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24 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
eac22367db limit possible recursions in tinycbor 2020-02-27 15:28:01 -05:00
47a2b131e9 more strict checks in cbor parsing 2020-02-27 15:27:23 -05:00
aeafd09007 only use .flag section for hw builds 2020-02-17 13:41:05 -05:00
8b6148ac90 bump 3.1.1 2020-02-13 17:32:26 -05:00
15a4fdfa66 remove unused code in bootloader 2020-02-13 17:17:23 -05:00
e713daba26 add temporary command to force flash locking 2020-02-13 17:17:23 -05:00
b78f2cd2e7 keep initialize last_addr and reject if it doesnt change 2020-02-13 17:17:23 -05:00
601c98000a Correct path for gencert tools and use python3 2020-02-12 14:52:53 -05:00
ab1c9417b1 Fix certification information 2020-02-12 14:52:53 -05:00
f6d96013e1 bump 3.1.0 2020-02-06 13:41:07 -05:00
f74dba7ff0 enforce ascending writes in bootloader update 2020-02-06 13:05:57 -05:00
794accf3dc Added how to setup Manjaro 18.x.
Added Manjaro setup for passwordless and second factor login to
documentation of applcation ideas. Also did some text formating.
2020-02-06 12:47:36 -05:00
2ca0ced808 Update programming.md 2020-01-22 12:41:39 -05:00
17b430fd44 Remove stale python-fido2 dependency 2020-01-16 10:35:22 +01:00
0d4197fb2c Merge pull request #356 from jnaulty/jnaulty/no-root-artifacts
Use current user at build container runtime
2020-01-15 21:17:53 +01:00
f74a77d80b Use current user at build container runtime
Using the current user id and group removes the need to use `sudo` when
cleaning up build artifacts from the docker build stage.

Issue: #355
2020-01-06 01:55:47 -08:00
5f1d61a3ba bump 2019-12-01 18:25:45 -05:00
46f2920e63 bugfix hid cancel 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
53427c4279 update metadata statements 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
ac10933379 pin fido2 dependency 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
8a44d14fef adjust default impl 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
1d59bbfdd4 support different aaguid's in cert for different solo models 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
54c66d80b6 overwrite x509 fields for tap or somu 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
6217fc34b9 update solo_cert to include aaguid field 2019-12-01 18:09:08 -05:00
13 changed files with 149 additions and 39 deletions

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@ -100,9 +100,10 @@ uncached-docker-build-toolchain:
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION_MAJ}
docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${SOLO_VERSION_MAJ}.${SOLO_VERSION_MIN}
docker-build-all:
docker-build-all:
docker run --rm -v "$(CURDIR)/builds:/builds" \
-v "$(CURDIR):/solo" \
-u $(shell id -u ${USER}):$(shell id -g ${USER}) \
$(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) "solo/in-docker-build.sh" ${SOLO_VERSION_FULL}
CPPCHECK_FLAGS=--quiet --error-exitcode=2

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@ -1 +1 @@
3.0.0
3.1.1

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@ -1,16 +1,23 @@
# Using Solo for passwordless or second factor login on Linux
## Setup on Ubuntu 18.04
## Setup on Ubuntu and Manjaro
Before you can use Solo for passwordless or second factor login in your Linux system you have to install some packages.
This was tested under **Linux Mint 19.2**.
This was tested on **Linux Mint 19.3** and on **Manjaro 18.x**
First you have to install PAM modules for u2f.
**Ubuntu (Linux Mint):**
```
sudo apt install libpam-u2f pamu2fcfg
```
**Manjaro**
```
pacman -Syu pam-u2f
```
## Setting up key
To use Solo as passwordless or second factor login, you have to setup your system with your Solo.
First create a new folder named **Yubico** in your **.config** folder in your **home** directory
@ -28,35 +35,57 @@ If you want to register an additional key use this command instead:
pamu2fcfg >> ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys
```
Now press the button on your Solo.
<br>
<br>
If you can't generate your key (error message), you may add Yubico Team from PPA and install latest libpam-u2f and pamu2fcfg and try again.
If you can't generate your key on **Ubuntu** (error message), you may add Yubico Team from PPA and install latest libpam-u2f and pamu2fcfg and try again.
```
sudo add-apt-repository ppa:yubico/stable
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get upgrade
```
**Manjaro** should work without problems.
## Login into Linux
### Passwordless
To login passwordless into your Linux system, you have to edit the file **lightdm** (or **gdm** or which display manager you prefered).
In case of lightdm:
In case of lightdm and VIM as editor:
```
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
```
Now search following entry:
**On Ubuntu:**<br>
Search following entry:
```
@include common-auth
@include common-auth
```
and add
```
auth sufficient pam_u2f.so
auth sufficient pam_u2f.so
```
**before** @include common-auth.
**before** *@include common-auth.*
<br>
<br>
Save the file and test it.<br>
**On Manjaro**<br>
Search following enrty
```
auth include system-login
```
and add
```
auth sufficient pam_u2f.so
```
** before** *auth include system-login*.
<br>
<br>
Now save the file and test it.<br>
Insert Solo in your USB port and logout.
