remove SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL default

"git describe" is used to get the version of the firmware from GIT tags ans it is used for build artifacts' names
We would prefer not to have this depency inside Docker

.all-contributorsrc

@@ -197,6 +197,16 @@
         "code",
         "doc"
       ]
+    },
+    {
+      "login": "ccinelli",
+      "name": "ccinelli",
+      "avatar_url": "https://avatars0.githubusercontent.com/u/38021940?v=4",
+      "profile": "https://github.com/ccinelli",
+      "contributions": [
+        "infra",
+        "test"
+      ]
     }
   ],
   "contributorsPerLine": 7,

.gitignore

@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@
 *.app
 *.i*86
 *.x86_64
-*.hex
+targets/*/*.hex
+targets/*/*.sha2
 
 # Debug files
 *.dSYM/

.travis.yml

@@ -6,14 +6,15 @@ addons:
     sources:
       - ubuntu-toolchain-r-test
     packages:
-      - gcc-7
+      - gcc-8
       - cppcheck
+services:
+  - docker
 before_install:
     - sudo add-apt-repository -y ppa:team-gcc-arm-embedded/ppa
     - sudo apt-get update -q
-    - sudo apt-get install -y gcc-arm-embedded
-    - sudo apt-get install -y python3-venv
+    - sudo apt-get install -y gcc-arm-embedded python3-venv
 script:
-  - export CC=gcc-7
+  - export CC=gcc-8
   - pyenv shell 3.6.7
   - make travis

Dockerfile

@@ -1,33 +1,38 @@
-FROM debian:stretch-slim
+FROM debian:9.11-slim
 MAINTAINER SoloKeys <hello@solokeys.com>
 
-RUN apt-get update -qq
-RUN apt-get install -qq bzip2 git make wget >/dev/null
+# Install necessary packages
+RUN apt-get update  \
+  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+    ca-certificates \
+    make \
+    wget \
+    bzip2 \
+    git \
+  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
-# 1. ARM GCC: for compilation
-RUN wget -q -O gcc.tar.bz2 https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/downloads/gnu-rm/8-2018q4/gcc-arm-none-eabi-8-2018-q4-major-linux.tar.bz2?revision=d830f9dd-cd4f-406d-8672-cca9210dd220?product=GNU%20Arm%20Embedded%20Toolchain,64-bit,,Linux,8-2018-q4-major
-#   from website
-RUN echo "f55f90d483ddb3bcf4dae5882c2094cd  gcc.tar.bz2" > gcc.md5
-RUN md5sum -c gcc.md5
-#   self-generated
-RUN echo "fb31fbdfe08406ece43eef5df623c0b2deb8b53e405e2c878300f7a1f303ee52  gcc.tar.bz2" > gcc.sha256
-RUN sha256sum -c gcc.sha256
-RUN tar -C /opt -xf gcc.tar.bz2
+# Install ARM compiler
+RUN set -eux; \
+	url="https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/downloads/gnu-rm/8-2019q3/RC1.1/gcc-arm-none-eabi-8-2019-q3-update-linux.tar.bz2?revision=c34d758a-be0c-476e-a2de-af8c6e16a8a2?product=GNU%20Arm%20Embedded%20Toolchain,64-bit,,Linux,8-2019-q3-update"; \
+	wget -O gcc.tar.bz2 "$url"; \
+  echo "6341f11972dac8de185646d0fbd73bfc gcc.tar.bz2" | md5sum -c -; \
+	echo "b50b02b0a16e5aad8620e9d7c31110ef285c1dde28980b1a9448b764d77d8f92 gcc.tar.bz2" | sha256sum -c -; \
+	tar -C /opt -xf gcc.tar.bz2; \
+	rm gcc.tar.bz2;
 
-# 2. Python3.7: for solo-python (merging etc.)
-RUN wget -q -O miniconda.sh https://repo.anaconda.com/miniconda/Miniconda3-4.5.12-Linux-x86_64.sh
-#   from website
-RUN echo "866ae9dff53ad0874e1d1a60b1ad1ef8  miniconda.sh" > miniconda.md5
-RUN md5sum -c miniconda.md5
-#   self-generated
-RUN echo "e5e5b4cd2a918e0e96b395534222773f7241dc59d776db1b9f7fedfcb489157a  miniconda.sh" > miniconda.sha256
-RUN sha256sum -c miniconda.sha256
+# Python3.7: for solo-python (merging etc.)
+RUN set -eux; \
+	url="https://repo.anaconda.com/miniconda/Miniconda3-4.5.12-Linux-x86_64.sh"; \
+	wget -O miniconda.sh "$url"; \
+  echo "866ae9dff53ad0874e1d1a60b1ad1ef8 miniconda.sh" | md5sum -c -; \
+	echo "e5e5b4cd2a918e0e96b395534222773f7241dc59d776db1b9f7fedfcb489157a miniconda.sh" | sha256sum -c -; \
+	bash ./miniconda.sh -b -p /opt/conda; \
+  ln -s /opt/conda/bin/python /usr/local/bin/python3; \
+  ln -s /opt/conda/bin/python /usr/local/bin/python; \
+  ln -s /opt/conda/bin/pip /usr/local/bin/pip3; \
+  ln -s /opt/conda/bin/pip /usr/local/bin/pip; \
+	rm miniconda.sh; \
+  pip install -U pip
 
-RUN bash ./miniconda.sh -b -p /opt/conda
-RUN ln -s /opt/conda/bin/python /usr/local/bin/python3
-RUN ln -s /opt/conda/bin/python /usr/local/bin/python
-RUN ln -s /opt/conda/bin/pip /usr/local/bin/pip3
-RUN ln -s /opt/conda/bin/pip /usr/local/bin/pip
-
-# 3. Source code
-RUN git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/solokeys/solo /solo --config core.autocrlf=input
+# solo-python (Python3.7 script for merging etc.)
+RUN pip install -U solo-python

Makefile

@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ else
 endif
 LDFLAGS += $(LIBCBOR)
 
-VERSION:=$(shell git describe --abbrev=0 )
 VERSION_FULL:=$(shell git describe)
+VERSION:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION_FULL)".split("-")[0])')
 VERSION_MAJ:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[0])')
 VERSION_MIN:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[1])')
 VERSION_PAT:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[2])')
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ test: venv
 	$(MAKE) clean
 	$(MAKE) -C . main
 	$(MAKE) clean
-	$(MAKE) -C ./targets/stm32l432 test PREFIX=$(PREFIX) "VENV=$(VENV)"
+	$(MAKE) -C ./targets/stm32l432 test PREFIX=$(PREFIX) "VENV=$(VENV)" VERSION_FULL=${VERSION_FULL}
 	$(MAKE) clean
 	$(MAKE) cppcheck
 
@@ -88,18 +88,30 @@ wink: venv
 fido2-test: venv
 	venv/bin/python tools/ctap_test.py
 
