attestion key, and certificate into one firmware file.

docs/solo/programming.md

@@ -36,9 +36,13 @@ So it's important to not mess this up or you may brick your device.
 You can use a firmware build from the [latest release](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/releases) or use
 a build that you made yourself.
 
-You need to use a firmware file that has the combined bootloader and application (or at the very least just the bootloader).
-This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `bundle.hex` from your build.  If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader,
-it will be bricked.
+You need to use a firmware file that has the combined bootloader, application, and attestation key pair (bootloader + firmware + key).
+This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `bundle.hex` from your build.  
+
+#### *Warning*
+
+* **If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader, it will be bricked**.  
+* **If you program bootloader and firmware with no attestation, you will run into FIDO registration issues**
 
 We provide two types of bundled builds.  The `bundle-hacker-*.hex` build is the hacker build.  If you update with this,
 you will update the bootloader and application, but nothing will be secured.  The `bundle-secure-non-solokeys.hex`

fido2/ctap.c

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ uint8_t ctap_get_info(CborEncoder * encoder)
     CborEncoder map;
     CborEncoder options;
     CborEncoder pins;
+    uint8_t aaguid[16];
+    device_read_aaguid(aaguid);
 
     ret = cbor_encoder_create_map(encoder, &map, 6);
     check_ret(ret);
@@ -105,7 +107,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_get_info(CborEncoder * encoder)
         ret = cbor_encode_uint(&map, RESP_aaguid);
         check_ret(ret);
         {
-            ret = cbor_encode_byte_string(&map, CTAP_AAGUID, 16);
+            ret = cbor_encode_byte_string(&map, aaguid, 16);
             check_ret(ret);
         }
 
@@ -505,7 +507,7 @@ static int ctap_make_auth_data(struct rpId * rp, CborEncoder * map, uint8_t * au
 
         cbor_encoder_init(&cose_key, cose_key_buf, *len - sizeof(CTAP_authData), 0);
 
-        memmove(authData->attest.aaguid, CTAP_AAGUID, 16);
+        device_read_aaguid(authData->attest.aaguid);
         authData->attest.credLenL =  sizeof(CredentialId) & 0x00FF;
         authData->attest.credLenH = (sizeof(CredentialId) & 0xFF00) >> 8;
 
@@ -630,11 +632,17 @@ int ctap_calculate_signature(uint8_t * data, int datalen, uint8_t * clientDataHa
 uint8_t ctap_add_attest_statement(CborEncoder * map, uint8_t * sigder, int len)
 {
     int ret;
+    uint8_t cert[1024];
+    uint16_t cert_size = device_attestation_cert_der_get_size();
+    if (cert_size > sizeof(cert)){
+        printf2(TAG_ERR,"Certificate is too large for CTAP2 buffer\r\n");
+        return CTAP2_ERR_PROCESSING;
+    }
+    device_attestation_read_cert_der(cert);
     
     CborEncoder stmtmap;
     CborEncoder x5carr;
 
-
     ret = cbor_encode_int(map,RESP_attStmt);
     check_ret(ret);
     ret = cbor_encoder_create_map(map, &stmtmap, 3);
@@ -657,7 +665,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_add_attest_statement(CborEncoder * map, uint8_t * sigder, int len)
         ret = cbor_encoder_create_array(&stmtmap, &x5carr, 1);
         check_ret(ret);
         {
-            ret = cbor_encode_byte_string(&x5carr, attestation_cert_der, device_attestation_cert_der_get_size());
+            ret = cbor_encode_byte_string(&x5carr, cert, device_attestation_cert_der_get_size());
             check_ret(ret);
             ret = cbor_encoder_close_container(&stmtmap, &x5carr);
             check_ret(ret);

fido2/ctap.h

@@ -19,9 +19,6 @@
 #define CTAP_VENDOR_FIRST           0x40
 #define CTAP_VENDOR_LAST            0xBF
 