Now you should be able to login into Linux without password, only with pressing your button on Solo and press enter.
@ -65,7 +94,7 @@ Why **sufficient**? The difference between the keyword sufficient and required i
The login mechanism can be also used for additional features like:
: - Login after screen timeout - edit /etc/pam.d/mate-screensaver (or kde-screensaver, ...)
- Login after screen timeout - edit /etc/pam.d/mate-screensaver (or kde-screensaver, ...)
- Passwordless sudo - edit /etc/pam.d/sudo
Check out your folder **/etc/pam.d/** and do some experiments.
@ -78,17 +107,36 @@ The login passwordless won't make your system more secure, but maybe more comfor
To use Solo as second factor, for login into your Linux system, is nearly the same.
```
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
```
Now search following entry:
**On Ubuntu**<br>
Search following entry:
```
@include common-auth
@include common-auth
```
and add
```
auth required pam_u2f.so
auth required pam_u2f.so
```
**after** @include common-auth.
**after** *@include common-auth*.
<br>
<br>
**On Manjaro**<br>
Search following entry:
```
auth include system-login
```
Add following entry
```
auth required pam_u2f.so
```
**after** *auth include system-login*.
<br>
<br>
Save the file and test it. <br>
In case your Solo is not present, your password will be incrorrect. If Solo is plugged into your USB port, it will signal pressing the button and you will be able to login into Linux.

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@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ email=example@example.com
openssl ecparam -genkey -name "$curve" -out root_key.pem -rand seed.bin
# generate a "signing request"
openssl req -new -key root_key.pem -out root_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=example.com/emailAddress=$email"
openssl req -new -key root_key.pem -out root_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=$CN/emailAddress=$email"
# self sign the request
openssl x509 -trustout -req -days 18250 -in root_key.pem.csr -signkey root_key.pem -out root_cert.pem -sha256
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ email=example@example.com
openssl ecparam -genkey -name "$curve" -out device_key.pem -rand seed.bin
# generate a "signing request"
openssl req -new -key device_key.pem -out device_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=example.com/emailAddress=$email"
openssl req -new -key device_key.pem -out device_key.pem.csr -subj "/C=$country/ST=$state/O=$organization/OU=$unit/CN=$CN/emailAddress=$email"
# sign the request
openssl x509 -req -days 18250 -in device_key.pem.csr -extfile v3.ext -CA root_cert.pem -CAkey root_key.pem -set_serial 01 -out device_cert.pem -sha256
@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ First, [Build your solo application and bootloader](/solo/building).
Print your attestation key in a hex string format. Using our utility script:
```
python tools/print_x_y.py device_key.pem
python3 tools/gencert/print_x_y.py device_key.pem
```
Merge the `bootloader.hex`, `solo.hex`, attestion key, and certificate into one firmware file.

View File

@ -36,9 +36,13 @@ So it's important to not mess this up or you may brick your device.
You can use a firmware build from the [latest release](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/releases) or use
a build that you made yourself.
You need to use a firmware file that has the combined bootloader and application (or at the very least just the bootloader).
This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `bundle.hex` from your build. If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader,
it will be bricked.
You need to use a firmware file that has the combined bootloader, application, and attestation key pair (bootloader + firmware + key).
This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `bundle.hex` from your build.
#### *Warning*
* **If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader, it will be bricked**.
* **If you program bootloader and firmware with no attestation, you will run into FIDO registration issues**
We provide two types of bundled builds. The `bundle-hacker-*.hex` build is the hacker build. If you update with this,
you will update the bootloader and application, but nothing will be secured. The `bundle-secure-non-solokeys.hex`

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@ -666,8 +666,8 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_extensions(CborValue * val, CTAP_extensions * ext)
if (ret == CborErrorOutOfMemory)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, rp map key is too large. Ignoring.\n");
cbor_value_advance(&map);
cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret( cbor_value_advance(&map) );
check_ret( cbor_value_advance(&map) );
continue;
}
check_ret(ret);
@ -1353,11 +1353,21 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_client_pin(CTAP_clientPin * CP, uint8_t * request, int length
break;
case CP_getKeyAgreement:
printf1(TAG_CP,"CP_getKeyAgreement\n");
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) != CborBooleanType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting cbor boolean\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_get_boolean(&map, &CP->getKeyAgreement);
check_ret(ret);
break;
case CP_getRetries:
printf1(TAG_CP,"CP_getRetries\n");
if (cbor_value_get_type(&map) != CborBooleanType)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, expecting cbor boolean\n");
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_get_boolean(&map, &CP->getRetries);
check_ret(ret);
break;

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@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ extern void _check_ret(CborError ret, int line, const char * filename);
uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE_BUFFER * wb);
extern void solo_lock_if_not_already();
uint8_t ctaphid_handle_packet(uint8_t * pkt_raw)
{
uint8_t cmd = 0;
@ -762,6 +765,16 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE
return 1;
break;
// Remove on next release
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && defined(SOLO)
case 0x99:
solo_lock_if_not_already();
wb->bcnt = 0;
ctaphid_write(wb, NULL, 0);
return 1;
break;
#endif
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && (defined(SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL))
case CTAPHID_LOADKEY:
/**

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@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
#include "version.h"
const version_t firmware_version
#ifdef SOLO
__attribute__ ((section (".flag"))) __attribute__ ((__used__))
#endif
= {
.major = SOLO_VERSION_MAJ,
.minor = SOLO_VERSION_MIN,
.patch = SOLO_VERSION_PATCH,
.reserved = 0
};
const version_t firmware_version __attribute__ ((section (".flag"))) __attribute__ ((__used__)) = {
.major = SOLO_VERSION_MAJ,
.minor = SOLO_VERSION_MIN,
.patch = SOLO_VERSION_PATCH,
.reserved = 0
};
// from tinycbor, for a quick static_assert
#include <compilersupport_p.h>

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@ -50,12 +50,15 @@ typedef struct {
uint8_t payload[255 - 10];
} __attribute__((packed)) BootloaderReq;
uint8_t * last_written_app_address = 0;
/**
* Erase all application pages. **APPLICATION_END_PAGE excluded**.