-DOCKER_IMAGE := "solokeys/solo-firmware:local"
-SOLO_VERSIONISH := "master"
-docker-build:
-	docker build -t $(DOCKER_IMAGE) .
+update:
+	git fetch --tags
+	git checkout master
+	git rebase origin/master
+	git submodule update --init --recursive
+
+DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE := "solokeys/solo-firmware-toolchain"
+
+docker-build-toolchain:
+	docker build -t $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) .
+	docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION}
+	docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}
+	docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}.${VERSION_MIN}
+
+uncached-docker-build-toolchain:
+	docker build --no-cache -t $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) .
+	docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION}
+	docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}
+	docker tag $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):latest $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE):${VERSION_MAJ}.${VERSION_MIN}
+
+docker-build-all: 
 	docker run --rm -v "$(CURDIR)/builds:/builds" \
-				    -v "$(CURDIR)/in-docker-build.sh:/in-docker-build.sh" \
-				    $(DOCKER_IMAGE) "./in-docker-build.sh" $(SOLO_VERSIONISH)
-uncached-docker-build:
-	docker build --no-cache -t $(DOCKER_IMAGE) .
-	docker run --rm -v "$(CURDIR)/builds:/builds" \
-				    -v "$(CURDIR)/in-docker-build.sh:/in-docker-build.sh" \
-				    $(DOCKER_IMAGE) "./in-docker-build.sh" $(SOLO_VERSIONISH)
+					-v "$(CURDIR):/solo" \
+				    $(DOCKER_TOOLCHAIN_IMAGE) "solo/in-docker-build.sh" ${VERSION_FULL}
 
 CPPCHECK_FLAGS=--quiet --error-exitcode=2
 
@@ -120,6 +132,14 @@ clean:
 full-clean: clean
 	rm -rf venv
 
+test-docker:
+	rm -rf builds/*
+	$(MAKE) uncached-docker-build-toolchain
+	# Check if there are 4 docker images/tas named "solokeys/solo-firmware-toolchain"
+	NTAGS=$$(docker images | grep -c "solokeys/solo-firmware-toolchain") && [ $$NTAGS -eq 4 ]
+	$(MAKE) docker-build-all
+
 travis:
 	$(MAKE) test VENV=". ../../venv/bin/activate;"
-	$(MAKE) black
+	$(MAKE) test-docker
+	$(MAKE) black

README.md

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-**NEW!** We launched a new tiny security key called Somu, it's live on Crowd Supply and you can [pre-order it now](https://solokeys.com/somu)!
-
-[<img src="https://miro.medium.com/max/1400/1*PnzCPLqq_5nt1gjgSEY2LQ.png" width="600">](https://solokeys.com/somu)
-
-Somu is the micro version of Solo. We were inspired to make a secure Tomu, so we took its tiny form factor, we added the secure microcontroller and firmware of Solo, et voilà! Here we have Somu.
-
 [![latest release](https://img.shields.io/github/release/solokeys/solo.svg)](https://update.solokeys.com/)
 [![Keybase Chat](https://img.shields.io/badge/chat-on%20keybase-brightgreen.svg)](https://keybase.io/team/solokeys.public)
 [![Build Status](https://travis-ci.com/solokeys/solo.svg?style=flat-square&branch=master)](https://travis-ci.com/solokeys/solo)
@@ -38,10 +32,58 @@ Check out [solokeys.com](https://solokeys.com), for options on where to buy Solo
 
 If you have a Solo for Hacker, here's how you can load your own code on it. You can find more details, including how to permanently lock it, in our [documentation](https://docs.solokeys.io/solo/building/). We support Python3.
 
+For example, if you want to turn off any blue light emission, you can edit [`led_rgb()`](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/blob/master/targets/stm32l432/src/app.h#L48) and change `LED_INIT_VALUE`
+to be a different hex color.
+
+Then recompile, load your new firmware, and enjoy a different LED color Solo.
+
+In the Hacker version, hardware is the same but the firmware is unlocked, so you can 1) load an unsigned application, or 2) entirely reflash the key. By contrast, in a regular Solo you can only upgrade to a firmware signed by SoloKeys, and flash is locked and debug disabled permanently.
+
+Hacker Solo isn't really secure so you should only use it for development. An attacker with physical access to a Solo for Hacker can reflash it following the steps above, and even a malware on your computer could possibly reflash it.
+
+## Checking out the code
 ```bash
 git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/solokeys/solo
 cd solo
+```
 
+If you forgot the `--recurse-submodules` while cloning, simply run `git submodule update --init --recursive`.
+
+`make update` will also checkout the latest code on `master` and submodules.
+
+## Checking out the code to build a specific version
+
+You can checkout the code to build a specific version of the firmware with:
+```
+VERSION_TO_BUILD=2.5.3
+git fetch --tags
+git checkout ${VERSION_TO_BUILD}
+git submodule update --init --recursive
+```
+
+## Installing the toolchain
+
+In order to compile ARM code, you need the ARM compiler and other things like bundling bootloader and firmware require the `solo-python` python package. Check our [documentation](https://docs.solokeys.io/solo/) for details
+
+## Installing the toolkit and compiling in Docker 
+Alternatively, you can use Docker to create a container with the toolchain.
+You can run:
+
+```bash
+# Build the toolchain container
+make docker-build-toolchain 
+
+# Build all versions of the firmware in the "builds" folder
+make docker-build-all
+```
+
+The `builds` folder will contain all the variation on the firmware in `.hex` files.
+
+## Build locally
+
+If you have the toolchain installed on your machine you can build the firmware with: 
+
+```bash
 cd targets/stm32l432
 make cbor
 make build-hacker
@@ -53,19 +95,6 @@ solo program aux enter-bootloader
 solo program bootloader targets/stm32l432/solo.hex
 ```
 
-Alternatively, run `make docker-build` and use the firmware generated in `/tmp`.
-
-If you forgot the `--recurse-submodules` when cloning, simply `git submodule update --init --recursive`.
-
-For example, if you want to turn off any blue light emission, you can edit [`led_rgb()`](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/blob/master/targets/stm32l432/src/app.h#L48) and change `LED_INIT_VALUE`
-to be a different hex color.
-
-Then recompile, load your new firmware, and enjoy a different LED color Solo.
-
-In the Hacker version, hardware is the same but the firmware is unlocked, so you can 1) load an unsigned application, or 2) entirely reflash the key. By contrast, in a regular Solo you can only upgrade to a firmware signed by SoloKeys, and flash is locked and debug disabled permanently.
-
-Hacker Solo isn't really secure so you should only use it for development. An attacker with physical access to a Solo for Hacker can reflash it following the steps above, and even a malware on your computer could possibly reflash it.
-
 # Developing Solo (No Hardware Needed)
 