-// AAGUID For Solo
-#define CTAP_AAGUID                 ((uint8_t*)"\x88\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79")
-
 #define MC_clientDataHash         0x01
 #define MC_rp                     0x02
 #define MC_user                   0x03

fido2/ctap_parse.c

@@ -666,8 +666,8 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_extensions(CborValue * val, CTAP_extensions * ext)
         if (ret == CborErrorOutOfMemory)
         {
             printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, rp map key is too large. Ignoring.\n");
-            cbor_value_advance(&map);
-            cbor_value_advance(&map);
+            check_ret( cbor_value_advance(&map) );
+            check_ret( cbor_value_advance(&map) );
             continue;
         }
         check_ret(ret);
@@ -1353,11 +1353,21 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_client_pin(CTAP_clientPin * CP, uint8_t * request, int length
                 break;
             case CP_getKeyAgreement:
                 printf1(TAG_CP,"CP_getKeyAgreement\n");
+                if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) != CborBooleanType)
+                {
+                    printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting cbor boolean\n");
+                    return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
+                }
                 ret = cbor_value_get_boolean(&map, &CP->getKeyAgreement);
                 check_ret(ret);
                 break;
             case CP_getRetries:
                 printf1(TAG_CP,"CP_getRetries\n");
+                if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) != CborBooleanType)
+                {
+                    printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting cbor boolean\n");
+                    return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
+                }
                 ret = cbor_value_get_boolean(&map, &CP->getRetries);
                 check_ret(ret);
                 break;

fido2/ctaphid.c

@@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ extern void _check_ret(CborError ret, int line, const char * filename);
 
 uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE_BUFFER * wb);
 
+
+extern void solo_lock_if_not_already();
+
 uint8_t ctaphid_handle_packet(uint8_t * pkt_raw)
 {
     uint8_t cmd = 0;
@@ -635,6 +638,9 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_handle_packet(uint8_t * pkt_raw)
             status = ctap_request(ctap_buffer, len, &ctap_resp);
 
             wb.bcnt = (ctap_resp.length+1);
+            wb.cid = cid;
+            wb.cmd = cmd;
+
 
 
             timestamp();
@@ -665,6 +671,9 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_handle_packet(uint8_t * pkt_raw)
             u2f_request((struct u2f_request_apdu*)ctap_buffer, &ctap_resp);
 
             wb.bcnt = (ctap_resp.length);
+            wb.cid = cid;
+            wb.cmd = cmd;
+
 
             ctaphid_write(&wb, ctap_resp.data, ctap_resp.length);
             ctaphid_write(&wb, NULL, 0);
@@ -756,6 +765,16 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE
             return 1;
         break;
 
+        // Remove on next release
+#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && defined(SOLO)
+        case 0x99:
+            solo_lock_if_not_already();
+            wb->bcnt = 0;
+            ctaphid_write(wb, NULL, 0);
+            return 1;
+        break;
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && (defined(SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL))
         case CTAPHID_LOADKEY:
             /**

fido2/device.c

@@ -59,7 +59,10 @@ static uint8_t _attestation_cert_der[] =
 "\x06\xf1\xe3\xab\x16\x21\x8e\xd8\xc0\x14\xaf\x09\x4f\x5b\x73\xef\x5e\x9e\x4b\xe7"
 "\x35\xeb\xdd\x9b\x6d\x8f\x7d\xf3\xc4\x3a\xd7";
 
-__attribute__((weak)) const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der = _attestation_cert_der;
+
+__attribute__((weak)) void device_attestation_read_cert_der(uint8_t * dst){
+    memmove(dst, _attestation_cert_der, device_attestation_cert_der_get_size());
+}
 
 __attribute__((weak)) uint8_t * device_get_attestation_key(){
     static uint8_t attestation_key[] = 
@@ -199,3 +202,8 @@ __attribute__((weak)) void ctap_overwrite_rk(int index, CTAP_residentKey * rk)
     }
 }
 