*/
static void erase_application()
{
int page;
last_written_app_address = (uint8_t*) 0;
for(page = APPLICATION_START_PAGE; page < APPLICATION_END_PAGE; page++)
{
flash_erase_page(page);
@ -106,17 +109,20 @@ int is_bootloader_disabled()
uint32_t * auth = (uint32_t *)(AUTH_WORD_ADDR+4);
return *auth == 0;
}
uint8_t * last_written_app_address;
#include "version.h"
bool is_firmware_version_newer_or_equal()
{
if (last_written_app_address == 0) {
return false;
}
printf1(TAG_BOOT,"Current firmware version: %u.%u.%u.%u (%02x.%02x.%02x.%02x)\r\n",
current_firmware_version.major, current_firmware_version.minor, current_firmware_version.patch, current_firmware_version.reserved,
current_firmware_version.major, current_firmware_version.minor, current_firmware_version.patch, current_firmware_version.reserved
);
volatile version_t * new_version = ((volatile version_t *) last_written_app_address);
volatile version_t * new_version = ((volatile version_t *) (last_written_app_address-8+4));
printf1(TAG_BOOT,"Uploaded firmware version: %u.%u.%u.%u (%02x.%02x.%02x.%02x)\r\n",
new_version->major, new_version->minor, new_version->patch, new_version->reserved,
new_version->major, new_version->minor, new_version->patch, new_version->reserved
@ -170,6 +176,7 @@ int bootloader_bridge(int klen, uint8_t * keyh)
uint32_t addr = ((*((uint32_t*)req->addr)) & 0xffffff) | 0x8000000;
uint32_t * ptr = (uint32_t *)addr;
uint32_t current_address;
switch(req->op){
case BootWrite:
@ -196,9 +203,16 @@ int bootloader_bridge(int klen, uint8_t * keyh)
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, boot check bypassed\n");
exit(1);
}
current_address = addr + len;
if (current_address < (uint32_t) last_written_app_address) {
printf2(TAG_ERR, "Error, only ascending writes allowed.\n");
has_erased = 0;
return CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
last_written_app_address = (uint8_t*) current_address;
// Do the actual write
flash_write((uint32_t)ptr,req->payload, len);
last_written_app_address = (uint8_t *)ptr + len - 8 + 4;
break;
case BootDone:
// Writing to flash finished. Request code validation.

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@ -84,4 +84,5 @@ cbor:
cd ../../tinycbor/ && make clean
cd ../../tinycbor/ && make CC="$(CC)" AR=$(AR) \
LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS_LIB)" \
CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Os"
CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Os -DCBOR_PARSER_MAX_RECURSIONS=3"

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@ -199,6 +199,20 @@ int solo_is_locked(){
return tag == ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG && (device_settings & SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED) != 0;
}
// Locks solo flash from debugging. Locks on next reboot.
// This should be removed in next Solo release.
void solo_lock_if_not_already() {
uint8_t buf[2048];
memmove(buf, (uint8_t*)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR, 2048);
((flash_attestation_page *)buf)->device_settings |= SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED;
flash_erase_page(ATTESTATION_PAGE);
flash_write(ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR, buf, 2048);
}
/** device_migrate
* Depending on version of device, migrates:
* * Moves attestation certificate to data segment.

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@ -146,12 +146,14 @@ void device_set_clock_rate(DEVICE_CLOCK_RATE param)
case DEVICE_LOW_POWER_IDLE:
SET_CLOCK_RATE0();
break;
#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER)
case DEVICE_LOW_POWER_FAST:
SET_CLOCK_RATE1();
break;
case DEVICE_FAST:
SET_CLOCK_RATE2();
break;
#endif
}
}

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@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
ecdsa
fido2==0.7.3
intelhex
pyserial
solo-python