 Clone Solo and build it
@@ -137,6 +166,7 @@ Thanks goes to these wonderful people ([emoji key](https://allcontributors.org/d
     <td align="center"><a href="http://www.schulz.dk"><img src="https://avatars1.githubusercontent.com/u/1150049?v=4" width="100px;" alt="Kim Schulz"/><br /><sub><b>Kim Schulz</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#business-kimusan" title="Business development">💼</a> <a href="#ideas-kimusan" title="Ideas, Planning, & Feedback">🤔</a></td>
     <td align="center"><a href="https://github.com/oplik0"><img src="https://avatars2.githubusercontent.com/u/25460763?v=4" width="100px;" alt="Jakub"/><br /><sub><b>Jakub</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/issues?q=author%3Aoplik0" title="Bug reports">🐛</a></td>
     <td align="center"><a href="https://github.com/jolo1581"><img src="https://avatars1.githubusercontent.com/u/53423977?v=4" width="100px;" alt="Jan A."/><br /><sub><b>Jan A.</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=jolo1581" title="Code">💻</a> <a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=jolo1581" title="Documentation">📖</a></td>
+    <td align="center"><a href="https://github.com/ccinelli"><img src="https://avatars0.githubusercontent.com/u/38021940?v=4" width="100px;" alt="ccinelli"/><br /><sub><b>ccinelli</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#infra-ccinelli" title="Infrastructure (Hosting, Build-Tools, etc)">🚇</a> <a href="https://github.com/solokeys/solo/commits?author=ccinelli" title="Tests">⚠️</a></td>
   </tr>
 </table>
 
@@ -170,7 +200,7 @@ You can buy Solo, Solo Tap, and Solo for Hackers at [solokeys.com](https://solok
 <br/>
 
 [![License](https://img.shields.io/github/license/solokeys/solo.svg)](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/blob/master/LICENSE)
-[![All Contributors](https://img.shields.io/badge/all_contributors-20-orange.svg?style=flat-square)](#contributors)
+[![All Contributors](https://img.shields.io/badge/all_contributors-21-orange.svg?style=flat-square)](#contributors)
 [![Build Status](https://travis-ci.com/solokeys/solo.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.com/solokeys/solo)
 [![Discourse Users](https://img.shields.io/discourse/https/discourse.solokeys.com/users.svg)](https://discourse.solokeys.com)
 [![Keybase Chat](https://img.shields.io/badge/chat-on%20keybase-brightgreen.svg)](https://keybase.io/team/solokeys.public)

STABLE_VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-2.5.3
+3.0.0

docs/solo/application-ideas.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# Using Solo for passwordless or second factor login on Linux 
+
+## Setup on Ubuntu 18.04
+Before you can use Solo for passwordless or second factor login in your Linux system you have to install some packages.
+
+This was tested under **Linux Mint 19.2**.
+
+First you have to install PAM modules for u2f.
+
+```
+  sudo apt install libpam-u2f pamu2fcfg
+```
+
+## Setting up key
+To use Solo as passwordless or second factor login, you have to setup your system with your Solo.
+First create a new folder named **Yubico** in your **.config** folder in your **home** directory
+
+```
+  mkdir ~/.config/Yubico
+```
+
+Then create a new key for PAM U2F module. If it is your first key you want to register use following command:
+```
+  pamu2fcfg > ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys
+```
+If you want to register an additional key use this command instead:
+```
+  pamu2fcfg >> ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys
+```
+Now press the button on your Solo.
+ 
+
+If you can't generate your key (error message), you may add Yubico Team from PPA and install latest libpam-u2f and pamu2fcfg and try again.
+```
+  sudo add-apt-repository ppa:yubico/stable
+  sudo apt-get update
+  sudo apt-get upgrade
+```
+
+
+## Login into Linux
+### Passwordless
+To login passwordless into your Linux system, you have to edit the file **lightdm** (or **gdm** or which display manager you prefered).
+In case of lightdm:
+
+```
+sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
+```
+Now search following entry:
+```
+@include common-auth
+```
+and add
+```
+auth    sufficient      pam_u2f.so
+```
+**before** @include common-auth.
+
+Save the file and test it.<br>
+Insert Solo in your USB port and logout.
+Now you should be able to login into Linux without password, only with pressing your button on Solo and press enter.
+
+Why **sufficient**? The difference between the keyword sufficient and required is, if you don't have your Solo available, you can also login, because the system falls back to password mode.
+
+
+The login mechanism can be also used for additional features like:
+
+:  - Login after screen timeout - edit /etc/pam.d/mate-screensaver (or kde-screensaver, ...)
+  - Passwordless sudo - edit /etc/pam.d/sudo
+
+Check out your folder **/etc/pam.d/** and do some experiments.
+
+**But remember:** <br>
+The login passwordless won't make your system more secure, but maybe more comfortable. If somebody have access to your Solo, this person will be also able to login into your system.
+
+
+### Solo as second factor
+To use Solo as second factor, for login into your Linux system, is nearly the same.
+
+```
+sudo vim /etc/pam.d/lightdm
+```
+Now search following entry:
+```
+@include common-auth
+```
+and add
+```
+auth    required      pam_u2f.so
+```
+**after** @include common-auth.
+
+Save the file and test it. <br>
+In case your Solo is not present, your password will be incrorrect. If Solo is plugged into your USB port, it will signal pressing the button and you will be able to login into Linux.
+
+Why **required**? If you choose the option **sufficent** your Solo is optional. You could also login without second factor if your Solo is not connected.
+
+**But remember:**<br>
+If you loose your Solo you won't be able to login into your system.

docs/solo/bootloader-mode.md

@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
 # Booting into bootloader mode
 
-You can put Solo into bootloader mode by holding down the button, and plugging in Solo.  After 2 seconds, bootloader mode will activate.
-You'll see a yellowish flashing light and you can let go of the button.
-
-Now Solo is ready to [accept firmware updates](/solo/signed-updates).  If the Solo is a secured model, it can only accept signed updates, typically in the `firmware-*.json` format.
-
-If Solo is running a hacker build, it can be put into bootloader mode on command.  This makes it easier for development.
+If you have a recent version of Solo, you can put it into bootloader mode by running this command.
 
 ```bash
 solo program aux enter-bootloader
 ```
 
+If your Solo is a bit older (<=2.5.3) You can put Solo into bootloader mode by using the button method:  
+Hold down button while plugging in Solo.  After 2 seconds, bootloader mode will activate.
+You'll see a yellowish flashing light and you can let go of the button.
+
+Now Solo is ready to [accept firmware updates](/solo/signed-updates).  If the Solo is a secured model, it can only accept signed updates, typically in the `firmware-*.json` format.
+
 # The boot stages of Solo
 
 Solo has 3 boot stages.
@@ -21,7 +22,8 @@ The first stage is the DFU (Device Firmware Update) which is in a ROM on Solo.
 This is what allows the entire firmware of Solo to be programmed.  **It's not recommended to develop for Solo using the DFU because 
 if you program broken firmware, you could brick your device**.
 
-On hacker devices, you can boot into the DFU by holding down the button for 5 seconds, when Solo is already in bootloader mode.
+On hacker/nonverifying-bootloader devices, you can boot into the DFU by holding down the button for 5 seconds, 
+when Solo is already in bootloader mode.
 
 You can also run this command when Solo is in bootloader mode to put it in DFU mode.
 