+__attribute__((weak)) void device_read_aaguid(uint8_t * dst){
+    uint8_t * aaguid = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79";
+    memmove(dst, aaguid, 16);
+}
+

fido2/device.h

@@ -199,13 +199,21 @@ int device_is_nfc();
 */
 uint8_t * device_get_attestation_key();
 
-/** Pointer to a ASN.1/DER encoded byte array of the attestation certificate.
+/** Read the device's attestation certificate into buffer @dst.
+ * @param dst the destination to write the certificate.
+ * 
+ * The size of the certificate can be retrieved using `device_attestation_cert_der_get_size()`.
 */
-extern const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der;
+void device_attestation_read_cert_der(uint8_t * dst);
 
 /** Returns the size in bytes of attestation_cert_der.
  * @return number of bytes in attestation_cert_der, not including any C string null byte.
 */
 uint16_t device_attestation_cert_der_get_size();
 
+/** Read the device's 16 byte AAGUID into a buffer.
+ * @param dst buffer to write 16 byte AAGUID into.
+ * */
+void device_read_aaguid(uint8_t * dst);
+
 #endif

fido2/u2f.c

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static int16_t u2f_authenticate(struct u2f_authenticate_request * req, uint8_t c
 static int16_t u2f_register(struct u2f_register_request * req)
 {
     uint8_t i[] = {0x0,U2F_EC_FMT_UNCOMPRESSED};
-
+    uint8_t cert[1024];
     struct u2f_key_handle key_handle;
     uint8_t pubkey[64];
     uint8_t hash[32];
@@ -308,6 +308,11 @@ static int16_t u2f_register(struct u2f_register_request * req)
 
     const uint16_t attest_size = device_attestation_cert_der_get_size();
 
+    if (attest_size > sizeof(cert)){
+        printf2(TAG_ERR,"Certificate is too large for buffer\r\n");
+        return U2F_SW_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+    }
+
 	if ( ! ctap_user_presence_test(750))
 	{
 		return U2F_SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED;
@@ -341,7 +346,8 @@ static int16_t u2f_register(struct u2f_register_request * req)
     u2f_response_writeback(i,1);
     u2f_response_writeback((uint8_t*)&key_handle,U2F_KEY_HANDLE_SIZE);
 
-    u2f_response_writeback(attestation_cert_der,attest_size);
+    device_attestation_read_cert_der(cert);
+    u2f_response_writeback(cert,attest_size);
 
     dump_signature_der(sig);
 

fido2/version.c

@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
 #include "version.h"
 
+const version_t firmware_version 
+#ifdef SOLO
+__attribute__ ((section (".flag"))) __attribute__ ((__used__)) 
+#endif
+    =  {
+      .major = SOLO_VERSION_MAJ,
+      .minor = SOLO_VERSION_MIN,
+      .patch = SOLO_VERSION_PATCH,
+      .reserved = 0
+    };
 
-const version_t firmware_version __attribute__ ((section (".flag"))) __attribute__ ((__used__)) =  {
-  .major = SOLO_VERSION_MAJ,
-  .minor = SOLO_VERSION_MIN,
-  .patch = SOLO_VERSION_PATCH,
-  .reserved = 0
-};
 
 // from tinycbor, for a quick static_assert
 #include <compilersupport_p.h>

metadata/Solo-FIDO2-CTAP2-Authenticator.json

@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
     "authenticationAlgorithm": 1,
     "publicKeyAlgAndEncoding": 260,
     "attestationTypes": [
-        15879,
-        15880
+        15879
     ],
     "userVerificationDetails": [
         [

targets/stm32l432/bootloader/bootloader.c

@@ -50,12 +50,15 @@ typedef struct {
     uint8_t payload[255 - 10];
 } __attribute__((packed)) BootloaderReq;
 