@@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ You can also run this command when Solo is in bootloader mode to put it in DFU m
 solo program aux enter-dfu
 ```
 
-Note it will stay in DFU mode until to tell it to boot again.  You can boot it again by running the following.
+Note it will stay in DFU mode until you to tell it to boot again.  You can boot it again by running the following.
 
 ```bash
 solo program aux leave-dfu

docs/solo/building.md

@@ -36,17 +36,21 @@ Enter the `stm32l4xx` target directory.
 cd targets/stm32l432
 ```
 
-Now build Solo.
+Now build the Solo application.
 
 ```
-make build-hacker
+make firmware
 ```
 
-The `build-hacker` recipe does a few things.  First it builds the bootloader, with
+The `firmware` recipe builds the solo application, and outputs `solo.hex`.  You can use this
+to reprogram any unlocked/hacker Solo model.  Note that it does not include the Solo bootloader,
+so it is not a full reprogram.
+
+<!-- First it builds the bootloader, with
 signature checking disabled.  Then it builds the Solo application with "hacker" features
 enabled, like being able to jump to the bootloader on command.  It then merges bootloader
 and solo builds into the same binary.  I.e. it combines `bootloader.hex` and `solo.hex`
-into `all.hex`.
+into `all.hex`. -->
 
 If you're just planning to do development, **please don't try to reprogram the bootloader**,
 as this can be risky if done often.  Just use `solo.hex`.
@@ -57,13 +61,13 @@ If you're developing, you probably want to see debug messages!  Solo has a USB
 Serial port that it will send debug messages through (from `printf`).  You can read them using
 a normal serial terminal like `picocom` or `putty`.
 
-Just add `DEBUG=1` or `DEBUG=2` to your build recipe, like this.
+Just add `-debug-1` or `-debug-2` to your build recipe, like this.
 
 ```
-make build-hacker DEBUG=1
+make firmware-debug-1
 ```
 
-If you use `DEBUG=2`, that means Solo will not boot until something starts reading
+If you use `debug-2`, that means Solo will not boot until something starts reading
 its debug messages.  So it basically waits to tether to a serial terminal so that you don't
 miss any debug messages.
 
@@ -78,27 +82,45 @@ solo monitor <serial-port>
 
 [See issue 62](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/issues/62).
 
-### Building a Solo release
+### Building a complete Solo build (application + bootloader + certificate)
 
-To build Solo
+To make a complete Solo build, you need to build the bootloader.  We provide
+two easy recipes:
 
-If you want to build a release of Solo, we recommend trying a Hacker build first
-just to make sure that it's working.  Otherwise it may not be as easy or possible to
-fix any mistakes.
+* `bootloader-nonverifying`: bootloader with no signature checking on updates.  I.e. "unlocked".
+* `bootloader-verifying`: bootloader with signature checking enforced on updated.  I.e. "Locked".
 
-If you're ready to program a full release, run this recipe to build.
+To be safe, let's use the `-nonverifying` build.
 
 ```
-make build-release-locked
+make bootloader-nonverifying
 ```
 
-This outputs bootloader.hex, solo.hex, and the combined all.hex.
+This outputs `bootloader.hex`.  We can then merge the bootloader and application.
 
-Programming `all.hex` will cause the device to permanently lock itself.  This means debuggers cannot be used and signature checking
-will be enforced on all future updates.
+```
+solo mergehex bootloader.hex solo.hex bundle.hex
+```
 
-Note if you program a secured `solo.hex` file onto a Solo Hacker, it will lock the flash, but the bootloader
-will still accept unsigned firmware updates.  So you can switch it back to being a hacker, but you will
-not be able to replace the unlocked bootloader anymore, since the permanently locked flash also disables the DFU.
-[Read more on Solo's boot stages](/solo/bootloader-mode).
+`bundle.hex` is our complete firmware build.  Note it is in this step that you can
+include a custom attestation certificate or lock the device from debugging/DFU.
+By default the "hacker" attestation certifcate and key is used.
+
+```
+solo mergehex  \
+    --attestation-key "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF" \
+    --attestation-cert attestation.der \
+    --lock \
+    solo.hex \
+    bootloader.hex \
+    bundle.hex
+```
+
+See [here for more information on custom attestation](/solo/customization/).
+
+If you use `--lock`, this will permanently lock the device to this new bootloader.  You
+won't be able to program the bootloader again or be able to connect a hardware debugger.
+The new bootloader may be able to accept (signed) updates still, depending on how you configured it.
+
+To learn more about normal updates or a "full" update, you should [read more on Solo's boot stages](/solo/bootloader-mode).
 

docs/solo/customization.md

@@ -114,28 +114,27 @@ If the checks succeed, you are ready to program the device attestation key and c
 
 ### Programming an attestation key and certificate
 
-Convert the DER format of the device attestation certificate to "C" bytes using our utility script.  You may first need to
-first install prerequisite python modules (`pip install -r tools/requirements.txt`).
+First, [Build your solo application and bootloader](/solo/building).
 
-```
-python tools/gencert/cbytes.py device_cert.der
-```
-
-Copy the byte string portion into the [`attestation.c` source file of Solo](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/blob/master/targets/stm32l432/src/attestation.c).  Overwrite the development or "default" certificate that is already there.
-
-Now [build the Solo firmware](/solo/building), either a secure or hacker build.  You will need to produce a `bootloader.hex` file and a `solo.hex` file.
-
-Print your attestation key in a hex string format.
+Print your attestation key in a hex string format.  Using our utility script:
 
 ```
 python tools/print_x_y.py device_key.pem
 ```
 
-Merge the `bootloader.hex`, `solo.hex`, and attestion key into one firmware file.
+Merge the `bootloader.hex`, `solo.hex`, attestion key, and certificate into one firmware file.
 
 ```
-solo mergehex --attestation-key <attestation-key-hex-string> bootloader.hex solo.hex all.hex
+solo mergehex  \
+    --attestation-key "(The 32-byte hex string extracted from device_key.pem)" \
+    --attestation-cert device_cert.der \
+    --lock \
+    solo.hex \
+    bootloader.hex \
+    bundle.hex
 ```
 
-Now you have a newly create `all.hex` file with a custom attestation key.  You can [program this `all.hex` file
+Now you have a newly created `bundle.hex` file with a custom attestation key and cert.  You can [program this `bundle.hex` file
 with Solo in DFU mode](/solo/programming#procedure).
+
+Are you interested in customizing in bulk?  Contact hello@solokeys.com and we can help.

docs/solo/programming.md

@@ -22,12 +22,11 @@ solo key update <--secure | --hacker>
 You can manually install the [latest release](https://github.com/solokeys/solo/releases), or use a build that you made.
 