+uint8_t * last_written_app_address = 0;
+
 /**
  * Erase all application pages. **APPLICATION_END_PAGE excluded**.
  */
 static void erase_application()
 {
     int page;
+    last_written_app_address = (uint8_t*) 0;
     for(page = APPLICATION_START_PAGE; page < APPLICATION_END_PAGE; page++)
     {
         flash_erase_page(page);
@@ -106,17 +109,20 @@ int is_bootloader_disabled()
     uint32_t * auth = (uint32_t *)(AUTH_WORD_ADDR+4);
     return *auth == 0;
 }
-uint8_t * last_written_app_address;
 
 #include "version.h"
 bool is_firmware_version_newer_or_equal()
 {
 
+    if (last_written_app_address == 0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
     printf1(TAG_BOOT,"Current firmware version: %u.%u.%u.%u (%02x.%02x.%02x.%02x)\r\n",
           current_firmware_version.major, current_firmware_version.minor, current_firmware_version.patch, current_firmware_version.reserved,
           current_firmware_version.major, current_firmware_version.minor, current_firmware_version.patch, current_firmware_version.reserved
           );
-  volatile version_t * new_version = ((volatile version_t *) last_written_app_address);
+  volatile version_t * new_version = ((volatile version_t *) (last_written_app_address-8+4));
   printf1(TAG_BOOT,"Uploaded firmware version: %u.%u.%u.%u (%02x.%02x.%02x.%02x)\r\n",
           new_version->major, new_version->minor, new_version->patch, new_version->reserved,
           new_version->major, new_version->minor, new_version->patch, new_version->reserved
@@ -170,6 +176,7 @@ int bootloader_bridge(int klen, uint8_t * keyh)
     uint32_t addr = ((*((uint32_t*)req->addr)) & 0xffffff) | 0x8000000;
 
     uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *)addr;
+    uint32_t current_address;
 
     switch(req->op){
         case BootWrite:
@@ -196,9 +203,16 @@ int bootloader_bridge(int klen, uint8_t * keyh)
                 printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, boot check bypassed\n");
                 exit(1);
             }
+            current_address = addr + len;
+            if (current_address < (uint32_t) last_written_app_address) {
+                printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, only ascending writes allowed.\n");
+                has_erased = 0;
+                return CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED;
+            }
+            last_written_app_address = (uint8_t*) current_address;
+
             // Do the actual write
             flash_write((uint32_t)ptr,req->payload, len);
-            last_written_app_address = (uint8_t *)ptr + len - 8 + 4;
             break;
         case BootDone:
             // Writing to flash finished. Request code validation.

targets/stm32l432/build/application.mk

@@ -84,4 +84,5 @@ cbor:
 	cd ../../tinycbor/ && make clean
 	cd ../../tinycbor/ && make CC="$(CC)" AR=$(AR) \
 LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS_LIB)" \
-CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Os"
+CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Os  -DCBOR_PARSER_MAX_RECURSIONS=3"
+

targets/stm32l432/src/attestation.c

@@ -5,12 +5,16 @@
 // http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
 // copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include "crypto.h"
 #include "memory_layout.h"
+#include "device.h"
+#include "sense.h"
+#include "log.h"
 