 ```bash
-# If it's a hacker, it will automatically boot into bootloader mode.
 solo program bootloader <firmware.hex | firmware.json>
 ```
 
 Note you won't be able to use `all.hex` or the `bundle-*.hex` builds, as these include the solo bootloader.  You shouldn't
-risk changing the Solo bootloader unless you want to make it a secure device, or [make other customizations]().
+risk changing the Solo bootloader unless you want to make it a secure device, or [make other customizations](/solo/customization/).
 
 ## Updating a Hacker to a Secure Solo
 
@@ -38,14 +37,14 @@ You can use a firmware build from the [latest release](https://github.com/soloke
 a build that you made yourself.
 
 You need to use a firmware file that has the combined bootloader and application (or at the very least just the bootloader).
-This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `all.hex` from your build.  If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader,
+This means using the `bundle-*.hex` file or the `bundle.hex` from your build.  If you overwrite the Solo flash with a missing bootloader,
 it will be bricked.
 
 We provide two types of bundled builds.  The `bundle-hacker-*.hex` build is the hacker build.  If you update with this,
 you will update the bootloader and application, but nothing will be secured.  The `bundle-secure-non-solokeys.hex`
 is a secured build that will lock your device and it will behave just like a Secure Solo.  The main difference is that
 it uses a "default" attestation key in the device, rather than the SoloKeys attestation key.  There is no security
-concern with using our default attestation key, aside from a privacy implication that services can distinguish it from Solo Secure.
+concern with using our default attestation key, aside from a small privacy implication that services can distinguish it from Solo Secure.
 
 ### Procedure
 
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ concern with using our default attestation key, aside from a privacy implication
 
 2. Program the device
 
-        solo program dfu <bundle-secure-non-solokeys.hex | all.hex>
+        solo program dfu <bundle-secure-non-solokeys.hex | bundle.hex>
 
     Double check you programmed it with bootloader + application (or just bootloader).
     If you messed it up, simply don't do the next step and repeat this step correctly.

fido2/crypto.c

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ typedef enum
 #endif
 
 
-const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[];
+const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der;
 const uint16_t attestation_cert_der_size;
 const uint8_t attestation_key[];
 const uint16_t attestation_key_size;
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ void crypto_aes256_encrypt(uint8_t * buf, int length)
 }
 
 
-const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[] =
+const uint8_t _attestation_cert_der[] =
 "\x30\x82\x01\xfb\x30\x82\x01\xa1\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x00\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
 "\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x30\x2c\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13"
 "\x02\x55\x53\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x02\x4d\x44\x31\x10\x30\x0e"
@@ -365,9 +365,11 @@ const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[] =
 "\x7e\x74\x64\x1b\xa3\x7b\xf7\xe6\xd3\xaf\x79\x28\xdb\xdc\xa5\x88\x02\x21\x00\xcd"
 "\x06\xf1\xe3\xab\x16\x21\x8e\xd8\xc0\x14\xaf\x09\x4f\x5b\x73\xef\x5e\x9e\x4b\xe7"
 "\x35\xeb\xdd\x9b\x6d\x8f\x7d\xf3\xc4\x3a\xd7";
+const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der = (const uint8_t *)_attestation_cert_der;
 
-
-const uint16_t attestation_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_cert_der)-1;
+uint16_t attestation_cert_der_get_size(){
+    return sizeof(_attestation_cert_der)-1;
+}
 
 
 const uint8_t attestation_key[] = "\xcd\x67\xaa\x31\x0d\x09\x1e\xd1\x6e\x7e\x98\x92\xaa\x07\x0e\x19\x94\xfc\xd7\x14\xae\x7c\x40\x8f\xb9\x46\xb7\x2e\x5f\xe7\x5d\x30";

fido2/crypto.h

@@ -54,10 +54,7 @@ void crypto_reset_master_secret();
 void crypto_load_master_secret(uint8_t * key);
 
 
-extern const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[];
-extern const uint16_t attestation_cert_der_size;
-
-extern const uint8_t attestation_key[];
-extern const uint16_t attestation_key_size;
+extern const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der;
+uint16_t attestation_cert_der_get_size();
 
 #endif

fido2/ctap.c

@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_add_attest_statement(CborEncoder * map, uint8_t * sigder, int len)
         ret = cbor_encoder_create_array(&stmtmap, &x5carr, 1);
         check_ret(ret);
         {
-            ret = cbor_encode_byte_string(&x5carr, attestation_cert_der, attestation_cert_der_size);
+            ret = cbor_encode_byte_string(&x5carr, attestation_cert_der, attestation_cert_der_get_size());
             check_ret(ret);
             ret = cbor_encoder_close_container(&stmtmap, &x5carr);
             check_ret(ret);

fido2/ctaphid.c

@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE
 {
     ctap_response_init(ctap_resp);
 
-#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && (defined(SOLO_HACKER) || defined(SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL))
+#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && (defined(SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL))
     uint32_t param;
 #endif
 #if defined(IS_BOOTLOADER)
@@ -710,23 +710,20 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE
             printf1(TAG_HID,"CTAPHID_BOOT\n");
             u2f_set_writeback_buffer(ctap_resp);
             is_busy = bootloader_bridge(len, ctap_buffer);
+            wb->bcnt = 1 + ctap_resp->length;
 
             ctaphid_write(wb, &is_busy, 1);
             ctaphid_write(wb, ctap_resp->data, ctap_resp->length);
             ctaphid_write(wb, NULL, 0);
             return 1;
 #endif
-#if defined(SOLO_HACKER)
+#if defined(SOLO)
         case CTAPHID_ENTERBOOT:
             printf1(TAG_HID,"CTAPHID_ENTERBOOT\n");
             boot_solo_bootloader();
             wb->bcnt = 0;
             ctaphid_write(wb, NULL, 0);
             return 1;
-        case CTAPHID_ENTERSTBOOT:
-            printf1(TAG_HID,"CTAPHID_ENTERBOOT\n");
-            boot_st_bootloader();
-            return 1;
 #endif
 
 #if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER)
@@ -745,43 +742,55 @@ uint8_t ctaphid_custom_command(int len, CTAP_RESPONSE * ctap_resp, CTAPHID_WRITE
 
         case CTAPHID_GETVERSION:
             printf1(TAG_HID,"CTAPHID_GETVERSION\n");
-            wb->bcnt = 3;
+            wb->bcnt = 4;
             ctap_buffer[0] = SOLO_VERSION_MAJ;
             ctap_buffer[1] = SOLO_VERSION_MIN;
             ctap_buffer[2] = SOLO_VERSION_PATCH;
-            ctaphid_write(wb, ctap_buffer, 3);
+#if defined(SOLO)
+            ctap_buffer[3] = solo_is_locked();
+#else
+            ctap_buffer[3] = 0;