 
 const uint8_t attestation_solo_cert_der[] =
-"\x30\x82\x02\xe1\x30\x82\x02\x88\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x01\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
+"\x30\x82\x03\x03\x30\x82\x02\xaa\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x01\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
 "\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x30\x81\x80\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06"
 "\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c"
 "\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53\x6f\x6c\x6f\x20\x4b"
@@ -18,36 +22,37 @@ const uint8_t attestation_solo_cert_der[] =
 "\x41\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73"
 "\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x01\x16"
 "\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x30"
-"\x20\x17\x0d\x31\x38\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x32\x35\x32\x30\x30\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30"
-"\x36\x38\x31\x30\x32\x39\x31\x32\x35\x32\x30\x30\x5a\x30\x81\x92\x31\x0b\x30\x09"
+"\x20\x17\x0d\x31\x39\x31\x32\x30\x31\x31\x39\x32\x33\x34\x39\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30"
+"\x36\x39\x31\x31\x31\x38\x31\x39\x32\x33\x34\x39\x5a\x30\x81\x91\x31\x0b\x30\x09"
 "\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08"
-"\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53"
-"\x6f\x6c\x6f\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x22\x30\x20\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x19\x41"
-"\x75\x74\x68\x65\x6e\x74\x69\x63\x61\x74\x6f\x72\x20\x41\x74\x74\x65\x73\x74\x61"
-"\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b"
-"\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01"
-"\x09\x01\x16\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63"
-"\x6f\x6d\x30\x59\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
-"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07\x03\x42\x00\x04\x22\xfe\x0f\xb5\x2a\x78\xbe\xc6\x45\x37\x1a"
-"\x28\xa7\x57\x43\x49\xa4\x6f\x85\x4d\xca\x4e\x25\x1c\x9f\x75\x30\x3d\xbf\x10\xd5"
-"\xd2\xd2\x0b\xb9\x69\x2c\xdd\xb2\x5c\x14\xd8\x39\x85\x12\xf6\x23\xee\x91\xba\xc6"
-"\xac\xff\x4a\x1a\x27\xef\xe0\xc1\x54\x3f\xd4\xd9\xc5\xa3\x81\xdc\x30\x81\xd9\x30"
-"\x1d\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0e\x04\x16\x04\x14\x3b\xe6\xd2\xc0\x6f\xf2\xe7\xb0\x7c\x9d"
-"\x9e\x28\xc0\x20\xb0\x0d\x07\xc8\x15\xc8\x30\x81\x9f\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x81"
-"\x97\x30\x81\x94\xa1\x81\x86\xa4\x81\x83\x30\x81\x80\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55"
-"\x04\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72"
-"\x79\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53\x6f\x6c\x6f"
-"\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x10\x30\x0e\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x07\x52\x6f\x6f\x74"
-"\x20\x43\x41\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65"
+"\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x08\x53"
+"\x6f\x6c\x6f\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x22\x30\x20\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x19\x41\x75"