+#endif
+            ctaphid_write(wb, ctap_buffer, 4);
             ctaphid_write(wb, NULL, 0);
             return 1;
         break;
 
-#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && (defined(SOLO_HACKER) || defined(SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL))
+#if !defined(IS_BOOTLOADER) && (defined(SOLO_EXPERIMENTAL))
         case CTAPHID_LOADKEY:
             /**
              * Load external key.  Useful for enabling backups.
-             * bytes:            4                   96
-             * payload: | counter_increase (BE) | master_key |
+             * bytes:                   4                     4                      96
+             * payload:  version [maj rev patch RFU]| counter_replacement (BE) | master_key |
              * 
              * Counter should be increased by a large amount, e.g. (0x10000000)
              * to outdo any previously lost/broken keys.
             */
             printf1(TAG_HID,"CTAPHID_LOADKEY\n");
-            if (len != 100)
+            if (len != 104)
             {
                 printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, invalid length.\n");
                 ctaphid_send_error(wb->cid, CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_LENGTH);
                 return 1;
             }
+            param = ctap_buffer[0] << 16;
+            param |= ctap_buffer[1] << 8;
+            param |= ctap_buffer[2] << 0;
+            if (param != 0){
+                ctaphid_send_error(wb->cid, CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION);
+                return 1;
+            }
 
             // Ask for THREE button presses
             if (ctap_user_presence_test(8000) > 0)
-                if (ctap_user_presence_test(8000) > 0)
-                    if (ctap_user_presence_test(8000) > 0)
+                if (ctap_user_presence_test(2000) > 0)
+                    if (ctap_user_presence_test(2000) > 0)
                     {
-                        ctap_load_external_keys(ctap_buffer + 4);
-                        param = ctap_buffer[3];
-                        param |= ctap_buffer[2] << 8;
-                        param |= ctap_buffer[1] << 16;
-                        param |= ctap_buffer[0] << 24;
+                        ctap_load_external_keys(ctap_buffer + 8);
+                        param = ctap_buffer[7];
+                        param |= ctap_buffer[6] << 8;
+                        param |= ctap_buffer[5] << 16;
+                        param |= ctap_buffer[4] << 24;
                         ctap_atomic_count(param);
 
                         wb->bcnt = 0;

fido2/u2f.c

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static int16_t u2f_register(struct u2f_register_request * req)
     uint8_t * sig = (uint8_t*)req;
 
 
-    const uint16_t attest_size = attestation_cert_der_size;
+    const uint16_t attest_size = attestation_cert_der_get_size();
 
 	if ( ! ctap_user_presence_test(750))
 	{

in-docker-build.sh

@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
 #!/bin/bash -xe
+version=$1
 
-version=${1:-master}
-
-export PREFIX=/opt/gcc-arm-none-eabi-8-2018-q4-major/bin/
+export PREFIX=/opt/gcc-arm-none-eabi-8-2019-q3-update/bin/
 
 cd /solo/targets/stm32l432
-git fetch --tags
-git checkout ${version}
-git submodule update --init --recursive
-version=$(git describe)
+ls
 
 make cbor
 
@@ -16,13 +12,12 @@ out_dir="/builds"
 
 function build() {
     part=${1}
-    variant=${2}
-    output=${3:-${part}}
-    what="${part}-${variant}"
+    output=${2}
+    what="${part}"
 
     make full-clean
 
-    make ${what}
+    make ${what} VERSION_FULL=${version}
 
     out_hex="${what}-${version}.hex"
     out_sha2="${what}-${version}.sha2"
@@ -32,24 +27,27 @@ function build() {
     cp ${out_hex} ${out_sha2} ${out_dir}
 }
 
-build bootloader nonverifying
-build bootloader verifying
-build firmware hacker solo
-build firmware hacker-debug-1 solo
-build firmware hacker-debug-2 solo
-build firmware secure solo
-build firmware secure-non-solokeys solo
+build bootloader-nonverifying bootloader
+build bootloader-verifying bootloader
+build firmware solo
+build firmware-debug-1 solo
+build firmware-debug-2 solo
+build firmware solo
 
-pip install -U pip
-pip install -U solo-python
 cd ${out_dir}
+
 bundle="bundle-hacker-${version}"
-/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex bootloader-nonverifying-${version}.hex firmware-hacker-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
+/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex bootloader-nonverifying-${version}.hex firmware-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
 sha256sum ${bundle}.hex > ${bundle}.sha2
+
 bundle="bundle-hacker-debug-1-${version}"
-/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex bootloader-nonverifying-${version}.hex firmware-hacker-debug-1-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
-bundle="bundle-hacker-debug-2-${version}"
-/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex bootloader-nonverifying-${version}.hex firmware-hacker-debug-2-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
-bundle="bundle-secure-non-solokeys-${version}"
-/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex bootloader-verifying-${version}.hex firmware-secure-non-solokeys-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
+/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex bootloader-nonverifying-${version}.hex firmware-debug-1-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
+sha256sum ${bundle}.hex > ${bundle}.sha2
+
+bundle="bundle-hacker-debug-2-${version}"
+/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex bootloader-nonverifying-${version}.hex firmware-debug-2-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
+sha256sum ${bundle}.hex > ${bundle}.sha2
+
+bundle="bundle-secure-non-solokeys-${version}"
+/opt/conda/bin/solo mergehex --lock bootloader-verifying-${version}.hex firmware-${version}.hex ${bundle}.hex
 sha256sum ${bundle}.hex > ${bundle}.sha2

mkdocs.yml

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ nav:
     - Bootloader mode: solo/bootloader-mode.md
     - Customization: solo/customization.md
     - Solo Extras: solo/solo-extras.md
+    - Application Ideas: solo/application-ideas.md
     - Running on Nucleo32 board: solo/nucleo32-board.md
     - Signed update process: solo/signed-updates.md
     - Code documentation: solo/code-overview.md

targets/stm32l432/Makefile

@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ ifndef DEBUG
 DEBUG=0
 endif
 
-APPMAKE=build/application.mk
-BOOTMAKE=build/bootloader.mk
+VERSION_FULL?=$(shell git describe)
+APPMAKE=build/application.mk VERSION_FULL=${VERSION_FULL} 
+BOOTMAKE=build/bootloader.mk VERSION_FULL=${VERSION_FULL} 
 
 merge_hex=solo mergehex
 
@@ -12,20 +13,14 @@ merge_hex=solo mergehex
 
 # The following are the main targets for reproducible builds.
 # TODO: better explanation
-firmware-hacker:
-	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=0 EXTRA_DEFINES='-DSOLO_HACKER -DFLASH_ROP=0'
+firmware:
+	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=0 
 
-firmware-hacker-debug-1:
-	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=1 EXTRA_DEFINES='-DSOLO_HACKER -DFLASH_ROP=0'
+firmware-debug-1:
+	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=1 
 
-firmware-hacker-debug-2:
-	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=2 EXTRA_DEFINES='-DSOLO_HACKER -DFLASH_ROP=0'
-
-firmware-secure-non-solokeys:
-	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=0 EXTRA_DEFINES='-DFLASH_ROP=2'
-
-firmware-secure:
-	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=0 EXTRA_DEFINES='-DUSE_SOLOKEYS_CERT -DFLASH_ROP=2'
+firmware-debug-2:
+	$(MAKE) -f $(APPMAKE) -j8 solo.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) DEBUG=2 
 
 bootloader-nonverifying:
 	$(MAKE) -f $(BOOTMAKE) -j8 bootloader.hex PREFIX=$(PREFIX) EXTRA_DEFINES='-DSOLO_HACKER' DEBUG=0
@@ -95,7 +90,7 @@ flashboot: bootloader.hex
 	STM32_Programmer_CLI -c port=SWD -halt  -d bootloader.hex -rst
 
 flash-firmware:
-	arm-none-eabi-size -A solo.elf
+	$(SZ) -A solo.elf
 	solo program aux enter-bootloader
 	solo program bootloader solo.hex
 

targets/stm32l432/bootloader/bootloader.h

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 #define _APP_H_
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include "version.h"
-
 #define DEBUG_UART      USART1
 
 #ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
@@ -21,6 +20,7 @@
 #define BOOT_TO_DFU         0
 
 
+#define SOLO                1
 #define IS_BOOTLOADER       1
 
 #define ENABLE_U2F_EXTENSIONS
@@ -64,4 +64,9 @@ int is_authorized_to_boot();
 int is_bootloader_disabled();
 void bootloader_heartbeat();
 
+// Return 1 if Solo is secure/locked.
+int solo_is_locked();
+
+
+
 #endif

targets/stm32l432/bootloader/main.c

@@ -46,9 +46,7 @@ int main()
 {
     uint8_t hidmsg[64];
     uint32_t t1 = 0;
-#ifdef SOLO_HACKER
     uint32_t stboot_time = 0;
-#endif
     uint32_t boot = 1;
 
     set_logging_mask(
@@ -98,7 +96,6 @@ int main()
     }
 
 
-#ifdef SOLO_HACKER
     if (!is_bootloader_disabled())
     {
         stboot_time = millis();
@@ -108,7 +105,6 @@ int main()
             goto start_bootloader;
         }
     }
-#endif
 
     if (is_authorized_to_boot() && (boot || is_bootloader_disabled()))
     {
@@ -119,9 +115,8 @@ int main()
 
         printf1(TAG_RED,"Not authorized to boot (%08x == %08lx)\r\n", AUTH_WORD_ADDR, *(uint32_t*)AUTH_WORD_ADDR);
     }
-#ifdef SOLO_HACKER
     start_bootloader:
-#endif
+
     SystemClock_Config();
     init_gpio();
     init_millisecond_timer(0);

targets/stm32l432/build/bootloader.mk

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ all: $(TARGET).elf
 
 %.elf: $(OBJ)
 	$(CC) $^ $(HW) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
-	arm-none-eabi-size $@
+	$(SZ) $@
 
 %.hex: %.elf
 	$(CP) -O ihex $^ $(TARGET).hex

targets/stm32l432/build/common.mk

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ USB_LIB := lib/usbd/usbd_cdc.c lib/usbd/usbd_cdc_if.c lib/usbd/usbd_composite.c
        lib/usbd/usbd_ctlreq.c lib/usbd/usbd_desc.c lib/usbd/usbd_hid.c \
 	   lib/usbd/usbd_ccid.c
 
-VERSION:=$(shell git describe --abbrev=0 )
-VERSION_FULL:=$(shell git describe)
+VERSION_FULL?=$(shell git describe)
+VERSION:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION_FULL)".split("-")[0])')
 VERSION_MAJ:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[0])')
 VERSION_MIN:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[1])')
 VERSION_PAT:=$(shell python -c 'print("$(VERSION)".split(".")[2])')

targets/stm32l432/src/app.h

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include "version.h"
 
+#define SOLO
+
 #define DEBUG_UART      USART1
 
 #ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
@@ -46,6 +48,9 @@
 void printing_init();
 void hw_init(int lf);
 
+// Return 1 if Solo is secure/locked.
+int solo_is_locked();
+
 //#define TEST
 //#define TEST_POWER
 

targets/stm32l432/src/attestation.c

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 // copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include "crypto.h"
+#include "memory_layout.h"
 
-#ifdef USE_SOLOKEYS_CERT
 
-const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[] =
+const uint8_t attestation_solo_cert_der[] =
 "\x30\x82\x02\xe1\x30\x82\x02\x88\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x01\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
 "\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x30\x81\x80\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06"
 "\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c"
@@ -49,11 +49,8 @@ const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[] =
 "\xf8\x84\xc3\x78\x35\x93\x63\x81\x2e\xbe\xa6\x12\x32\x6e\x29\x90\xc8\x91\x4b\x71"
 "\x52"
 ;
-#else
 
-// For testing/development only
-
-const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[] =
+const uint8_t attestation_hacker_cert_der[] =
 "\x30\x82\x02\xe9\x30\x82\x02\x8e\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x01\x01\x30\x0a\x06\x08"
 "\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x30\x81\x82\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06"
 "\x13\x02\x55\x53\x31\x11\x30\x0f\x06\x03\x55\x04\x08\x0c\x08\x4d\x61\x72\x79\x6c"
@@ -94,8 +91,16 @@ const uint8_t attestation_cert_der[] =
 "\xf3\x87\x61\x82\xd8\xcd\x48\xfc\x57"
 ;
 
-#endif
 
-const uint16_t attestation_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_cert_der)-1;
+const uint16_t attestation_solo_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_solo_cert_der)-1;
+const uint16_t attestation_hacker_cert_der_size = sizeof(attestation_hacker_cert_der)-1;
+
+// const uint16_t attestation_key_size = 32;
+const uint8_t * attestation_cert_der = ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert;
+
+#include "log.h"
+uint16_t attestation_cert_der_get_size(){
+    uint16_t sz = (uint16_t)((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert_size;
+    return sz;
+}
 
-const uint16_t attestation_key_size = 32;

targets/stm32l432/src/crypto.c

@@ -194,9 +194,10 @@ void crypto_ecc256_init(void)
 
 void crypto_ecc256_load_attestation_key(void)
 {
-    static uint8_t _key [32];
-    memmove(_key, (uint8_t*)ATTESTATION_KEY_ADDR, 32);
-    _signing_key = _key;
+    // static uint8_t _key [32];
+    flash_attestation_page * page =(flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR;
+    // memmove(_key, (uint8_t *)ATTESTATION_KEY_ADDR, 32);
+    _signing_key = page->attestation_key;
     _key_len = 32;
 }
 

targets/stm32l432/src/device.c

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #define LOW_FREQUENCY        1
 #define HIGH_FREQUENCY       0
 
+#define SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED                    0x2
+
 void wait_for_usb_tether(void);
 
 
@@ -191,6 +193,98 @@ void device_init_button(void)
     }
 }
 
+int solo_is_locked(){