+"\x74\x68\x65\x6e\x74\x69\x63\x61\x74\x6f\x72\x20\x41\x74\x74\x65\x73\x74\x61\x74"
+"\x69\x6f\x6e\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65"
 "\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09"
 "\x01\x16\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f"
-"\x6d\x82\x09\x00\xc4\x47\x63\x92\x8f\xf4\xbe\x8c\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x13\x04"
-"\x02\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04\x04\x03\x02\x04\xf0\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
-"\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x03\x47\x00\x30\x44\x02\x20\x71\x10\x46\x2c\xf5"
-"\x16\x18\x97\x55\xca\x64\x50\x3b\x69\xb2\xdf\x17\x71\xab\xad\x8e\xc0\xd6\xa6\x07"
-"\x3d\x66\x8a\x3b\xbb\xfe\x61\x02\x20\x1e\x82\xef\xeb\x5e\x4e\x3a\x00\x84\x64\xd2"
-"\xf8\x84\xc3\x78\x35\x93\x63\x81\x2e\xbe\xa6\x12\x32\x6e\x29\x90\xc8\x91\x4b\x71"
-"\x52"
+"\x6d\x30\x59\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce"
+"\x3d\x03\x01\x07\x03\x42\x00\x04\x22\xfe\x0f\xb5\x2a\x78\xbe\xc6\x45\x37\x1a\x28"
+"\xa7\x57\x43\x49\xa4\x6f\x85\x4d\xca\x4e\x25\x1c\x9f\x75\x30\x3d\xbf\x10\xd5\xd2"
+"\xd2\x0b\xb9\x69\x2c\xdd\xb2\x5c\x14\xd8\x39\x85\x12\xf6\x23\xee\x91\xba\xc6\xac"
+"\xff\x4a\x1a\x27\xef\xe0\xc1\x54\x3f\xd4\xd9\xc5\xa3\x81\xff\x30\x81\xfc\x30\x1d"
+"\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0e\x04\x16\x04\x14\x3b\xe6\xd2\xc0\x6f\xf2\xe7\xb0\x7c\x9d\x9e"
+"\x28\xc0\x20\xb0\x0d\x07\xc8\x15\xc8\x30\x81\x9f\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x81\x97"
+"\x30\x81\x94\xa1\x81\x86\xa4\x81\x83\x30\x81\x80\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04"
+"\x06\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72\x79"
+"\x6c\x61\x6e\x64\x31\x12\x30\x10\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x0c\x09\x53\x6f\x6c\x6f\x20"
+"\x4b\x65\x79\x73\x31\x10\x30\x0e\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x0c\x07\x52\x6f\x6f\x74\x20"
+"\x43\x41\x31\x15\x30\x13\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x0c\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79"
+"\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d\x31\x21\x30\x1f\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x01"
+"\x16\x12\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f\x40\x73\x6f\x6c\x6f\x6b\x65\x79\x73\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d"
+"\x82\x09\x00\xc4\x47\x63\x92\x8f\xf4\xbe\x8c\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x13\x04\x02"
+"\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04\x04\x03\x02\x04\xf0\x30\x21\x06\x0b\x2b"
+"\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\xe5\x1c\x01\x01\x04\x04\x12\x04\x10\x88\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0"
+"\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79\x30\x0a\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04"
+"\x03\x02\x03\x47\x00\x30\x44\x02\x20\x4d\xea\x09\x15\x6c\x86\x48\x57\x2a\xa8\x8d"
+"\x87\xc3\xfa\xb6\x6b\x29\x9b\xfb\x8b\x4d\x4d\x29\x77\x5b\xa1\x04\x4c\x7f\x12\x8d"
+"\x71\x02\x20\x47\x4c\x3d\xb2\xa1\x74\xe3\x9c\xfe\xe1\x23\xbf\xec\x47\x96\xf4\xe5"
+"\x9b\x65\x76\xac\xc8\x69\x1d\xe2\x74\xff\x4e\xa4\xcf\x02\x6d"
 ;
 
 const uint8_t attestation_hacker_cert_der[] =
@@ -95,7 +100,6 @@ const uint8_t attestation_hacker_cert_der[] =
 const uint16_t attestation_solo_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_solo_cert_der)-1;
 const uint16_t attestation_hacker_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_hacker_cert_der)-1;
 
-const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der = ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert;
 
 uint8_t * device_get_attestation_key(){
     flash_attestation_page * page =(flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR;
@@ -106,3 +110,22 @@ uint16_t device_attestation_cert_der_get_size(){
     uint16_t sz = (uint16_t)((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert_size;
     return sz;
 }
+
+void device_attestation_read_cert_der(uint8_t * dst){
+    const uint8_t * der = ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert;
+    uint16_t sz = device_attestation_cert_der_get_size();
+    memmove(dst, der, sz);
+
+    // Overwrite respective x509 fields if Tap or Somu.
+    if (memcmp(dst + 0x2c6, "\xea\x09\x15\x6c\x86\x48\x57\x2a\xa8\x8d", 10) == 0){
+        if (device_is_nfc()){
+            dst[0x2a2] = 0x89;//tap aaguid byte
+            memmove(dst + 0xac, "\x34\x33\x38\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30\x36\x39\x31\x31\x31\x38\x31\x39\x32\x34\x33\x38", 20);//tap-id
+            memmove(dst + 0x2c5, "\x6d\x7b\x41\x2b\xff\x57\xf0\x03\xbd\x5b\x39\x4a\xf7\xa9\x2d\x6d\xcb\x9e\x2d\x88\xbf\xb3\x93\xc5\x66\x3b\xd1\xbc\x34\xfa\x5c\x4c\x02\x20\x59\x01\x49\x39\x1b\xb7\xa9\x1c\xed\x49\x78\x4f\x92\xa9\x61\x14\xa5\x6e\x96\x3f\x29\x02\x93\xe0\x5d\xe2\x75\xd0\x60\xd9\x74\xc2", 66);//tap-sig 
+        } else if (tsc_sensor_exists()) {
+            dst[0x2a2] = 0x98;//somu aaguid byte
+            memmove(dst + 0xac, "\x35\x30\x32\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x30\x36\x39\x31\x31\x31\x38\x31\x39\x32\x35\x30\x32", 20);//somu-id
+            memmove(dst + 0x2c5, "\x4d\x08\xc8\x9d\xc4\x50\x49\x70\x48\x4d\xd0\x12\xd9\x7c\x62\x5e\x6b\xd3\x84\xd5\x36\x42\xfe\x86\x8e\x7a\x23\x59\xa0\x20\xf0\xc5\x02\x20\x5f\x70\x93\x61\x5a\xe4\x20\xcf\xb9\x8a\xf5\xdd\x87\xd0\x48\x6d\x7d\x59\xef\x9e\x0e\x11\xa3\x8e\xf7\xe3\xe2\xf5\x35\x37\x99\x1a", 66);//somu-sig
+        }
+    }
+}

targets/stm32l432/src/device.c

@@ -199,6 +199,20 @@ int solo_is_locked(){
     return tag == ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG && (device_settings & SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED) != 0;
 }
 
+// Locks solo flash from debugging.  Locks on next reboot.
+// This should be removed in next Solo release.
+void solo_lock_if_not_already() {
+    uint8_t buf[2048];
+
+    memmove(buf, (uint8_t*)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR, 2048);
+
+    ((flash_attestation_page *)buf)->device_settings |= SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED;
+
+    flash_erase_page(ATTESTATION_PAGE);
+
+    flash_write(ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR, buf, 2048);
+}
+
 /** device_migrate
  * Depending on version of device, migrates:
  * * Moves attestation certificate to data segment. 
@@ -859,6 +873,17 @@ void boot_solo_bootloader(void)
 
 }
 
+void device_read_aaguid(uint8_t * dst){
+    uint8_t * aaguid = (uint8_t *)"\x88\x76\x63\x1b\xd4\xa0\x42\x7f\x57\x73\x0e\xc7\x1c\x9e\x02\x79";
+    memmove(dst, aaguid, 16);
+    if (device_is_nfc()){
+        dst[0] = 0x89;
+    }
+    else if (tsc_sensor_exists()){
+        dst[0] = 0x98;
+    }
+    dump_hex1(TAG_GREEN,dst, 16);
+}
 
 
 void _Error_Handler(char *file, int line)

targets/stm32l432/src/init.c

@@ -146,12 +146,14 @@ void device_set_clock_rate(DEVICE_CLOCK_RATE param)
         case DEVICE_LOW_POWER_IDLE:
             SET_CLOCK_RATE0();
         break;
+#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER)
         case DEVICE_LOW_POWER_FAST:
             SET_CLOCK_RATE1();
         break;
         case DEVICE_FAST:
             SET_CLOCK_RATE2();
         break;
+#endif
     }
 }
 

targets/stm32l432/src/memory_layout.h

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ typedef struct flash_memory_st flash_memory_st;
 #include <assert.h>
 static_assert(sizeof(flash_memory_st) == 256*1024, "Data structure doesn't match flash size");
 
-#define ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG      0xaa551e78
+#define ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG      0xaa551e79
 
 struct flash_attestation_page{
   uint8_t attestation_key[32];

tools/requirements.txt

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 ecdsa
-fido2
 intelhex
 pyserial
 solo-python