+    uint64_t device_settings = ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->device_settings;
+    uint32_t tag = (uint32_t)(device_settings >> 32ull);
+    return tag == ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG && (device_settings & SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED) != 0;
+}
+
+/** device_migrate
+ * Depending on version of device, migrates:
+ * * Moves attestation certificate to data segment. 
+ * * Creates locked variable and stores in data segment.
+ * 
+ * Once in place, this allows all devices to accept same firmware,
+ * rather than using "hacker" and "secure" builds.
+*/
+static void device_migrate(){
+    extern const uint16_t attestation_solo_cert_der_size;
+    extern const uint16_t attestation_hacker_cert_der_size;
+
+    extern uint8_t attestation_solo_cert_der[];
+    extern uint8_t attestation_hacker_cert_der[];
+
+    uint64_t device_settings = ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->device_settings;
+    uint32_t configure_tag = (uint32_t)(device_settings >> 32);
+
+    if (configure_tag != ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG)
+    {
+        printf1(TAG_RED,"Migrating certificate and lock information to data segment.\r\n");
+
+        device_settings = ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG;
+        device_settings <<= 32;
+
+        // Read current device lock level.
+        uint32_t optr = FLASH->OPTR;
+        if ((optr & 0xff) != 0xAA){
+            device_settings |= SOLO_FLAG_LOCKED;
+        }
+
+        uint8_t tmp_attestation_key[32];
+
+        memmove(tmp_attestation_key,
+            ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_key,
+            32);
+
+        flash_erase_page(ATTESTATION_PAGE);
+        flash_write(
+            (uint32_t)((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_key,
+            tmp_attestation_key,
+            32
+        );
+
+        // Check if this is Solo Hacker attestation (not confidential)
+        // then write solo or hacker attestation cert to flash page.
+        uint8_t solo_hacker_attestation_key[32] = "\x1b\x26\x26\xec\xc8\xf6\x9b\x0f\x69\xe3\x4f"
+                                                  "\xb2\x36\xd7\x64\x66\xba\x12\xac\x16\xc3\xab"
+                                                  "\x57\x50\xba\x06\x4e\x8b\x90\xe0\x24\x48";
+
+        if (memcmp(solo_hacker_attestation_key,
+                   tmp_attestation_key,
+                   32) == 0)
+        {
+            printf1(TAG_GREEN,"Updating solo hacker cert\r\n");
+            flash_write_dword(
+             (uint32_t)&((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert_size,
+             (uint64_t)attestation_hacker_cert_der_size
+             );
+            flash_write(
+                (uint32_t)((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert,
+                attestation_hacker_cert_der,
+                attestation_hacker_cert_der_size
+            );
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            printf1(TAG_GREEN,"Updating solo secure cert\r\n");
+            flash_write_dword(
+             (uint32_t)&((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert_size,
+             (uint64_t)attestation_solo_cert_der_size
+             );
+            flash_write(
+                (uint32_t)((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->attestation_cert,
+                attestation_solo_cert_der,
+                attestation_solo_cert_der_size
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Save / done.
+        flash_write_dword(
+            (uint32_t) & ((flash_attestation_page *)ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR)->device_settings,
+            (uint64_t)device_settings);
+    }
+}
+
 void device_init(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
 
@@ -219,6 +313,8 @@ void device_init(int argc, char *argv[])
     ctaphid_init();
     ctap_init();
 
+    device_migrate();
+
 #if BOOT_TO_DFU
     flash_option_bytes_init(1);
 #else
@@ -464,7 +560,11 @@ uint32_t ctap_atomic_count(uint32_t amount)
         return lastc;
     }
 
-    lastc += amount;
+    if (amount > 256){
+        lastc = amount;
+    } else {
+        lastc += amount;
+    }
 
     if (lastc/256 > erases)
     {

targets/stm32l432/src/flash.c

@@ -31,21 +31,18 @@ static void flash_unlock(void)
 // Locks flash and turns off DFU
 void flash_option_bytes_init(int boot_from_dfu)
 {
-#ifndef FLASH_ROP
-#define FLASH_ROP 0
-#endif
-#if FLASH_ROP == 0
     uint32_t val = 0xfffff8aa;
-#elif FLASH_ROP == 2
-    uint32_t val = 0xfffff8cc;
-#else
-    uint32_t val = 0xfffff8b9;
-#endif
 
-    if (boot_from_dfu)
-    {
+    if (boot_from_dfu){
         val &= ~(1<<27); // nBOOT0 = 0  (boot from system rom)
     }
+    else {
+        if (solo_is_locked())
+        {
+            val = 0xfffff8cc;
+        }
+    }
+
     val &= ~(1<<26); // nSWBOOT0 = 0  (boot from nBoot0)
     val &= ~(1<<25); // SRAM2_RST = 1 (erase sram on reset)
     val &= ~(1<<24); // SRAM2_PE = 1 (parity check en)

targets/stm32l432/src/memory_layout.h

@@ -17,8 +17,11 @@
 #define	COUNTER1_PAGE	(PAGES - 3)
 
 // State of FIDO2 application
-#define	STATE2_PAGE		(PAGES - 2)
-#define	STATE1_PAGE		(PAGES - 1)
+#define	STATE2_PAGE		      (PAGES - 2)
+#define	STATE1_PAGE		      (PAGES - 1)
+
+#define	STATE1_PAGE_ADDR		(0x08000000 + ((STATE1_PAGE)*PAGE_SIZE)) 
+#define	STATE2_PAGE_ADDR		(0x08000000 + ((STATE2_PAGE)*PAGE_SIZE)) 
 
 // Storage of FIDO2 resident keys
 #define RK_NUM_PAGES    10
@@ -32,8 +35,8 @@
 #define APPLICATION_START_ADDR	(0x08000000 + ((APPLICATION_START_PAGE)*PAGE_SIZE))
 
 // where attestation key is located
-#define ATTESTATION_KEY_PAGE    (PAGES - 15)
-#define ATTESTATION_KEY_ADDR    (0x08000000 + ATTESTATION_KEY_PAGE*PAGE_SIZE)
+#define ATTESTATION_PAGE        (PAGES - 15)
+#define ATTESTATION_PAGE_ADDR   (0x08000000 + ATTESTATION_PAGE*PAGE_SIZE)
 
 // End of application code.  Leave some extra room for future data storage.
 // NOT included in application
@@ -48,7 +51,6 @@
 #define BOOT_VERSION_ADDR    (0x08000000 + BOOT_VERSION_PAGE*FLASH_PAGE_SIZE + 8)
 #define LAST_PAGE       (APPLICATION_END_PAGE-1)
 
-
 struct flash_memory_st{
   uint8_t bootloader[APPLICATION_START_PAGE*2*1024];
   uint8_t application[(APPLICATION_END_PAGE-APPLICATION_START_PAGE)*2*1024-8];
@@ -65,5 +67,19 @@ typedef struct flash_memory_st flash_memory_st;
 #include <assert.h>
 static_assert(sizeof(flash_memory_st) == 256*1024, "Data structure doesn't match flash size");
 
+#define ATTESTATION_CONFIGURED_TAG      0xaa551e78
+
+struct flash_attestation_page{
+  uint8_t attestation_key[32];
+  // DWORD padded.
+  uint64_t device_settings;
+  uint64_t attestation_cert_size;
+  uint8_t attestation_cert[2048 - 32 - 8 - 8];
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+typedef struct flash_attestation_page flash_attestation_page;
+
+static_assert(sizeof(flash_attestation_page) == 2048, "Data structure doesn't match flash size");
+
 
 #endif